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The main focus of this study is to examine the modernization of the Ottoman navy 
during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz, exploring naval administration, education, and 
technology. Giving a summary of the transformation of shipbuilding technologies and 
bureaucratic institutions of the Ottoman naval forces between 1808 and 1861, it 
analyses the structure of the Ottoman navy, its level of development in comparison to 
previous periods of time, and the condition of the vessels making up the naval fleet 
from 1861 to 1876. It also intends to evaluate the character of existing administrative 
structures at the outset of Abdülaziz’s reign in 1861 and the nature of subsequent 
changes, including structural reorganization of the Imperial Naval Arsenal, the Ministry 
of Marine, and the Naval Academy, as well as advancements in military training and 
seafaring; all within the context of the impact of these changes on the military, political, 
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Throughout the nineteenth century, warship design underwent a slow transition from 
wooden sails to modern capital ships by the impact of technology on naval warfare. As 
the decade progressed after the Battle of Navarino in 1827, warships running on steam 
power were widely adopted by the major navies, and the rise of ironclads in the late 
1850s, marked the turning point both in warship construction and naval strategy as the 
dominant element of battle at sea.  
The stages of this century-lasting transformation on the Ottoman Empire are 
fairly well known to scholars. They include the age of sail that had characterized the 
period prior to 1827, the supremacy of the combination of wood and steam lasting until 
the mid-1850s and the rise of torpedo and later capital ship in the pre-dreadnought age 
between 1878 and 1905. This led the era of ironclads in the Ottoman navy—from late 
1850s to the Great Eastern Crisis of 1878—to remain shrouded in mystery, even though 
the Ottoman Navy emerged as the third greatest naval power of Europe by 1878. For 
this reason, it is a must to evaluate the naval strategy and tactics developed under the 
influence of technological innovations, by devoting special attention to the Ottoman 
naval modernization in terms of administration, education, and technology in the era of 
ironclads, which we intend to analyse in this study. Being regarded as the climax of the 
modernization attempts accelerated from the declaration of the Imperial Edict of 
Gülhane, special focus of our work will be given to the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz and 
his efforts to execute the transition of warship design from wood to iron and to develop 
a new naval system inspired by foreign agents, particularly Britain.  
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The principal reason for our emphasis on this period in particular derives from 
the significant point that even though the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz has widely been 
regarded as the period during which the most significant breakthroughs were made on 
the field of maritime development in the entire history of the Ottoman Empire, no 
academic work has been written on the topic relying on the intensive utilization of both 
Turkish and British archives.1 Despite placing the fleet among Europe’s leading naval 
powers, the era of the Sultan Abdülaziz was concluded by the treasury’s insolvency and 
the modernized navy was withdrawn to the Golden Horne and left to decay until the 
1890s. This contradiction leads this period to be considered as an era of both success 
and failure, which increases the significance of the topic as a challenging area of 
research. For this reason, a clear analysis is needed to enlighten the underlying reasons 
of the failure of the modernization attempts, which can be verified by archival evidence. 
As a result, many questions remain unanswered. What were the political forces 
that required the Ottomans to carry out a naval reformation programme from the late 
eighteenth century to the end of the Empire? Why did Britain play a significant role in 
providing assistance to Ottoman Empire, particularly after the arrival of Tanzimat? How 
was the naval administration organized after the permanent establishment of the Naval 
Board in 1845 and which auxiliary units were added to the existing administrative 
system in the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz? What was the driving force for the 
                                               
1 On taking a general look at the current historiography, it can be seen that most of the academic works 
dealing with the Ottoman Navy focus mainly on the sixteenth century, when the Ottomans effectively 
guaranteed their dominance in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, which was further consolidated by 
the Prevesa naval victory of 1538. In contrast to this, a few academic works has been written on the state 
of the navy in the Tanzimat reform era, rendering it to be a developing area of research, even though 
military reformation was conducted by the Ottoman Sultans from the late eighteenth century as the main 
solution to cease the retrogressive affairs of the state and gain back the territories lost in previous decades. 
For this purpose, a naval-oriented reform policy was followed by Sultan Selim III (1789-1807), Sultan 
Mahmud II (1808-1839), Sultan Abdülmecid (1839-1861) and Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876-1909), which 
have been studied by Zorlu, 2008; Düzcü, 2012; Bal: 2010 and Batmaz, 2002. By focusing on the naval 
modernization of Sultan Abdülaziz, our work intends to fill this gap to provide consistency for Ottoman 
naval historiography throughout the nineteenth century. 
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abolishment of the office of Kapudan Pasha and its replacement with new 
administrative system developed with the establishment of the Ministry of Marine? 
How significant was the role of British advisors commissioned in the Ottoman Navy in 
this new structuring? How efficient was the modernized navy during the Cretan 
Insurrection? How long did the naval service take and how were naval personnel 
recruited? What were the main difficulties that were encountered by marines during 
their navy service?  To what extent was the technical training improved and what sort of 
measures did the administrative units take to prevent the continuation of the dependency 
on the West? Was the Ministry of Marine able to train adequate number of officers to be 
commissioned both in the warships and Imperial arsenals? How effective were the 
technological innovations relating to armour production and naval armament in 
promoting naval modernization and how was the navy expanded? What were the main 
reasons leading Sultan Abdülaziz II to change the naval policy of the Empire and what 
caused him to withdraw the recently-constructed armoured fleet from active service for 
a period of nearly twelve years? 
Accordingly, the primary concern of this study has been to analyse why the 
naval modernization carried out in Sultan Abdülaziz’s reign proved insufficient to 
create an efficient naval force. In this context, structures of the Ottoman Navy, the 
Imperial Naval Arsenal, the Ministry of Marine and the Naval Academy have been 
evaluated in military, political and financial aspects and depending on this, the 
periodization has been determined to encompass the period between 1861 and 1876. In 
addition to this, a general assessment of the naval reforms implemented in the age of 
sail and steam between the Battle of Navarino and the Crimean War will be provided to 
leave the reader with a better appreciation of the political reasons for the need of the 
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Empire for naval modernization and each chapter regarding administration, recruitment 
of marines, training of officers and technology will have a short introductory part, 
explaining the development of naval units in the Tanzimat reform era, which will enable 
the reader to understand what needed to be reformed within the existing system 
inherited from the previous periods. It shall be useful to recall that the regulations 
prepared by the administrative units for the Ministry of Marine, the Naval Academy and 
the Imperial Naval Arsenal are our only source to see the primary tasks and 
functionality of the newly established units and practices in the reign of Sultan 
Abdülaziz and most of them have been used for the first time by this study. For this 
reason, the detailed information given regarding the content of each regulation in the 
thesis’s chapters, will enable us to follow the amendments made on the structuring of 
the naval units between 1861 and 1876 and to distinguish the newly implemented 
practices from the older ones, which also provides the most accurate and chronological 




When the available literature referring to the naval modernization of the Ottoman 
Empire in the nineteenth century is evaluated as a whole, it can be found to be far from 
satisfactory, in comparison to the quality of works that have been written until today. 
The main issue arising pertaining to the exploration of naval historiography become 
apparent when trying to access and find accurate classifications of the primary and 
archival sources, which employ a specialized naval terminology that not all researchers 
are familiar with—especially when it comes to the delicate task of accurate translation. 
Books and articles pertaining to the history of the Ottoman navy were often written by 
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the officers commissioned or retired from the Turkish Naval Forces, which creates a 
further difficulty during research. Many of the officers were semi-academic or non-
academic, meaning works drawn up by such researchers do not consider the importance 
of citing sources, giving references or compiling a comprehensive bibliography.2 
Finally, the low quantity of primary sources and the ever-repeating nature of the 
secondary literature may be considered as another limitation, equating to the continuing 
difficulties experienced by researchers. 
 For our research, we will start the assessment of the available literature with the 
archival sources, which have the most valuable data for this study. These were obtained 
from the Prime Ministerial Ottoman Archive, the Istanbul Naval Museum 
Commandership Archive, and the National Archives of Great Britain. During the 
sixteen year reign of Sultan Abdülaziz, one of the most remarkable changes 
implemented was the abolishment of the Office of Kapudan Pasha and the 
establishment of the Ministry of Marine in 1867, which gave a more institutionalized 
framework to naval affairs. Therefore, while the naval documents dated until 1867 are 
kept in the Prime Ministerial Ottoman Archive, the rest dated after 1867 are mainly 
preserved by the Istanbul Naval Museum Commandership. As will be mentioned in the 
main body of this dissertation, acceleration can be observed in the implementation of 
the naval reforms after the foundation of the Ministry, and for this reason, the 
catalogues within the body of the Istanbul Naval Museum Commandership Archive 
include the most important archival data for our research. At this point, it shall be useful 
to reiterate that accessing most of the classifications preserved in this archive is not 
permitted, and most of the documents we used for our research were obtained by special 
                                               
2 Zorlu, 2004: 299. 
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permission. In other words, they have been used for the first time in this study. Among 
them, the Şura-yı Bahriye3 (the Naval Council) classification became a prominently 
used source, as it contains valuable data to show the functioning of the naval 
administration and the decision-making mechanism between the Ministry and the 
members of the Naval Board. It can be also observed that all the new regulations 
prepared by the Naval Board regarding the administration of the Ottoman Navy were 
included in the defters, preserved by the Şura-yı Bahriye registers. The catalogue of 
Mektepler (the Schools) focusses on the issues regarding the structuring and the 
operation of the naval training, which provides broader knowledge on the selection of 
naval cadets; the departments of the Naval Academy; the training specially arranged, 
and advanced for the Ottoman navy during the same period. Fiscal registers—called the 
Muhasebe classification—were useful to have a better understanding on the financial 
management and the distribution of the allocations reserved for the naval treasury from 
the state’s budget. The process to procure raw materials, necessary for the naval works 
to be carried out in the Imperial arsenals, can be also observed from the documents 
presented by the fiscal registers. In addition to those, Tersane (the Arsenal) and Mektubi 
(the Chief Secretariat) registers shed light onto such matters as the manufacturing and 
construction activities, and the division of workforce commissioned in the Imperial 
Naval Arsenal. 
 Contrary to the data preserved by the abovementioned catalogues, registers 
within the body of the Prime Ministerial Archive do not have chronologically ordered 
recordings for our research. Among them, decrees for the Dahiliye Nezareti (the Interior 
Ministry), papers of the Amedi Mektubi Kalemi Mühimme (the Chief Secretariat), 
                                               
3 The name of the Naval Board, which was the main unit to negotiate all the affairs relating to the 




Ayniyat Defters which included the correspondence between the Ministry, and the 
Office of Grand Vizier and Decrees for the Meclis-i Mahsus (the Special Council), were 
invaluable as they contained important information concerning the advancements 
observed in the naval service and recruitment. To observe the effect of the British 
mission over the naval modernization of the Ottoman Empire, the Admiralty records 
preserved by the National Archives of Britain provide chronologically ordered 
information regarding the name and profession of British officers, and workers who 
entered the service of the Ottoman navy during the same period. The data obtained from 
the registers of the Board of Admiralty also includes comments and correspondence 
between the Foreign Office and the British Embassy in Istanbul, which gives insight 
into the British point of view on the subject of the development of the naval schools, 
naval industry, and shipbuilding activities. 
 The most important primary sources of this study were found to be the memoirs 
of officers commissioned in the Ottoman navy; papers published between 1861 and 
1876 and books written by the officers regarding every aspect of the naval history of the 
Empire. For our research in the first category, we examined Sketches From My Life 
written by Augustus Charles Hobart Hampden—known as Hobart Pasha—who entered 
the service of the Ottoman navy in 1867 and played an active role in the implementation 
of naval reforms as the president of the Naval Reforms Commission. We also referred 
to Spunyarn From the Strands of a Sailor’s Life Afloat and Ashore, Forthy Seven Years 
Under the Ensigns of Great Britain and Turkey, written by Henry Felix Woods Pasha as 
the navigation instructor of the Naval Academy, which included his personal 
observations on the development of naval training, and also the British influences over 
the Imperial Naval Arsenal. In addition to those, the memoirs of Süleyman Nutku Bey 
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presented in the books called Bahriye Kur’a Neferi and Süleyman Nutki Bey’in 
Hatıraları, made apparent the difficulties in the implementation of naval modernization, 
particularly in the practical training of cadets, between 1873 and 1874 from the personal 
observations of a naval student. Being the first military newspaper of the Ottoman 
Empire, Ceride-i Askeriye is a valuable source for all researchers as all kinds of official 
and unofficial activities carried out by the army and navy forces of the Empire were 
recorded week-by-week in this official army gazette. In the last category, Bahriyemiz 
Tarihinden Filasalar, written by Safvet Bey—a naval officer in the reign of Sultan 
Abdülhamid II—according partially to official documents explains the early 
development of the naval administration and also the preparatory phase of naval 
training. The second volume of Mahmud Şevket Pasha’s Osmanlı Teşkilat ve Kıyafeti 
Askeriyesi is another important primary source dealing with the development phases of 
the naval service and the application of the conscription law specially arranged for the 
land army to the naval recruitment and its consequences.  
As for secondary sources, we referred to İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı’s Osmanlı 
Devleti’nin Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilatı and İdris Bostan’s 17. Yüzyılda Tersane-i 
Amire are widely references by naval historians who intend to examine the structuring 
of the naval organization in the classical period. In particular, Bostan’s book is widely 
used as a general reference book for dealing with the types and features of vessels in the 
age of sail, the administration of the Imperial Naval Arsenal, the materials used in the 
shipbuilding activities, and the equipment necessary for the usage of crews on board. 
Furthermore, Afif Büyüktuğrul’s Osmanlı Deniz Harp Tarihi ve Cumhuriyet 
Donanması and Nejat Gülen’s Şanlı Bahriye 1773-1973 are semi-academic works, 
which were evaluated in the first phase of our research to gain an understanding into 
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general framework of the subject. Covering mainly the evolution of naval 
administration, Bahriye’de Yapılan Islahat Hareketleri ve Bahriye Nezareti’nin 
Kuruluşu, written by Ali İhsan Gencer, presents useful information to follow the 
development phases of the naval decision-making mechanism. Although Gencer’s work 
gives some details of the advancements observed in naval training and technology, its 
content mainly deals with the period before Sultan Abdülaziz’s accession to the throne, 
as can be seen in its last chapter that covers the naval administration between 1861 and 
1867. This chapter consists largely of a summary giving the names and short description 
of the administrative units. For this reason, the main benefit of this research is that it 
provides an opportunity for our work to make a comparison between the new 
administrative system established in the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz and the institutional 
structuring of previous periods. In addition to this, the same author’s article, titled 
Osmanlı Bahriyesinde Islahat ve Bahriye Neareti’nin Kuruluşu, provides a short 
summary of the aforementioned book, but it does not include detailed information for 
our research period.  
Among other works specifically written to examine the Ottoman naval forces 
from 1861 to 1867, Emin Yakıtal’s article titled Abdülaziz Dönemi’ne Dair Bir 
İnceleme summarizes the effect of the state’s political conjuncture on the formation of 
the naval reforms and, a small-scale list of the vessels, which constituted the naval fleet 
and the main reasons for the failure of the Sultan Abdülaziz’s naval policy according to 
the information provided by the secondary sources. Celalettin Yavuz’s Sultan Abdülaziz 
Donanması-Yelkenli Teknelerden Buhar Makineli Gemilere Geçiş, Bitmeyen Reform 
İhtiyaçları is another article which was written for the short evaluation of the phases of 
naval modernization and the process that dragged the treasury into bankruptcy. In 
10 
 
Sultan Abdülaziz’den I. Dünya Savaşı’na Kadar Osmanlı Donanması, written by 
Mehmet Beşirli, the condition of the naval fleet is briefly mentioned based on the 
information obtained from the secondary literature. Tuncay Zorlu’s article titled Bahriye  
Nezareti’nin Kuruluşu ve Abdülaziz Dönemi’nde Osmanlı Denizciliği is another 
summary of the secondary sources regarding the foundation of the Ministry of Marine, 
the naval training and some technological innovations carried out in the Imperial Naval 
Arsenal.  
Enver Ziya Karal’s Osmanlı Tarihi, Islahat Fermanı Devri (1861-1876) is a 
volume of a well-known general reference book published by the Turkish Historical 
Foundation, and focuses mainly on the political developments. In this work only a few 
pages were reserved for the development of the Ottoman navy in the same period. It 
contains figures regarding the number of the vessels that constituted the Ottoman navy, 
and the number of personnel commissioned in the naval fleet presented in the relevant 
section, leading it to be widely used by many researchers despite the fact that a 
reference—which would show where this information derived from—was not given by 
the author. Based mainly on the secondary literature and French and British archival 
documents, Daniel Panzac’s work titled La Marine Ottomane: De I’apogée à la chute 
de I’Empire (1572-1923) is an important reference book dealing with the maritime 
history of the Ottoman navy between the sixteenth and twentieth centuries. In the 
relevant section of chapter eight, the book presents summarized information on the 
modernization of the Ottoman navy in terms of advancements observed in the naval 
technology, and also training provided for the naval officers. Another important 
reference source is The Ottoman Steam Navy 1828-1923, written by Bernd 
Langensiepen and Ahmet Güleryüz, which examines the technological characteristics of 
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warships and steamers commissioned in the Ottoman Navy with visual materials. 
Tuncay Zorlu’s Innovation and Empire in Turkey: Sultan Selim III and the 
Modernization of the Ottoman Navy mainly deals with the development in naval 
technology, such as the adaptation of copper sheathing of the hulls of vessels; naval 
equipment introduced to the traditional Ottoman shipbuilding methods and its 
application; the primary materials necessary for the construction activities, and the 
construction of the first drydock in the Imperial Naval Arsenal based on rich archival 
sources.  
The age of steamships in the Ottoman navy started with the introduction of 
steam power in Ottoman shipbuilding technology, after the destruction of the Ottoman 
squadron anchored in the Port of Navarino in 1827. In this area of research, Nurcan 
Bal’s master’s thesis titled XIX. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Bahriyesi’nde Gemi İnşa 
Teknolojisinde Değişim: Buharlı Gemiler Dönemi and Levent Düzcü’s PhD dissertation 
titled Yelkenliden Buharlıya Geçişte Osmanlı Denizciliği (1825-1855) became 
important academic works, which mainly examine the type and quantity of steamers 
commissioned in the naval fleet and the application of steam power to shipbuilding 
technology. Another such useful PhD dissertation is Şakir Batmaz’s II. Abdülhamid 
Devri Osmanlı Donanması, which focuses on the institutional development of the naval 
administration and training in the same period. This work is an important source in 
helping to understand Sultan Abdülhamid’s approach on the functionality of the 
Ottoman navy right after the implementation of the comprehensive naval modernization 
carried out in the period of Sultan Abdülaziz. 
Having evaluated the available literature for our research, our work aims to 
analyse the modernization of the Ottoman navy in the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz, 
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particularly by the intensive utilization of archival sources preserved in the 
aforementioned Turkish and British Archives. Although key arguments will be 
presented by separate introductions at the beginning of each chapter, it will be useful to 
give a brief description of thesis’s chapters for informing the reader on the structure of 
the study. Accordingly, the first chapter starts with a general assessment of the naval 
reformation in the age of sail and steam, and the effects of the political developments 
between 1808 and 1861 to evaluate the need of the Empire for naval modernization.  
As the existing system was subjected to a series of amendments after the 
establishment of the Ministry Marine, we will examine the naval administrative system 
of the Sultan Abdülaziz’s reign in two periods as 1861-1867 and 1867-1876. Presenting 
an evaluation of the naval administrative system, which was gradually improved in the 
Tanzimat reform era, the administrative reforms which deeply affected the 
reorganization of the Navy between 1861 and 1867 will be analysed in the second 
chapter. In the third chapter, second phase of the naval administration and the 
structuring of the auxiliary units will be examined by focusing on the abolishment of the 
Office of Kapudan Pasha and the establishment of the Ministry of Marine. Considering 
the effects of the British advisors commissioned in the Ottoman navy in the same 
period, the role of the British mission over the naval modernization will also be detailed 
in the same chapter.  
The main focus will be given to the naval service and the recruitment of marines 
in the fourth chapter, which covers also the development of technical education, and the 
naval industry corps established as a solution for decreasing the number of foreign 




In the fifth chapter, the modernization of naval education will be examined by 
focusing on the Naval Academy and developments in the required training of naval 
officers. Giving a summary of the existing training methods inherited from the previous 
period, conditions for the student admission, the number of students and alterations 
made in the student placement quotas from 1861 to 1876, the length of education, the 
curriculum of the Naval Academy and the practical training of cadets will be detailed by 
separate sections. 
In the final chapter, which covers firstly the organization and structure of the 
Imperial Naval Arsenal, the construction of dry dock number one, the foreign and local 
workforce and their working conditions together with the manufacturing and 
construction stations, the rise of iron in warship design and its impact on the 
modernization of the naval fleet, the cost of the naval modernization and the state of the 














CHAPTER 1. THE EVOLUTION OF THE OTTOMAN NAVAL 





In the nineteenth century, the most important development affecting the maritime policy 
of the Ottoman Empire was the Industrial Revolution and the beginning of the usage of 
steam power in shipbuilding. With the arrival of the steam engine, which was invented 
by James Watt in 1775, industrialization movements began to spread rapidly from 
Britain throughout the globe. As a result of this, the necessity for fast ships with higher 
load-bearing capacity increased. They became crucial in marketing manufactured 
products, and ensuring the transport of raw materials such as cotton, coal, and iron for 
their use in factories. Eventually, the steam engine became available in the field of 
maritime transport, and the first steamship was built by an American engineer, Robert 
Fulton, in 1806.4 Toward the end of the first quarter of nineteenth century, they sailed 
mostly for commercial purposes and transferred to the military marine after the 1830s. 
Alongside the continuing construction of sailing ships, mounting of steam engines onto 
the existing ships or purchasing and building of new steamships became popular. These 
developments were followed by the rise of iron in warship design in the late 1850s, 
leading wooden vessels running on wind power to be replaced by armoured vessels 
running on steam power, which gave rise to an increasing need for naval education, 
technological infrastructure, and financial support. In short, the naval forces needed 
modernization. 
                                               




 Throughout the century, it was a common procedure to purchase steamships 
from the dockyards of Britain for the countries that preferred to install their traditional 
guns on the purchased ships. The states, who wanted to build the steamships in their 
own dockyards, also needed to obtain British support. Therefore, Britain, who created 
the most advanced military-commercial fleet and carried a great interest by providing 
technical materials and qualified personnel for the other countries, was undoubtedly the 
most developed country in the age of steam and iron. Because of this, it also obtained 
the opportunity of monitoring the naval affairs of the rival states and the development of 
their shipbuilding technology.  
 Under these circumstances, the Ottoman Empire tried to follow these rapid 
developments of the nineteenth century by modernizing its navy and merchant maritime 
fleet in terms of administration, technology, and education. The driving force of this 
awareness was the state’s declining integrity and the Ottoman Sultans’ determination 
that their naval force should level up with the navies of Britain, France, and Russia so as 
to stop the retrogressive affairs of the state and gain back the territories lost in previous 
decades. For this purpose, a naval-oriented reform policy was followed by Sultan Selim 
III, Sultan Mahmud II, and Sultan Abdülmecid until the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz. 
The Ottoman Empire did not fully appreciate the necessity to modernize military 
technologies, in accordance with the purpose of protecting their national unity, until 
decades after their European counterparts. The reformist approach followed since the 
1730s proved that the superiority of the West in terms of science and technology was 
eventually acknowledged by the Ottoman Sultans. It became clear that meeting the 
desperate needs of the Empire to modernize its army and navy was fully dependent on 
western aid received according to each state’s political status in foreign affairs. 
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Accordingly, the primary argument of this chapter is to analyse the need for the 
naval modernization, and the reasons for the unstable foreign approach of European 
powers in providing assistance to the Ottoman naval forces, which in turn will explain 
the intense British influence on the naval modernization carried out in the reign of 
Sultan Abdülaziz. Furthermore, the development phases of the system established in the 
period of Sultan Mahmud II and Sultan Abdülmecid will be examined by scrutinizing 
the technological, administrative and educational reforms implemented both in the age 
of sail and steam to have a better understanding how they contributed to the Sultan 
Abdülaziz’s comprehensive modernization programme. 
 
The Evolution of the Ottoman Naval Modernization under the Influence of 
Political Developments (1808-1861) 
 
As is well known, the Nizam-Cedid refers to a reform programme intended to bring to 
an end the political decline of the Empire, which was triggered after the Ottoman-
Russian War of 1768-1774, through taking advantage of European technical 
superiority.5 It was carried out by Sultan Selim III, and aimed to making military 
adjustments in a narrow sense and political, social and cultural innovations in broader 
terms. Selim III ascended the throne at the start of the French Revolution and he began 
to realize that the nationalist ideology, which was being spread in Europe at the same 
time, would threaten the Ottoman borders. Selim was influenced by the ideas expressed 
in the reports written by Ebubekir Ratip Efendi, who was sent to Vienna as an Ottoman 
envoy in 1792. Ebubekir Efendi thought that a new single nation state model, combined 
with the idea of one language, one religion, and one nation, would lead to a great war 
                                               
5 Karal, 1988: 29-30. 
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that would involve Europe as a whole, and would result in a possible Austro-Russian 
territorial expansion against the Ottomans’ interest in the Balkans.6 In his reports, the 
main reason for the outbreak of the revolution was specified as the deterioration of order 
after the French treasury’s bankruptcy, and for this reason he emphasized that an 
intended increase in the state’s budget could not be achieved without providing the 
security that was directly connected with making progress in agriculture, commerce and 
industry. To ensure internal and external security he pointed out the importance of 
having a strong military power.7  
This main concept he presented in his well-known layiha also explains why the 
Ottomans focussed mainly on military reforms during the innovation period, which 
started at the end of the eighteenth century and continued until the end of the Empire. 
The failure of the Ottoman army in the Ottoman-Austrian War in 1787 and Ottoman-
Russian War in 1792 highlighted the desperate need of the Empire for a powerful army 
and a strong navy, which could only be achieved through an aggressive programme of 
reform. For this reason, the period of Sultan Selim III can be seen as the starting point 
of the proper recognition of western superiority, and arguably the first Ottoman Sultan 
who recognised the urgent need to modernize the Ottoman military forces against the 
increasing Russian threat coming from the north.  
As a result of this innovative approach, the newly constructed Ottoman Navy 
consisted of 20 ships of the line, 11 corvettes and 13 frigates, all amounting to 44 
towards 1803. However, the first and most comprehensive reform programme of 
Ottoman history, the Nizam-ı Cedid, was a short-lived step due to the negative impacts 
of the State’s internal and external problems. The French invasion of Egypt in 1798, in 
                                               
6 Yeşil, 2007: 291, 300. 
7 Faroqhi, 2014: 25; Arıkan, 1994: 278; Karal, 1988: 32; Yeşil, 2007: 290, 300-301. 
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order to control the commercial activities in the Indian Ocean by providing 
disconnection between Britain and its dominions, led to an Ottoman-Russian alliance 
over the Black Sea.8 On 23 December 1798, Britain also participated in this alliance by 
sending a British squadron under the command of Admiral Nelson, which destroyed the 
French navy anchored on Abukir Bay on 1 August 1798.9 Furthermore financial 
difficulties experienced by the subjects due to the campaign led to a negative reception 
of the Nizam-ı Cedid reforms by all the provinces; Istanbul in particular and subsequent 
reforms had to be paused for a while. Insurrections in the Balkans occurred with the 
influence of nationalist thought, causing the existing unrest to increase and eventually 
Selim III was dethroned and the period of new ordinance came to an end with the 
Kabakçı Mustafa Riot that broke out on 26 May 1807.10  
Ascending to the throne on 29 July 1808 with the support of the ayan11 of 
Rustchuk, Alemdar Mustafa Pasha, Sultan Mahmud II intended to continue his uncle 
Selim’s reformist policy on naval affairs. For this purpose, he assigned Abdullah Ramiz 
Efendi as Kapudan Pasha on 23 August 1808. Ramiz Pasha firstly ordered old and 
useless ships to be decommissioned and started the construction of new vessels. 
Furthermore, he ordered the execution of Kahvecioğlu Mustafa Captain who acted as 
the janissaries’ agent in collecting tribute from artisans. As a result of these strict 
measures, a recovery was seen in the Imperial Naval Arsenal, but this also led to an 
opposition being mounted by a group of officials in the navy.12 
                                               
8 Richmond, 2013: 32; Armaoğlu, 2003: 84-85. 
9 Mustafa Nuri Paşa, IV, 2008: 447-448. 
10 Beydilli, 2009: 422-423. 
11 Ayan was a term used for the notable people of the provinces who assisted governors to collect the 
taxes (Pakalın, 1983: 120). 
12 Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 3-4; Ünal, 2008: 583; Avcı, 2014: 172. 
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This hostility gained intensity, especially after the foundation of the Sekban-ı 
Cedid13 army, and resulted in a rebellion raised by the janissaries against the 
government on 14 October 1808. The rebellious soldiers besieged the Sublime Porte 
and a part of them was stopped by Alemdar Mustafa Pasha as he committed suicide by 
exploding the powder kegs in his palace.14 On 17 October 1808, Kandıralı Mehmet 
assumed the leadership of the rebels and the Imperial Naval Arsenal and Imperial 
Armoury of Artillery were captured by his supporters. Kapudan Pasha Ramiz Pasha and 
naval treasury secretary Moralı Esseyid Ali Efendi fled to Rumelia. The fleet was 
rescued from burning at the last moment and following the decision to repeal the 
Sekban-ı Cedid, the rebellion was suppressed. 15  
Apart from this internal revolt, the Ottoman Empire fell into political and 
financial decline because of increasing external problems. After losing its position on 
the Straits following the acceptance of the Treaty of Dardanelles—signed between the 
Ottoman Empire and Britain on 5 January 1809, confirming Ottoman sovereignty over 
the Straits—Russia changed its attitude and began to interfere in the internal affairs of 
the Ottoman Empire under the pretext of defending the rights of Orthodox subjects.16 
The support given by Russia to the Serbians, who rebelled against the Empire in 1801, 
confirmed that she had already determined this policy as a second plan to attack the 
Ottoman Empire since the beginning of the century and within the frame of this policy, 
Russians had previously encouraged the rebellion of Greeks in Morea in 1821. 
Although the British policy towards the East was to keep the balance between the 
                                               
13 It refers a new army established by the Grand Vizier Alemdar Mustafa Pasha and consisted of trained 
soldiers. Most of them had been commissioned in the abolished army of Nizam-ı Cedid in the period of 
Sultan Selim III and Sekban-ı Cedid army can be seen as its continuation (Karal, 2007: 93). 
14 Câbi Ömer Efendi, 2003: 270-272. 
15 Câbi Ömer Efendi, 2003: 295-297. 
16 Richmond, 2013: 34. 
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Ottoman Empire and Russia after the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the Greek Revolt 
caused the possibility of an increase in Russian effectiveness in the Eastern 
Mediterranean.17 This led Britain to change their interest on Ottoman land, and they 
decided to act together with Russia in order to prevent her controlling the revolt 
independently. Even though this alliance was officially confirmed with the St. 
Petersburg Protocol of 1826, Tsar Nicolas I sent an ultimatum to Istanbul, demanding 
the withdrawal of Ottoman troops from Wallachia and Moldavia, and the official 
recognition of the privileges given to the Serbs with the Treaty of Bucharest by the 
Sultan. In the meantime, the Ottoman Empire had no land army due to the disbandment 
of the Janissary corps by Sultan Mahmud II on 15 June 1826.18 For this reason, she was 
forced to accept the official confirmation of the Russian protectorate on Orthodox 
subjects in 1826 by fulfilling the Russian demands about the Christians, whom they 
claimed were being oppressed in Wallachia and Moldavia.19 Tsar Nicolas I’s attempt to 
act separately after being an ally of Britain led the St. Petersburg Protocol to be changed 
into the London Treaty, signed between Britain, Russia, and France on 6 July 1827. On 
the other hand, Sultan Mahmud II assessed this agreement as interference in Ottoman 
internal affairs.20 
 As a consequence of the Greek Independence War, the Empire could not 
become concerned with the naval issues and Greek sailors formed a large pirate fleet in 
the Mediterranean Sea. This fleet, which had a great quantity of gunnery and high 
manoeuvring power, played an active role in the Greek War of Independence. Although 
the 44-ship Ottoman navy was sent to the Mediterranean in order to prevent the 
                                               
17 Dönmez, 2014: 43. 
18 Mahmud Celaleddin Paşa, 1979: 25; Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 20; Karal, 1988: 146-147; Armaoğlu, 
2003: 177-178. 
19 Cobden, 1854: 44. 
20 Armaoğlu, 2003: 179-180. 
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activities of the Greek pirates, it failed against the Greek ships which were commanded 
by more experienced sailors.21 The Ottoman Empire, having failed in its efforts to 
receive support from Europe to aid in the suppression of the rebellion, asked for help 
from Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Pasha, the governor of Egypt. The revolt was suppressed 
temporarily with the help of Mehmed Ali Pasha, who was promised the governorship of 
Crete and Syria in addition to Egypt, by Sultan Mahmud II in 1827. However, the 
negative response of the Ottoman Empire against the London Treaty of 1827 led to the 
destruction of the Ottoman-Egyptian Navy anchored in Navarino Bay that amounted to 
89 sails; of which two were 84 gun-ships, one a 76 gun-ship, four double frigates, 
thirteen frigates, thirty corvettes, twenty-eight brigs, five schooners and six fire-brigs, 
by the combined navy of the allied powers on 20 October 1827.22 Apart from the 
transport vessels, 60 ships from the Turco-Egyptian Navy were destroyed and 
approximately 3000 officers and marines were killed after the attack.23  
The Ottoman navy, which was modernized with the efforts of Selim III and 
Mahmud II, lost their most valuable ships and the most qualified personnel in a mere 
couple of hours, which was accepted as the last major naval war of sailing ships in 
history.24 The intense reaction of the Ottoman Empire against the Battle of Navarino 
resulted in the withdrawal of British, French, and Russian Ambassadors by the end of 
1827. This also meant the pause of diplomatic relations of the Empire with these 
                                               
21 Slade, 1945: 24. This event indicated particularly the inadequate training of the naval personnel rather 
than the deficiencies in shipbuilding technology. Therefore, training would be considered as the priority 
issue for future reform activities relating to the Ottoman navy. 
22 Nutki, 1993a: 147-149; James, 1837: 471-486. 
23 James, 1837: 484-485. The Battle of Navarino can be seen as the victory of British aid to liberalise the 
Greeks but indeed it was a strategic mistake that would cause an increase in the Russian effectiveness in 
warm waters. Having realized that, collaboration with Russians in the Mediterranean resulted in a change 
of the British government which was heavily criticised by the press and the new Prime Minister, the Duke 
of Wellington removed Admiral Codrington, who was the commander of British squadron at Navarino, 
from his office (Dönmez, 2014: 46-47). 
24 Gencer, 1986: 35-36. 
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countries, which caused the Ottomans to be trapped in political isolation until the 1830s. 
The Ottoman Empire, surrounded by seas on three sides, became a power without a 
navy once again, as had happened previously after the Battle of Çeşme in 1770. On the 
other hand, the Ottomans took the opportunity to observe the steamships of allied navies 
which were fast-moving and had high carrying capacity in Navarino. This provided the 
beginning of the steamship age in Ottoman naval history.25 
The first steamship of the Ottoman Navy, called Sürat, was purchased from 
Britain and presented to Sultan Mahmud II by a group of Armenian merchants in 
1827.26 Despite Britain seeming to be the most popular centre for purchasing ships and 
ship equipment, the Ottoman Empire referred to another state to ask for help in shipping 
because of the strained relations with Britain after the Battle of Navarino. Following the 
proposal of Captain Koca Hüsrev Pasha, the United States of America willing to 
develop commercial relations with the Ottoman Empire by proposing an executive trade 
arrangement, was specified as the assistant state in the naval modernization.27  
As a result of mutual negotiations, the Turkish-American Friendship, Commerce 
and Navigation Agreement was signed on 7 May 1830. Besides determining the 
commercial regulations between the two states, this agreement also included a 
confidential article. According to this, the USA, who constructed low-cost ships thanks 
to the abundance of timber, would build steamships for the Ottoman Empire and also 
technical assistance would be provided by American experts to the personnel of the 
Imperial Naval Arsenal.28 This agreement was confirmed by the US Senate, but the 
confidential article was refused on grounds that it was found contrary to the Monroe 
                                               
25 Bal, 2010: 15. 
26 Arı, 2009: 132. 
27 Erhan, 1998: 459. 
28 Gencer, 1986: 38-39; Erhan, 1998: 458-459. 
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Doctrine of 1823. This decision received a very negative response from Sultan Mahmud 
II and was protested by the Sublime Porte. Thereupon, the USA sent a script to the 
Sublime Porte on 27 September 1831 through the agency of its charge d’affaires, David 
Porter, in order to have the trade agreement approved by the Sultan. Accordingly, the 
USA agreed to support the Ottoman navy in terms of technology as long as it did not 
affect the other treaties that the USA had signed with some European countries.29 
As a consequence of the mutual consent, the experts, who were sent by the US 
government to Istanbul, launched steamship construction activities in the Imperial 
Naval Arsenal. It was observed that three American experts had a great influence on the 
Ottoman navy in the 1830s. One of them was Henry Eckford, who came to Istanbul in 
1831. A corvette type-vessel of 1000 tons called the United States designed by him was 
purchased by the Ottoman Empire instantly, renamed Mesir-i Ferah, and joined the 
ranks of the Ottoman naval fleet. Before dying from a sudden illness, Eckford added 
two further ships during the remainder of his life: a 74-gun war ship and a frigate.30  
Other American experts included Charles Ross and Forster Rhodes. Coming to 
Istanbul in 1831, Rhodes was admired and appreciated by Kapudan Pasha, who 
assigned him as the head of the naval restructuring programme. Ensuring that quite a 
number of brand new vessels were built under his leadership, he started to build a ship-
of-the line called Nusretiye in 1832 and it was launched in 1835.31 Rhodes also began to 
produce steam engines in Aynalıkavak dockyard, which was conducted under his 
supervision.32  
                                               
29 Gencer, 1986: 38; Bal, 2010: 16; Arı, 2009: 134. 
30 Langensiepen and Güleryüz, 1995: 1; Gencer, 1986: 39-40. 
31 Bulgurcuoğlu, 2009: 39. 
32 Langensiepen and Güleryüz, 1995: 1. 
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Receiving support from the USA, which was a considerable geographical 
distance from the Ottoman territories in comparison to Britain, can be explained by the 
tension in diplomatic relations between the Empire and Europe after the Battle of 
Navarino and Greek Independence. However this situation was modified with the 
Egyptian Question, which was a further consequence of the Battle of Navarino, arose on 
account of Mehmed Ali Pasha who had been conferred only the governorship of Crete 
after the Treaty of Edirne in 1831. Indeed he was well aware of the weakness of the 
Empire and desired to seize the opportunity to extend his territorial domination. Being 
acquainted with the progress of Egyptian troops towards inner Anatolia, Sultan 
Mahmud II, who was not given any assistance from Britain or France, was forced to 
accept Tsar Nicolas I’s offer of help. Upon the Russian Navy’s approach towards the 
Istanbul Straits on 23 April 1833, France and Britain, who had preferred to remain 
neutral on the problem, brokered reconciliation between the Ottoman Empire and Egypt 
in order to remove Russia from the Straits. However, the Treaty of Hünkar İskelesi was 
signed with Russia in 1833 in consideration of its aid. By the terms of this treaty, the 
Ottoman Empire was required in case of an outbreak of war to close the Straits to all 
other foreign powers except Russia.33 This treaty, which was contrary to the political 
interests of Britain and France, came up once again when the governor of Egypt 
rebelled for the second time. The London Straits Convention, which was signed 
between the Ottoman Empire and European countries on 13 July 1841, determined that 
the Straits would be free only for merchant ships.34 Depending on this, British Foreign 
Minister Lord Palmerston followed a policy in favour of Sultan Mahmud II after 1831 
and emphasised the immediate need of the Ottoman Empire to implement reforms to 
                                               
33 Baker, 1928: 84. 
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strengthen its army and navy. To manage this, first of all the Revolt of Mehmet Ali 
Pasha should be suppressed and Russian pressure over Istanbul should be prevented 
according to his recommendations. Doing this, precautions could be taken in order to 
maintain the financial situation. Afterwards British officers would be allowed to be 
commissioned in the Ottoman navy and the army so as to support the military reform 
programme.35 In the meantime, the Treaty of Hünkar İskelesi caused the relations with 
Britain to be strained once again. In fact, the alliance of Ottomans and Russians in 1833 
was a natural result of the Battle of Navarino and the French occupation of Algeria in 
1830. Sultan Mahmud II lost his trust in Britain but he knew the necessity for a naval 
reform programme as Russia, which he was forced to endure due to the rebellion of 
Mehmet Ali Pasha, had to be removed from the Straits. In the report of the British 
Ambassador Lord Ponsonby, the condition of the Ottoman navy consisting of 27 ships 
was regarded as unfavourable due to the insufficient number of qualified officers for the 
efficient operation of warships.36 From this date forward, British diplomacy would try 
to achieve the complete removal of Russia from the Ottoman Empire and to establish a 
definite peace over Ottoman lands, securing the protection of the Black Sea, Istanbul, 
and the Straits, which was fully dependent on the existence of a powerful navy. Thus 
Britain preferred the sovereignty over the Ottomans, which could have the power to 
protect their lands against any kind of attack over the Straits instead of Russia. This 
concept would be determined as the foreign policy of Britain on the Eastern Question 
                                               
35 Dönmez, 2014: 93-94. Depending upon this purpose, a gradual increase can be followed in the size of 
the budgets of the Ottoman Navy during the reign of Sultan Abdülmecid. Accordingly, while the 
allocation of the navy in 1841 was 209,404 pounds sterling, it reached 647,765 pounds sterling in 1861 
and the average amount for expenditures per year appears as 400,328 pounds sterling. However, the fiscal 
records, which show the total income and expense rates between the same years, also indicate that the 
average allocation reserved for the land army, amounting to 2,637,479 pounds sterling, was considerably 
higher than the budget for the navy, which means that while the total percentage of the allocation of the 
state’s treasury spent on the expenses of naval affairs was 5.1%, 33.64% was reserved for the 
expenditures of army forces (Güran, 2003: 19-53). 
36 Dönmez, 2014: 114-116, 121. 
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from 1833 to the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-1878, and the reforms to strengthen the 
Ottoman naval and military powers would be implemented under the supervision of 
Britain.  
Upon the recovery of the relations between the Ottoman Empire and Britain, 
British-made engines and steam boilers started to be purchased and used in the Ottoman 
navy. This trade in naval equipment initiated the century-lasting commercial 
relationship between the two countries. The first steam vessel the Ottoman Empire 
owned was built on 24 November 1837 and called Eser-i Hayri, followed by Mesir-i 
Bahri and Tahir-i Bahri respectively in 1838 and 1839.37 
While the construction of sailing vessels was being continued in parallel with the 
period of Selim III, the first steamships were built with the assistance of American 
experts in the Imperial Naval Arsenal by taking the steamships, which were imported 
from the USA, Britain and France, as models. Among the ship-of-the lines, the 
Mahmudiye, which had a capacity of 1280 personnel and 128 guns, was constructed by 
the chief architect of the Imperial Naval Arsenal Mehmed Efendi and architect Mehmed 
Kalfa who had been students of the French expert Le Brun. This ship was also 
considered to be the largest ship built for the Ottoman Navy.38 
Apart from the shipbuilding activities, new reforms were continued to be 
implemented to reorganize the new training system established in the Nizam-ı Cedid 
period, in accordance with the requirements of new steam technology. However, 
stability in naval training could not be achieved as it was interrupted many times to find 
a better area for school building during the same period. Due to the great fire of 1821 
that started in Kasımpaşa, the Naval Engineering School became unusable and the 
                                               
37 Langensiepen and Güleryüz, 1995: 1; Sondhaus, 2001: 31. 
38 Bulgurcuoğlu, 2009: 44-45.  
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students had to suspend their studies for a year. In the education term of 1822-1823, the 
school building was moved to the Erre-hane (sawmill store) in the Imperial Naval 
Arsenal.39 However, the technical deficiencies of this new building caused deterioration 
in discipline among pupils and changes were introduced by Kapudan Pasha Koca 
Hüsrev Pasha to improve the situation. His proposal was implemented in 1825. Having 
similar characteristics to the previous, this proposal stated that the salaries of the 
teachers and the students should be increased, as they were forced to look for different 
job opportunities at the same time because of the low wages.40 
Recognizing the need for a larger-capacity school building, it was decided that 
the residence of Cezayirli Hasan Pasha should be demolished by the approval of Sultan 
Mahmud II and a new building with a capacity of 400 students was planned. Until the 
completion of its construction, the students were transferred to another building named 
Kalyoncu Kışlası in Heybelida in 1837. One year after, the school moved again to its 
new building and its Code of Practice, named the Şerait Kanunu, was constituted. 
According to this, prospective students would be chosen among the candidates, who 
were 10 or 12 years old, healthy, and capable of reading and writing. Acceptance of 
students by request would be strictly forbidden during the student admission process. In 
addition to this, the lectures were specified as geometry, logarithms, surveying, 
müsellat-ı müsteviye (plane trigonometry), calculation, algebra, müsellat-ı küreviye 
(spherical trigonometry), heyet (astronomy), ebad-ı kevakib (dimension of stars), arz ve 
tul mechutunu istihraç (calculation of latitudes and longitudes), technical drawing, 
Turkish literary composition, Arabic, and Persian.41  
                                               
39 Sayacı: 18, Uzunçarşılı, 1988: 510.  
40 Sayacı: 18-20. 
41 Sayacı: 23-24; Çoker, 2006; 13-14; Gökçay, 2005: 21; Uzunçarşılı, 1988; 510. 
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Sultan Mahmud II died while the Egyptian Question was proceeding. His son, 
Sultan Abdülmecid, succeeded to the throne in 1839 and following his accession, he 
declared the Imperial Edict of Gülhane, known as Tanzimat Fermanı, which aimed to 
create a better environment for the intended modernization by taking control over the 
state’s disrupted institutions.42 This also resulted in the opening of a new era in Ottoman 
history called the Tanzimat.  
 At the same time, the Ottoman navy was close by Egypt under the supervision of 
Kapudan Pasha Ahmed Fevzi Pasha to quell the continuing rebellion of Kavalalı 
Mehmed Ali Pasha. Sultan Abdülmecid appointed Hüsrev Paşa as the Grand Vizier and 
receiving this information about Hüsrev Paşa’s promotion, Ahmed Fevzi Pasha became 
concerned about his rival’s intentions and absconded to Egypt with the navy. The 25-
ship Ottoman fleet, which was handed over to Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Pasha in the port of 
Alexandria, consisted of the following ships contained in the table below:43 
Table 1. The Ships Comprising of the Ottoman Fleet in Egypt in 1839 
Ship-of-the Lines Frigates Corvettes Brigs Steamer 
Mahmudiye Nizamiye Mesir-i Ferah Cay-ı Ferah Peyk-i Şevket 
Mesudiye  Şadiye  Fecr-i Sefid  
Fethiye Suriye  Kuts-i Zafer  
Memduhiye Hıfzu’r-rahman    
Fevziye Mir’at-ı Zafer    
Teşrifiye Tair-i Bahri    
Tevfikiye Navek-i Bahri    
Nusretiye Şihab-ı Bahri    
Burc-ı Zafer Nesim-i Zafer    
 Fazlullah    
 Kaid-i Zafer    
  
Under the positive influence of the acceptance of the principle of equality among 
national subjects with the declaration of the Imperial Edict of Gülhane, Lord Palmerston 
                                               
42 For further information regarding the Imperial Edict of Gülhane see Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 55-95; 
Karal, 2007: 170-185; Kaynar, 1991:164-190. 
43 Bulgurcuoğlu, 2009: 58-60. 
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repeated his offer to support the Ottoman Empire regarding naval modernization. In the 
meantime, Captain Baldwin Wake Walker, known as Yaver Pasha, entered the service 
of the Ottoman navy as an advisor in 183844 and was asked to prepare a report about the 
condition of the fleet. According to his observations, the navy was in desperate need of 
radical reforms. Not only officers, but also the students were considerably insufficient 
in terms of maritime sciences and applications. In his other report, he highlighted the 
inadequate number of ships in Istanbul due to the Ottoman fleet, which Ahmet Fevzi 
Pasha had absconded to Alexandria. In addition to this, he indicated that although there 
were 1100 students connected with the navy, most of them were ignorant to the idea of 
seamanship.45 On 6 August 1840, Sultan Abdülmecid confirmed Captain Walker’s 
commandership over the Ottoman fleet, which would be combined with the British 
squadron for the operation arranged against Mehmet Ali Pasha in Syria. Therefore the 
offer, which had been rejected by Sultan Mahmud II on the grounds that a Christian 
could not be in command of Muslim marines, was officially approved and the 
effectiveness of British officers in the Ottoman navy continued from this date forward. 
  Upon the resolution of the Egyptian Question with the Treaty of London in 
favour of the Ottoman Empire in 1840, the Ottoman Navy was brought from Egypt on 4 
January 1841 thanks to the aid of Britain. Returning to Istanbul on 21 March 1841, the 
fleet was wrecked due to the rebellion. As a result of the investigations, some ships 
                                               
44 Captain Walker entered the Royal Navy in July 1812 and was promoted to a lieutenant on 6 April 1820. 
Until 1827, he served in the Jamaica, South America, and West Africa Stations and was sent to the 
Mediterranean station in 1828. Being commissioned nearly ten years in the same area, Walker entered the 
service of the Sultan Abdülmecid in 1838 with Admiralty permission. He was mainly responsible for the 
implementation of new reforms designed for the naval fleet and he stayed in the same position until 1844 
(for further information, see Hamilton, 2004). 
45 Dönmez, 2014: 285. 
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were repaired, and some of them had to be virtually rebuilt. During this process, many 
of these ships were reassembled using steam engines.46  
Most of the ships inherited from the reign of Sultan Selim III and constructed 
between 1821 and 1827 were destroyed in the Battle of Navarino and some of them 
were greatly damaged during the rebellion of Mehmet Ali Pasha. Another decrease in 
the number of ships was experienced in 1853 when the Russians destroyed the Ottoman 
fleet with a sudden attack against Sinop. Towards the end of the reign of Sultan 
Abdülmecid, while the number of sailed ships was 29, the number of steamships 




As clearly presented, Ottoman military modernization, which continued at an increasing 
pace from the last quarter of the eighteenth century to the end of the nineteenth century, 
followed a progressive course, influenced by the political alliances or conflicts between 
the Empire and the European states. The Russian efforts to dominate the Straits and the 
Eastern Mediterranean in the process started with the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca 
dragged the Ottoman Empire into numerous wars and land losses, and Britain played 
the key role in determining the future existence of Ottoman integrity during this period. 
A consistency in the foreign policy of Britain could not be achieved with the Ottoman 
Empire, as it was included in the combined French-Russian navy in the destruction of 
the Ottoman fleet at the Battle of Navarino: although it had become an ally of the 
Ottomans during the French occupation of Egypt in 1798. Particularly after the Battle of 
Navarino, the modernization of maritime field was concentrated more on its technical 
                                               
46 Arı, 2009: 135-136. 
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side and the steam technology were adapted into the Ottoman shipbuilding tradition, 
which led to an increase in construction activities with the arrival of technical assistance 
requested from the United States. This also confirmed the strength of the Ottoman naval 
infrastructure as the Imperial Naval Arsenal recovered in a short-time and the Ottomans 
began to apply new technologies right after their rivals. 
However, the ambivalent approach of Britain in relation to the Egyptian 
rebellion caused the Empire to be faced with the danger of collapse and led Sultan 
Mahmud II to sign the Treaty of Hünkar İskelesi with Russia in 1833. The concern of 
British diplomacy in regard to the possible Russian protectorate over the Ottoman 
Empire resulted in Britain changing its attitude, and to follow a policy to protect 
Ottoman territorial integrity to guarantee its sovereignty over the Straits. This principle 
was officially confirmed with the Treaty of Paris in 1856. For this reason, the 
elimination of the Russian threat until 1877 is attributable to this alteration of the British 
policy towards the Ottoman Empire after the Treaty of Hünkar İskelesi.  
As the continuation of the existence of the Empire became dependent on the 
diplomatic and military support of Britain, the protection of the Straits, Black Sea, and 
the Eastern Mediterranean was determined as the main purpose of the Ottoman military 
forces. For this reason, having a strong navy emerged as the top priority of the Empire 
and it was encouraged by Britain to start a naval oriented modernization programme 
towards the 1850s. In the reports prepared by the naval advisors commissioned in the 
Ottoman navy, training was realised as the biggest shortfall of the naval forces, and the 
route of the future naval modernization was determined to consist of deploying the navy 
only for providing the internal security and protecting the seashores from an external 
threat. In addition, it was decided that the utmost consideration should be given to 
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training, and the naval reforms should be implemented to increase the number of 
qualified personnel to be commissioned in the warships. In parallel with this, after the 
acceptance of Lord Palmerston’s offer to commission British officers in the Ottoman 
navy in 1840, the Ottoman Empire became dependent on Britain in terms of technical 




















CHAPTER 2. THE EARLY INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS OF 




The pressing need for a powerful navy derives from the necessity of maintaining the 
shores of a country against any attack from the outside. This is also paramount in 
controlling maritime trade and shipping traffic within the territorial waters, and provides 
a suitable basis for the military and commercial fleets regarding operations abroad by 
giving safety to the national coasts.47 Given the importance attached to quality and 
technological knowledge rather than the number of ships, equipment, guns, ammunition 
and personnel, it became apparent that an efficient administrative system is the principal 
requirement for the naval forces.  
Having a good awareness in regard to the basic tasks of the naval 
administration—such as determining a logical decision-making mechanism in war-time 
and keeping the fleet all the time in a battle-ready form including peace-time—the 
Ottomans commenced the modernization of the traditional sea policy of the existing 
administrative system in the period of Sultan Selim III. In this long process that 
continued until the beginning of the twentieth century, the rapid changes taking place in 
the world’s naval technology situated the Ottoman Admiralty in a more privileged 
position than other institutions, and the responsibilities held by the Admiralty presented 
a more complex structure in the nineteenth century. 
The main duties of the naval administration in the Ottoman Empire were to 
ensure the maintenance and the expansion of the naval fleet in accordance with the 
Empire’s national interests, and to train officers and marines who had the competence to 
                                               
47 Sampson, 1910: 195; Admiralty Administration, Its Faults and Its Defaults, 1861: 2-3. 
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operate battleships in an efficient manner. Besides providing an appropriate distribution 
for the navy to the specified locations, Ottoman admirals were also responsible for 
keeping the fleet in an ideal format in terms of personnel and equipment in both war and 
peace time. 
In the period starting with the declaration of Tanzimat, new implementations 
were put on the agenda on this existing system and each unit began to contain specific 
characteristics in parallel with these developments. The authority for naval decision-
making was still in the hands of Kapudan Pasha in the year that Sultan Abdülaziz 
ascended the throne. However new auxiliary units were established in addition to the 
Naval Board, which was in charge of the financial management and the preparation of 
proposals to determine naval reforms since 1845. Under the directions of their head 
officers, members of each unit constituting the naval affairs were responsible for 
providing the functionality of the Ottoman navy in the frame of their assigned position. 
The natural mechanism of this correlation, which was improved continuously from the 
Tanzimat reform era onwards, was operated with the practices of consultation, 
submitting proposals, making changes in existing regulations, decision making, and 
implementation respectively. In addition to this, the rules and regulations to be followed 
by all these units and naval personnel were identified by the naval code of 1849 and this 
system continued to be applied until 1867.  
In 1867, the office of Kapudan Pasha, which had been the head of the Ottoman 
navy for more than 300 years, was abolished and the naval administration entered a 
comprehensive modernization process with the foundation of the Ministry of Marine. 
For this reason, we will try to examine the naval administrative system of the Sultan 
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Abdülaziz’s reign in two periods—1861-1867 and 1867-1876—in order to analyse the 
administrative amendments and reforms in the frame of the conditions of their period.  
Consequently, the first part of our work will focus on the application of 
Tanzimat reforms to the Ottoman Admiralty by analysing the main characteristics of the 
administrative system that started to be implemented with the permanent foundation of 
the Naval Board in 1845. In the second part of the chapter, we will examine alterations 
made on the existing decision-making mechanism in the first phase of naval 
administration implemented between 1861 and 1867 by scrutinizing these questions: (1) 
To what extend was the system transferred from the previous periods evaluated in the 
reign of Sultan Abdülaziz? (2) What kinds of changes were implemented in naval 
administration? (3) Which administrative units did the Ottoman Navy have between 
1861 and 1867, and what were their main tasks and functionality? 
 
Naval Administration and Decision-Making during the Tanzimat Reform Era 
 
The development of the structure and the command of the Ottoman Navy was a gradual 
process based on the need to maintain the territories conquered by the land army and 
later to provide security for the shipping routes of trade and communication.48 
Following the annexation of the Saruhan, Aydın and Menteşe Emirates, the requirement 
of a sea force for the safety of the trade carried out along the coasts of the Western 
Anatolia resulted in the appointment of Saruca Ağa, as the derya bey (bey of the sea) of 
Gallipoli by Sultan Bayezid I in order to establish the dockyards and the navy. Next 
holders of the same position were entitled as sancak beys, who were responsible for 
manning the fleet and directing the construction and maintenance activities by receiving 
                                               
48 Bostan, 2007: 512-513; Shaw and Shaw, 1976: 131. 
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the revenues of the sancak of Gallipoli and the kazas of Galata and Izmit, until February 
1534, when Captain Barbaros Hayreddin was assigned as both the beylerbey (governor 
general) of the Cezayir-i Bahr-i Sefid province and the commander of navy with the title 
of Kapudan Pasha, the Admiral General of the Ottoman naval forces. Given the right to 
sit in the Imperial Council with the rank of vizir, the Office of Kapudan Pasha was 
rendered the apex of the naval organization and the sancaks constituted the Cezayir-i 
Bahr-i Sefid province were attached to the navy holdings while the affairs of the navy 
were directed in two distinct areas as the fleet operations and the construction and 
maintenance activities carried in the dockyards. Depending on this structuring, the main 
responsibility of the Kapudan Pasha was determined to keep the order of naval affairs 
both ashore and offshore, and under his jurisdiction, the operation of dockyards were 
attached to a hierarchy of officials including commanders, scribes and record-keepers 
while each ship belonging to the Navy was operated by a reis (captain) or hassa reis, 
who held tımars in the sancaks of the Kapudan Pasha for manning their large vessels.49  
The necessity to modernize this briefly outlined traditional Kapudan Pasha 
system of administration were first came under question after the arrival of the Naval 
Code prepared by the Mezomorto Hüseyin Pasha in 1701, revealing the significance of 
promoting officers, who had sufficient knowledge of seamanship, for significant posts 
while commencing the transition period from galleys to galleons, which enabled the 
Ottoman Navy to control the Eastern Mediterranean until the entire destruction of the 
Ottoman fleet by the Russian Navy in the Battle of Çeşme in 1770.50 To reconstruct the 
navy in compliance with the European shipbuilding technologies, the application of 
Nizam-ı Cedid reforms to the Ottoman Navy was directed by Küçük Hüseyin Pasha, 
                                               
49 Bostan, 2001: 355; Bostan, 2002: 241; Shaw and Shaw, 1976: 131-132. 
50 Uzunçarşılı, 1988: 488-500; Bostan, 2001: 354-355. 
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who was appointed as Kapudan Pasha in 1792. Depending upon the increasing number 
of vessels, a careful financial management became unavoidable towards the beginning 
of the nineteenth century and a separate naval treasury was established to provide and 
manage the needed budget for the prospective reforms with the arrival of the Naval 
Code of 1804.51 
According to the principles of the administrative reforms outlined and imposed 
after 1804 in the new naval code, the Directorate of the Imperial Naval Arsenal52 was 
abolished and replaced with the Umur-ı Bahriye Nezareti (Ministry of Marine) to 
regulate the expenditures on the naval modernization with the establishment of a 
separate treasury of the Navy. In this way, the main tasks of the Admiralty and Ministry 
were separated. Accordingly, the Captain Pasha was responsible for military issues such 
as outfitting the ships with required guns, discipline of military personnel and 
organization of armament expenses, whereas the Minister of Marine was commissioned 
to regulate the purchasing of any kind of naval equipment and determining the monthly 
salaries of the naval personnel. The Ministry of Marine was a very important new unit 
as it represented the instatement of another administrative authority in addition to the 
Captain Pasha in terms of decision-making for the first time. Thus the Captain Pashas, 
who held all the military, administrative and financial responsibilities for the Ottoman 
navy until 1804, would examine the financial matters according to the instructions given 
by the Ministry of Marine and make decisions within the frame of its proposals. 
                                               
51 Uzunçarşılı, 1988: 426-427; Gencer, 2001: 65-66. 
52 Being one of the most prominent officers in the Ottoman navy, directorate of the Imperial Naval 
Arsenal (Tersane Emini) was in charge of the management of revenues and expenditures (Bostan, 1992a: 
33). In traveller Olivier’s accounts recorded between 1792 and 1798 in Istanbul, he was referred as the 
Captain Pasha’s assistant and responsible for regulating the income allocated for the Imperial Naval 
Arsenal and providing all kinds of equipment needed for construction, shipbuilding and other related 
activities after receiving Captain Pasha’s approval (Olivier, 1801: 41). 
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However, the new system of administration was abolished following the dethronement 
of Sultan Selim III and the traditional administrative methods were resumed. 
After the declaration of the Imperial Edict of Gülhane on 3 November 1839, the 
necessity to adapt available naval administration mechanisms into the new system 
emerged, and the foundation of a commission consisting of pashas and officers was 
proposed so as to assist Kapudan Pasha in planning the modernization activities 
concerning naval affairs. This board, referred to as the “Naval Board”, was constituted 
for the first time in Ottoman naval history. Being established on 23 January 1840, the 
Naval Board was originated by taking the Ottoman land army organization as a model, 
as was indicated in a document regarding the foundation date of the Naval Board with 
the following statement: “… a commission will be instituted in the Imperial Naval 
Arsenal as there were in the Ministry of War and the Imperial Armoury of Artillery.” 
The foundation purpose of the Naval Board, which was also entitled as Şura-yı Ali-i 
Bahriye, Meclis-i Rüesa, Şura-yı Bahriye or Meclis-i Bahriye in Ottoman archival 
documents, stated in the same document, as providing the implementation of required 
activities to put the empire’s naval forces in order.53 
When the hierarchical structuring of the board is examined, we find it to be 
consisting of eight members, which included a chairman, a mufti, who served as a legal 
advisor, a scribe, a registrar, and four permanent members.54 The responsibility to 
change their position was given directly to the Kapudan Pasha. We learn the details of 
its tasks and functioning mechanism from another document dated 20 March 1840. 
Accordingly, the Naval Board was an auxiliary unit directly affiliated to the Kapudan 
Pasha, and responsible for all kinds of purchasing and manufacturing activities 
                                               
53 Safvet, 1329: 39-40. 
54 Safvet, 1329: 40. 
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belonging to the Imperial Naval Arsenal. Its authority also covered the decisions made 
concerning the artisan class working in the arsenal and the staff and students of the 
Naval Academy.55  
Established in order to provide the sea forces a better financial management, the 
Board was abolished in 1841 without having achieved the intended reforms due to the 
report of Kapudan Pasha Tahir Pasha, stating briefly that it was an unnecessary unit and 
the management of financial affairs for both the arsenal and the navy were given into 
the hands of the Undersecretariat of the Navy.56 From this date forward, projects 
planned to modernize the Ottoman navy would be conducted by another commission 
called Meclis-i Adiyye, which would be convened when necessary under the 
chairmanship of the undersecretariat. 
This structuring continued until 1845, when the organization of the Naval Board 
was reconsidered once again. Accordingly it was regarded as an unfavourable 
implementation to give all the powers of naval matters to one person and an official 
proposal was represented to the Grand Vizier with the following statements: 
Works carried out by component ideas and different views cannot be compared 
with the decisions made by a single vote. For this reason, the ideas discussed 
and generated for naval affairs, will be brought in compliance with the method 
of great powers in naval administration including more than one kapudan pasha 
called Admiral. Four or five officers will be commissioned with the title of 
kapudan pasha and they will gather in the Divanhane57 to discuss all kinds of 
matters relating to the navy every day. To finalise the examined issues and to 
acquaint other departments, an office called Umur-ı Bahriye Nezareti will be 
established. The Office of Kapudan Pasha will be abolished and instead of this, 
an officer called Bahriye Müşiri will be appointed in parallel with the practice 
carried out in the Ministry of War and the Imperial Armoury of Artillery. Apart 
                                               
55 BOA, İ.DH, 442. For the full translation of this document see Gencer, 2001: 138-139. 
56 Gencer, 2002: 235. 
57 Divanhane represents the administrative building of the Ottoman navy and the office of Kapudan 
Pasha. It was first established in the period of Sultan Mehmet II and an additional building was built 
during the reign of Sultan Selim I (Bostan, 1992a: 11). 
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from this, a special commission will be constituted for the Imperial Naval 
Arsenal.58 
 
The prominent point of this document is the suggestion of the abolishment of the 
office of Kapudan Pasha and the re-establishment of the Ministry of Marine, which had 
been decommissioned following the dethronement of Sultan Selim III.  This would 
result in, the Ministry becoming the only decision-making body for naval affairs. After 
this proposal was delivered to the Sultan through the office of Grand Vizier, an imperial 
decree was issued, explaining that the assignment of a permanent Naval Board under the 
supervision of the Kapudan Pasha would be appropriate to prevent the naval reforms to 
be prepared by only one point of view.59 This indicates the rejection of the proposal 
regarding the abolishment of Kapudan Pasha as the Naval Board was positioned as a 
consultative commission. 
With the approval of the Sultan, the permanent Naval Board was founded on 8 
September 1845. According to the proposal prepared by the Kapudan Pasha Mehmet 
Ali Pasha, to be submitted to the Grand Vizier, its members were listed as a chairman, a 
mufti, two scribes and four members. Considering their numbers and qualifications, it 
can be said that the Naval Board had the same characteristics as the one established in 
1840. Furthermore the Undersecretariat of the Navy was replaced with the Ministry of 
the Imperial Naval Arsenal.60  
Given the responsibility of preparing the prospective reforms, the Naval Board 
was also the financial administrator of the navy and the arsenals. The needed equipment 
for construction and manufacturing was determined by this council and it had also the 
authority of amendments on the articles of naval code regarding the naval personnel. 
                                               
58 From BOA, Mesail-i Mühimme, 345-1transcribed by Gencer, 2001: 143-145. 
59 Gencer, 2002: 235. 
60 Gencer, 2001: 151-153. 
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The unit providing the budget needed for all these tasks was the Ministry of the Imperial 
Naval Arsenal.61  
To implement the decision taken by the Naval Board, it had to be approved by 
many units. Both new laws and regulations prepared by the Naval Board and protocols, 
containing comments and suggestions for the modernization of the fleet, were first 
presented for Kapudan Pasha’s approval and they were sent to the Meclis-i Vâlâ-yı 
Ahkâm-ı Adliye62 after being examined by the office of Grand Vizier. If there were 
questions or issues to be clarified and corrected by the Meclis-i Vâlâ, they were 
transmitted back to the Kapudan Pasha through the Grand Vizier to be submitted to the 
Naval Board. Following the corrections made on necessary parts, proposals were 
submitted again to the Meclis-i Vâlâ through the re-approval of other units, and they 
were confirmed here again for forwarding to the Grand Vizier. The final decision was 
taken by Meclis-i Mahsus, which was a council united under the chairmanship of the 
Grand Vizier. After their confirmation, the documents were transmitted to the Sultan 
and the acknowledgement of the proposals with the issuing of an imperial decree was 
expected. 
As a natural consequence of the westernization carried out for the state’s whole 
institutional system after the arrival of Tanzimat, a significant increase was observed in 
the reforms towards the middle of the nineteenth century. Although the responsibility to 
manage this comprehensive modernization was given to the Meclis-i Vâlâ, another 
                                               
61 Gencer, 2001: 160. 
62 It was established on 24 March 1838 with the efforts of Mustafa Reşit Pasha in order to ensure the 
preparation and the implementation of new laws and regulations, setting up a substructure for the 
Tanzimat (Seyitdanlıoğlu, 1999: 36). It was combined with the Meclis-i Tanzimat and divided into three 
units as the Departments of Law and Order, Administration of Civil Service and Proceedings in 1861. On 
28 March 1868, the assembly was separated again as Divân-ı Ahkâm-ı Adliye and Şurâ-yı Devlet to 
liberalize executive and legislative powers and to prevent interference in judicial power. Accordingly 
Şurâ-yı Devlet was held the responsibility of the preparation of new law and regulations and Divân-ı 
Ahkâm-ı Adliye was assigned to take the juridical tasks as a high court (Seyitdanlıoğlu, 1999: 53-58). 
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assembly needed to be established as delays had been experienced in the practices of 
Meclis-i Vâlâ, and it was found insufficient for this wide-ranging task. Conflicts among 
the high bureaucracy of Tanzimat era also played a major role in this decision.63 Indeed 
the presidency of the assembly changed 22 times between 1839 and 1855 and this 
situation did not allow ensuring stability in the intended innovation. For this reason, a 
new assembly called Meclis-i Tanzimat was founded on 25 September 1854 so as to 
prepare new regulations for the complete application of Tanzimat, to revise the existing 
units and to prevent bribery.64  
However the acceleration of units in the administration of Tanzimat reforms 
inhibited the Meclis-i Vâlâ from functioning efficiently due to increased liabilities, 
particularly after the declaration of the Imperial Reform Edict known as Islahat 
Fermanı in 1856. Therefore these two assemblies, which were assigned almost the same 
tasks, were combined under the name of Meclis-i Vâlâ-yı Ahkâm-ı Adliye following the 
accession of Sultan Abdülaziz to the throne in 1861, and Meclis-i Vâlâ was divided into 
three units. One of them was the Legislation and Order Department called Kavanin ve 
Nizamat Dairesi, which was in charge of preparing the proposals for the new laws and 
regulations.65 Accordingly, while any proposal prepared by the Naval Board was 
presented to the Assembly of Tanzimat between 1854 and 1861, the component 
authority in that position after 1861 was specified as the Legislation and Order 
Department. 
This networking allowed any kind of application with regard to the reformation 
to be considered by different units of the state’s whole administrative system, so as to 
develop a more encompassing decision-making mechanism. However, immediate 
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application of decisions was slowed down because of this long approval process and it 
also allowed bureaucratic units, which had no concern with the maritime field, to have a 
voice in the modernization of naval affairs. By taking account of the suggestions of 
many units, the state intended to create a control mechanism to monitor efficient 
administration by means of having an economical attitude towards the expenditures of 
the Imperial Naval Arsenal. By this way, it aimed to avoid unnecessary expenses. 
Conversely, this practice resulted in clumsiness in relation to naval decision-making, 
which in reality needed to be implemented without unnecessary delay. 
A certain consistency in the total number of members of the Naval Board could 
not be achieved in the period of Sultan Abdülmecid, as it was eight until 1851 but was 
increased to nine after the inclusion of the minister of naval factories with the rank of 
vice admiral called ferik.66 This number was decreased to eight again in 1853 and a new 
office was added in 1856 to control the scribes of the Naval Board with the title of 
meclis-i bahriye mümeyyizliği, meaning naval examiner. Following the decision to drop 
the number of scribes to one, an office called purchasing transactor was established in 
1857 in order to monitor all kinds of correspondence relating to purchasing.67 
Towards the 1850s, the liabilities of the Naval Board were considerably 
expanded in parallel with the acceleration in the number of ships, and also military and 
bureaucratic personnel. As well as being responsible for the development of the arsenals 
in terms of equipment and skilled workers, the Naval Board was also involved in the 
management of the commercial fleet and the private ferry companies, which were the 
                                               
66 Ferik was one of the military ranks of the Ottoman army between the rank of müşir and mirliva, and 
was enacted after the abolishment of the Janissary corps and establishment of the new army, Asakir-i 
Mansure-i Muhammediye (Pakalın, 1983: 606-607). In the period of Sultan Abdülmecid, the titles used 
for the naval officers were changed in accordance with the application carried out in the Ottoman army. 
Depending on this alteration, the title of patrona which refers the vice admiral of the Ottoman navy after 
kapudan pasha and kapudane were turned into the title of ferik (Mahmud Şevket Paşa, 1325: 35). 
67 Gencer, 2001: 207-208. 
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main determiners of the Bosphorus traffic.68 In order to lighten its workload, an 
assisting council was established on 23 October 1849. The main task of this temporary 
structure was to specify the needed reforms for the arsenals and the navy and nominate 
the members who would be chosen by the Naval Board. This council was to be 
convened to discuss the relevant issues in the office of Harbour Master three days every 
week.69 The other councils assisting the Naval Board were the councils of construction 
and harbour. Particularly after the implication of steam power in to the Imperial Naval 
Arsenal, a remarkable increase was observed in shipbuilding activities from the 
beginning of 1830s. In addition to the construction works, the Naval Board was in 
charge of controlling the Bosphorus ferry traffic after the foundation of Şirket-i 
Hayriye70 in 1851 by following the instructions given by the Imperial Naval Arsenal. 
Considering the developments in civil maritime in 1858, the increasing workload was 
divided between the relevant departments, and with the establishment of the 
                                               
68 Transport companies from different countries had the right to trade in the coastal cities, to load their 
ships with a range of goods and passengers, and also to move freely among the ports of the Ottoman 
Empire thanks to the capitulations, which were made permanent since the middle of the eighteenth 
century. Civil transport was being dominated by foreign-flagged ships and this situation led Sultan 
Abdülmecid to take some measures and establish a nationalization policy (Kütükoğlu, 1995: 166). For 
this purpose, a steamship called Peyk-i Şevket was purchased and assigned to transporting goods and 
passengers between the ports of Istanbul and Izmir. By order of Sultan Abdülmecid, without shipping a 
sufficient number of shiploads with the Peyk-i Şevket, taking cargo and passengers on foreign ships was 
prohibited. In order to maintain the service of this steamship without interruption, a national transport 
company named Şirket-i Osmaniye was founded and increased its effectiveness by purchasing steamships 
(Arı, 2009: 138). The name of this institution was amended as Mecidiye Şirketi at first and then it was 
decided to be named as Fevaid-i Osmaniye Şirketi in 1843. This company owned 19 steamers which were 
responsible for the transport of the islands of Marmara, the port of Thessaloniki, Crete, Bosphorus, the 
port of Trabzon and the ports of the Marmara Sea respectively (Gencer, 1986: 16-17; Kütükoğlu, 1995: 
167-168, 173).  
69 Gencer, 2001: 199-200, 203. 
70 Although Fevaid-i Osmaniye Şirketi annexed Üsküdar port in addition to Istanbul-Izmir transportation 
line, it failed in competition with foreign companies and was forced to transfer its ships to the French 
Company. As these negative developments appeared, establishment of a new national company was to be 
required and Şirket-i Hayriye was founded in 1851. This company’s transportation fleet consisted of two 
ferryboats, 14 paddle steamers and two steamboats and scheduled services were being organized at 
certain points in the Bosphorus. Thanks to this company, the local economy around portsides was 
reinvigorated and new factories were established to be used for the renovation of the steamers. Due to the 
success of the Şirket-i Hayriye, the French company was forced to stop the transport in the Bosphorus and 
to sell its steamers to the Ottoman Empire in 1852. Şirket-i Hayriye was the one of the most important 




construction and harbour councils, each unit became more independent in developing 
more effective proposals in accordance with their needs and desires. While the council 
of harbour consisted of a chairman, a mufti and five members chosen among the 
merchants enrolled to Şirket-i Hayriye, the construction council included the technical 
staff of the Imperial Naval Arsenal such as chief architect, head architect for repairs and 
chief caulker, as well as the chairman and two permanent members with the rank of 
colonel. Furthermore, another council named Meclis-i Umumi-i Ümera-yı Bahriye was 
established in a temporary context for the resolution of urgent issues regarding the 
Ottoman navy. The members of all administrative units were obliged to participate in 
this council to finalize such matters.71 
All the units established in the reign of Sultan Abdülmecid were in the position 
of advisors to Kapudan Pasha. However, the gradual involvement of bureaucracy into 
the Ottoman naval administration along with the distribution of tasks so as not to give 
the responsibility of the decision-making mechanism to a single authority indicated that 
the government was seeking to introduce a more institutionalized framework into the 
administration of the maritime field during the same period. The main reason for this 
application was the emerging necessity to administer each unit of the navy according to 
certain procedures and regulations after the proclamation of the Imperial Edict of 
Gülhane. The most important step taken for this purpose was the new naval code 
prepared by the Naval Board, for the purpose of administration of naval personnel in a 
clearly identified framework. After receiving the approval of Kapudan Pasha Mehmet 
Ali Pasha, it was submitted to the Meclis-i Vâlâ-yı Ahkâm-ı Adliye through the office 
                                               
71 Gencer, 2001: 203-206. 
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of Grand Vizier. With the acknowledgement of Sultan Abdülmecid, it was put into 
practice on 2 June 1849.72   
As the administrative reforms were carried out between 1840 and 1845, an 
amendment for administrative units was not included until the naval code of 1849, 
which consisted of 167 articles regarding mainly the rules and liabilities of the naval 
personnel commissioned both in the warships and the Imperial Naval Arsenal. The most 
remarkable point about administration was the emphasis placed upon the obligation for 
Naval Board approval for various implementations made according to the naval code. 
By this means, the authority of the Naval Board was presented in a clear context.  
The first articles of the naval code related to the marines and the rules that they 
had to obey in the ships and in their barracks. In addition to this, the ceremonial 
protocol was clearly identified when the Sultan desired to visit any ship belonging to the 
navy. Besides giving information about the patient care planning in the naval hospital, 
the position of senior officers and responsibilities of staff who were commissioned in 
the ammunition stores was explained in detail in the second part.73 Articles related to 
the procedure for crime and punishment, the maintenance of the warships and the 
preservation of ammunition stored in their magazines, the rules and regulations for the 
personnel during cruising, the recruitment process of marines, and their training were 
also added to the naval code.74 The final part was about the practice applied in the 
manufacturing and construction sites of the Imperial Naval Arsenal.75  
 
                                               
72 Bahriye Nizamnamesi (1849), 1996: 1. 
73 Bahriye Nizamnamesi (1849), 1996: 2-9. 
74 Bahriye Nizamnamesi (1849), 1996: 10-15, 22, 30-34. 
75 Bahriye Nizamnamesi (1849), 1996: 43-51.  
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Enthronement of Sultan Abdülaziz and the First Phase of the Naval 
Administration (1861-1867) 
 
Following the death of Sultan Abdülmecid on 25 June 1861, his brother Sultan 
Abdülaziz succeeded to the throne on the same day. Although he was kept away from 
politics and encouraged to engage in sports, hunting, painting, and music in order not to 
cause Sultan Abdülmecid any suspicion regarding a premature enthusiasm for the 
throne during his princeship, Abdülaziz closely followed the present issues of the state 
and started to plan possible solutions that would be carried out in his reign.76 
The young, healthy, and dynamic appearance of the new Sultan, who was 31 
years-old in the first year of his reign, caused an increase in his popularity among the 
public in a short time. Indeed increasing insurrections under the influence of the Pan-
slavist policy that was being followed by Russia with regard to the Christian subjects of 
the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans, in addition to the looming financial crisis, had had 
a negative impact on the state’s central authority. For this reason, people considered any 
change in state leadership as a promising development that could relieve the country 
from the depression. Thus Sultan Abdülaziz emphasised with an imperial decree 
addressed to the Grand Vizier Kıbrıslı Mehmet Paşa on 2 July 1861 that he would be a 
leader who should work untiringly for the well-being and prosperity of his subjects by 
taking measures to regulate the state’s treasury; paying great attention on the army and 
navy, and promising the upholding of the treaties previously concluded with the allied 
states.77 
                                               
76 Mahmud Celaleddin Paşa, 1979: 43-44; Sayar, 1978: 200; Ongunsu, 1993: 57; Gülen, 2001: 98; Uyar 
and Erickson, 2009: 117. 
77 Karal, 2003: 2-3. 
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Sultan Abdülaziz intended to continue the reformist policy that was followed by 
his father Sultan Mahmud II and his brother Sultan Abdülmecid, despite the fact he 
knew that the financial depression was the biggest obstacle set against this purpose. The 
cost for the transfer of his palace residence to Dolmabahçe following his enthronement 
brought an additional burden to the treasury which was already on the brink of 
bankruptcy in consequence of the mounting expenses.78 Therefore he focused more on 
the financial matters by taking precautions to overcome the crisis in the beginning of his 
reign and resorted to placing controls on the palace, laying off redundant officers, who 
held unnecessary offices, and fighting against bribery, all of which granted a respite to 
the financial situation towards 1863.79 
The recovery observed in the state’s financial statement allowed Sultan 
Abdülaziz to carry out the military modernization that he had envisioned before his 
sultanate. The new Sultan of the Ottoman Empire—whose brother had guaranteed the 
empire’s territorial integrity with the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1856 by obtaining 
an alliance with Britain and France during the Crimean War—intended to recapture 
Crimea and to protect the Ottoman lands against Russian expansionist policy. Thus, the 
military reforms accelerated in pursuit of this purpose, left their mark on this period and 
an external attack that could threaten the political integrity of the Empire was not seen 
until the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-1878. As a result of this policy, the Ottoman 
navy became one the most powerful navies of Europe with its ironclads and technical 
equipment towards 1875. In parallel to this, fundamental changes were made on the 
                                               
78 Cevdet Paşa, 1991: 143. 
79 This partial improvement in financial condition of the Empire can be seen from the total revenues of 
the Ottoman budgets between 1859 and 1863. Accordingly, while the Ottoman budget of 1859-1860 was 
9,711,608 pounds sterling, it rose to 10,016,545 pounds sterling in 1861 and 10,091,092 pounds sterling 
in 1862. Depending on fiscal measures taken by the Sultan and increasing revenues obtained from 
customs, tobacco, stamp and salt duties, the budget amounted to 13,284,332 pounds sterling in 1863. 
From TNA: PRO FO 424/20; FO 424/24, 17; FO 78/1790 transferred by Kiyotaki, 2005: 24. 
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administration of the Ottoman navy and the management was brought into a more 
bureaucratic frame.  
The most remarkable implementation in the first period of the naval 
administration was the division of administrative affairs into three units called Navy, 
Order and Provision on 11 August 1863. A document, which is preserved in the Şura-yı 
Bahriye Classification of the Istanbul Naval Museum Archive, is a twelve-point 
regulation, including detailed information about the tasks and liabilities of these newly 
established departments.80 
According to this, the main purpose of the new practice was to provide the 
Naval Board a more coordinate administration due to the increased number of 
warships and the issues related to their maintenance. In accordance with this purpose, 
the departments of Navy, Order and Provision would assess the matters connected with 
their own tasks by themselves and their proposals, including amendments to the existing 
system and new applications, and would be submitted for the approval of the Naval 
Board.81 Kapudan Pasha remained his position to be the chief officer who was 
responsible to the Sultan for all naval business. Being the representative of the navy in 
the government, his decisions determined the political direction of the navy in parallel 
with the imperial policy and for this reason, the authority to finalize the proposals would 
be left to the Kapudan Pasha like in the previous periods as the members of these units 
were still his advisors. 
                                               
80 DMA, ŞUB, 1865, 80-82 (11 August 1863).  
81 DMA, ŞUB, 1865, 80-81 (11 August 1863). This implementation was only mentioned by Gencer, 
2001: 208 among secondary sources and the other sources providing information on this issue referenced 
Gencer’s book which informs the readers only about the names of these newly established units and refers 
1864 as the date of this implementation without giving the day and the month. In this section, we clarify 
this date as 11 August 1863 and give detailed information on the tasks and liabilities of each unit 
constituted the naval administration system between 1861 and 1867. 
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By separating the workload of the Naval Board between different units, a 
reduction in the expenditures was also expected, as it was emphasised in the new 
regulation that each unit would be responsible to use the budget allocated from the 
naval treasury only for the necessary issues. When the departments are examined in 
terms of their assigned tasks, a considerable expansion can be observed in connection 
with the technical modernization of the Ottoman navy which started from the accession 
of Sultan Abdülaziz to the throne. Accordingly we will evaluate the administrative 
responsibilities of each unit in separate headings. 
The Naval Board: Behind the office of Kapudan Pasha, it was the most 
important department of the Ottoman navy for being the main advisory centre for all 
kinds of affairs related to the naval forces and the arsenals. Being the first naval 
advisory group of the Kapudan Pasha, it consisted of nine members and a mufti under 
the supervision of a president and according to the new regulation, the number of 
members would not be increased as long as a new officer was directly appointed by the 
Sultan. In case of an important decision, the advice of officers registered to the navy 
would be consulted by the chairman of the board.82 
 The board’s main authority was to administer the activities engaged in 
manufacturing and construction in an efficient way. The proposals made by this unit 
had weight, given that its liabilities laid mainly with the fighting efficiency and 
employment of the fleet. It held the responsibility of control over all correspondence 
between the other departments and to obtain the needed approval from the Naval Board, 
which was the only authority prior to the Kapudan Pasha in planning the new laws and 
required amendments to the existing regulations. While the other departments had a 
                                               
82 DMA, ŞUB, 1865, 81-82 (11 August 1863). 
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kind of independency in specifying the needs of their units, there were some other 
responsibilities held only by the Naval Board, such as the demotions and appointments 
of the officers whose ranks were higher than lieutenant commander, and the execution 
of purchasing activities by regulating the tender offers and related negotiations to 
determine the appropriate prices. In addition to these, the board had the power to impose 
the penalty of incarceration for more than three years and other heavy sentences.83  
Navy Unit: Including a chairman and three other members, this department 
directed everything about the fleet and its activities were complement of the work of the 
Naval Board. It engaged in the issues concerning the navy and the naval personnel, and 
was in charge of the modernization of warships and keeping the navy in good order, 
guarding the costs of the Mediterranean and Black Sea, and the maintenance and 
renovation of naval ordnance such as guns, weapons, and cannon balls. The preparation 
of reforms for the Imperial Naval Arsenal, Danube fleet, and the naval forces located in 
Basra also fell to this department, which was also concerned with the recruitment 
process of marines and their training.84 It was subordinate to the Naval Board as were 
the other departments and, considering the variety of its tasks, this unit may be regarded 
as the main assistant of the board as their operations were closely related. 
Order Unit: The duties of the order unit were mainly concerned with the 
supervision of the rules and regulations and their compliance with the existing code of 
practice. It also directed the preparation of books regarding the salaries, appointments, 
and attendance of naval personnel. The accordance of the procedure about the 
reassigned staff with the present regulations and the progress payments of dependants 
benefits were monitored by this department. In addition to this, it supervised the 
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84 DMA, ŞUB, 1865, 82 (11 August 1863). 
52 
 
applications of marines requesting their removal from the naval register and the 
determination of punishments for crimes such as bribery and corruption.85 
Provision Unit: The Naval Board was assisted by this unit in regard to the work 
at the storehouses and depots of the Imperial Naval Arsenal. It directed the provision of 
required material such as clothing and food for the marines, and oversaw the important 
technical equipment kept in the storehouses for the Imperial Naval Arsenal. All these 
necessary supplies were purchased and delivered to the relevant department by the 
provision unit which was responsible for carrying out the purchasing work punctually. 
They were in charge of issuing the bills for the purchased goods and examination of 
their compliance with the contracts made at the time of delivery to the storehouses and 
controlling the correspondence sent by the Manufacturing Board 86 regarding timbers 
purchased or produced for the warships. Additionally, the members were to prepare 
account books reporting the expenditures of storehouses and depots in the Imperial 
Naval Arsenal at the end of every year.87 
As can be seen, the workload distribution according to which the Naval Board 
conducted its business can be witnessed in detail, highlighting the success of the 
implementation of the new regulations of 1863. Three conditions, however, principally 
determined the decision-making: the domestic and foreign policy of the state, the 
strength of the navy, and the naval estimates. Therefore it was very important for all 
these branches of the naval administration to work together in an efficient manner to 
provide consistency for the naval treasury, by taking the required measures to keep the 
navy in a battle-ready form. This necessity occurred after the accelerated number of 
                                               
85 DMA, ŞUB, 1865, 82 (11 August 1863). 
86 It was written in the same document that this unit was intended to be established after the acceptance of 
the new regulation of 1863 (DMA, ŞUB, 1865, 82 (11 August 1863). 
87 DMA, ŞUB, 1865, 82 (11 August 1863). 
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warships positioned the manufacturing and construction works to be foregrounded in 
the activities of the Naval Board, as the budget was mostly used for these areas. For this 
reason, the need for another unit emerged within the frame of the new system and was 
to be specifically connected with the shipbuilding programme which had two main 
characteristics: the finalization of the work in hand and the new construction and 
provision of proper management of estimates for the purchase of necessary materials. 
In parallel with this purpose, it was stated in the new regulation that the 
establishment of an additional board called İmalat-ı Bahriye Meclisi (Manufacturing 
Board) would be required.88 After our archival research focusing on this matter, we 
observed that this decision was implemented in the same year.  
 The Manufacturing Board was established on 27 December 1863 by the Naval 
Board to supervise the schedule of work done in the arsenals, the provision of required 
equipment, and its allocation in accordance with the shipbuilding programme. In other 
words, the construction and reparation of the battleships, and the production and 
determination of technical equipment and military provisions, fell to this department. To 
allow manufacturing and construction works to be completed optimally, it held the main 
responsibility to direct the budget allocated for these purposes which helped preventing 
unnecessary expenses.89  
Besides being the chief officer of the harbour council, the harbourmaster was 
specified as the president of this board as well, and it was decided to appoint three 
officers as the other members whose ranks ranged from major general to colonel. If 
consultation with other offices was required, the chairman had the permission to assign 
more members temporarily.  
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The essentialities of all the provisions supplied for warships, and their adequacy 
were under the control of the manufacturing board which was in charge of informing the 
storehouses about this issue. In case of an urgent consignment for the navy when 
commissioned under immediate circumstances, the approval of manufacturing board 
was sufficient to dispatch needed equipment. 
Another important task that the board dealt with was the construction and design 
of the warships. Following the order issued for a new construction, the qualities such as 
length, displacement and numbers of guns were determined by Kapudan Pasha and 
sketch designs prepared by the manufacturing board in compliance with the instructions 
were sent to the Naval Board to be discussed. In addition to this, reports regarding the 
condition of ships under repair and their equipment that needed alteration or 
replacement were drawn up by this unit. The approval of the Naval Board for these two 
implementations was sufficient and the decisions made on these issues could not be 
changed without the sanction of the same authority. Additionally, the responsibility for 
the translation of papers and books published in regard to shipbuilding and machinery 
sciences in foreign countries was given to the manufacturing board, in order to be kept 
informed about the alterations and inventions in those areas.90 
On 30 December 1863, another unit called Erkan-ı Harbiye Zabitliği (Unit for 
Senior Naval Officers) was founded in order to provide a better administration for the 
usage of naval ordnance such as cannon balls, munitions, weapons and explosive 
guns.91 As may be recalled, this task had fallen to the navy unit among the assisting 
departments of the Naval Board by the new regulation implemented on 11 August 1863. 
Thus the workload related to naval ammunition was shifted to this new unit to lighten 
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the heavy workload of the Naval Board, which supervised all kinds of modernization 
activities for the Ottoman navy.  
In the fifth article of the regulation explaining the work definition of the Unit for 
Senior Naval Officers, it was advised to train the officers commissioned in this unit on 
the topic of science of strategy and its practice. Furthermore we learn from the same 
document that an English officer, named Mr. Philips, was commissioned for the 
interpretation work of this unit with a monthly salary amounting to 25 pounds sterling.92 
This situation indicates that the regulations implemented in the British Admiralty Board 
might be a model for the preparation of new law and ordinances prepared for this unit. 
As can be seen, the first phase of the naval administration in the reign of Sultan 
Abdülaziz resulted in the foundation of several assisting subunits. This necessity 
emerged from the intense operations carried out in the dockyards, and the tasks and 
liabilities of naval personnel were clearly defined by the new rules and regulations. This 
new system, operated between 1861 and 1867, can be seen more clearly in the diagram 
below: 
 
Figure 1. First Phase of the Naval Administration (1861-1867) 
                                               
























Kapudan Pasha retained his position as the chief officer and decision maker of 
the navy while the other units were still his advisors. However the rapid expansion of 
the advisory units for the naval administration after 1863 indicated the traditional nature 
of Ottoman naval administration was on a path of fundamental change, which led to the 
foundation of the Ministry of Marine in 1867.  
 
Conclusion 
Following the declaration of the Imperial Edict of Gülhane in 1839, the application of 
Tanzimat reforms revealed the need for a radical innovation of the traditional 
administrative system of the Ottoman navy and the most significant developments in the 
naval administration were the foundation of the Naval Board in 1840 and the measures 
introduced in 1845 to make its position permanent. It kept the characteristics of being an 
advisory authority, but this also allowed the other officers of the Ottoman navy 
alongside of the Kapudan Pasha to carry out the preparatory phase of reforms in a more 
systematic manner, since the responsibility for this issue was given to a permanent 
council rather than to an unstable structure as the Meclis-i Adiyye. Aside from the 
assisting council, another two councils were established in 1858 in order to control the 
construction works and to supervise maritime transport. In parallel with these 
developments, the rules and regulations of military and administrative personnel of the 
navy in their assigned position were framed in a more systematic manner with the 
arrival of the naval code in 1849.  
In the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz, the first step taken for the modernization of the 
naval administration was the division of the workload of the Naval Board into three 
departments—Navy, Order and Provision—in 1863 to maintain a better management 
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strategy for providing consistency of the naval treasury, and keeping the navy in a 
battle-ready form, adapted to the acceleration observed in the number of warships and 
naval personnel. In addition to this, the affairs of Imperial Naval Arsenal were to be 
institutionalized with the establishment of the Manufacturing Board and Unit for Senior 




















CHAPTER 3. THE MINISTRY OF MARINE AND DEVELOPMENTS IN 





In the second phase of the naval administration, the management of the naval fleet was 
subjected to a fundamental change which brought a new bureaucratic approach to the 
administrative structuring by altering its military character. This process started with the 
abolishment of the Office of Kapudan Pasha and the foundation of the Ministry of 
Marine in 1867. This was the most significant development in naval administration, 
which we intend to discuss in this present chapter to have a clear analysis on the main 
characteristics of this new structuring, which was imported directly from British naval 
experience.  
Secondly, we will focus more on the results of the abandonment of the system 
applied in the first phase of the naval administration, by discussing the reorganisation of 
administrative units. In the final part of the chapter, the role the British mission played 
in the naval modernization will be examined by considering the effects of the British 
advisors commissioned in the Ottoman navy during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz. As 
remarked in the first chapter, Britain became a prominent state in providing assistance 
to the Ottoman Empire, helping to strengthen their naval forces, leading to a long-term 
Ottoman-British alliance after the Treaty of Hünkar İskelesi in 1833. We also remarked 
that the scope of the naval modernization carried out in the period of Sultan Abdülaziz 
depended mostly on British aid due to the aforementioned reasons, and the British 
Admiralty was taken as the model in terms of naval administration, education, and 
technology during this period. To ground this claim on a more solid base in this present 
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chapter, British advisors who were commissioned in the Ottoman navy with the title of 
“pasha” will be evaluated in order to assess their effectiveness in reforming the naval 
administration. To confirm the idea that the new administration system of the Ottoman 
navy replicated British prototypes under the influence of British advisors, we will 
examine the effect of the British mission by focusing on the new naval code, which was 




The Abolishment of the Office of Kapudan Pasha and the Foundation of the 
Ministry of Marine  
 
The most important administrative reform made by the Ottoman navy was the 
abolishment of the office of Kapudan Pasha, and the establishment of the Ministry of 
Marine in 1867. As it is understood from the previous section, the acceleration of new 
units and regulations were the precursor of a radical transition in the nature of the naval 
administration, as it started to become dominated by its bureaucratic framework as 
opposed to its military arm towards the middle of Sultan Abdülaziz’s reign. As has been 
mentioned, this idea had been first presented by the office of Grand Vizier in 1845, with 
the suggestion for the inclusion of more than one Kapudan Pasha called Admiral in 
compliance with the practice implemented by the European powers. However it had 
been refused by the Sultan Abdülmecid and by this means, the office of Kapudan Pasha 
continued its existence until 1867.  
The secondary literature suggests the expansion of the Kapudan Pasha’s 
authority and responsibility—including the financial administration of the Imperial 
Naval Arsenal after the abolishment of the Undersecretariat of the Navy in 1861—was 
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the reason for this radical decision. It is also claimed that because of his increasing 
responsibilities, the Kapudan Pasha could not supervise the comprehensive 
modernization of the navy in an efficient manner.93  
We can accept this idea to have partial accuracy, as it is clear that the 
comprehensive naval modernization in the period of Sultan Abdülaziz required a heavy 
workload. However we also know that the financial administration of the navy was 
given to the Naval Board beginning in 1845, and the increasing affairs of the Ottoman 
navy were divided between different offices established in 1863 to assist Kapudan 
Pasha, who retained the position of being the only decision-maker on naval issues.  
For this reason, we think that the abolishment of the Undersecretariat of the 
Navy in 1861 cannot be claimed as the main reason for the Ottoman navy’s 
abandonment of the traditional administration, whose conventions had existed for 
centuries, in order to have a more institutional dimension by the establishment of the 
Ministry of Marine. Considering imperial policy to be the main determiner of the 
Ottoman naval insight, we believe that the political developments of the Empire’s 
foreign policy, particularly with Britain playing a key role in the kind of remarkable 
implementations that were carried out for the Ottoman navy during this period, provide 
a more convincing explanation for the changes.  
As previously mentioned, as a consequence of the Russian-French-British 
cooperation during the Battle of Navarino in 1827, the Ottoman Empire was dragged 
into a political isolation, which resulted in their unlikely reliance on Russia during the 
rebellion of Egypt’s governors. With the help of the declaration of Tanzimat in 1839, 
we observe the full support of Britain and France to the Ottomans during the Hungarian 
                                               




Refugees Problem and Holy Lands Question, and this resulted in an Ottoman-British-
French alliance against Russia during the Ottoman-Russian war of 1853-1856, known 
as the Crimean war. After the Treaty of Paris in 1856, the Ottoman territorial integrity 
was guaranteed by the European powers and the Ottomans protected their status as an 
ally of Britain and France towards the middle of the 1870s. This inconsistency in the 
political balance forced the Empire to appeal to different states—which were France and 
Sweden in the reign of Sultan Selim III, the USA in the period of Sultan Mahmud II, 
and Britain in the Tanzimat reform era—to receive assistance in their naval 
modernization programme during the nineteenth century. For this reason, we observe 
Britain to be the most important country with which the Ottoman Empire had intense 
relations in terms of naval assistance in the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz. As we shall see 
in the later chapters of our work regarding naval education and technical modernization, 
the Ottoman navy started to receive British aid in the planned naval modernization at 
the beginning of the 1860s. Under the influence of British advisors, consultants, and 
British made equipment and warships bought to be commissioned in the Ottoman navy, 
the naval administration also tried to associate itself with the administrative methods 
implemented in the Royal Navy. Therefore it can be said that the decision to establish 
the Ministry of Marine was the continuation of the same idea that was brought to the 
agenda in 1845 to replicate the British naval administration. 
Within the scope of this opinion, we see that the proposal first suggested a 
bilateral administration as military and financial management, which was submitted to 
the Sultan on 11 March 1867 by the Grand Vizier, stating that while the tasks and 
liabilities of the office of Kapudan Pasha were limited to naval works, a separate unit 
called the Ministry of Marine would be established to administer the financial issues of 
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the Imperial Naval Arsenal such as equipment required for warships, salaries, and 
materials for the naval personnel.94 In addition, it was decided that Hakkı Pasha,95 the 
Minister of the Sultan’s Treasury, would be appointed as the Minister of Marine, while 
his brother Mehmed Emin Efendi and the accountant of the Edirne province, Hafız Said, 
were to be assigned as the assistant minister and accountant of the navy respectively.96 
In the same proposal, the formation of another unit was also proposed to assist the 
Kapudan Pasha with the following statement:  
The tasks of Kapudan Pasha will be limited to be the commander of the navy as 
before and a private board under his supervision consisting of distinguished 
officers from the naval personnel will be required in the new administration.97  
 
The unit mentioned was the Board of Admiralty, and it was established to 
determine prospective reforms regarding the navy, and to report them to the Kapudan 
Pasha to be implemented after the mutual approval of both the Kapudan Pasha and the 
Minister of Marine. On 26 March 1867, the chairman and the members of the board 
were introduced to the Kapudan Pasha for confirmation.98 Vice-Admiral Mustafa Pasha 
was appointed as the chairman,99 and he was replaced with Hacı Vesim Pasha with an 
annual salary of 272 pounds sterling.100  
In the new system, the financial and the military tasks were completely separated 
in this way. In other words, while the Kapudan Pasha was the commander of the fleet, 
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the minister was positioned as the treasury keeper. However, this time the Kapudan 
Pasha was under the supervision of the minister, who became the main decision-maker 
of the Ottoman navy, which seems the main difference from the similar 
implementations in the previous periods. 
Hakkı Pasha, appointed as the Minister of Marine on 12 March 1867, presented 
the regulations concerning the structuring of the Ministry and the duties of the office of 
Kapudan Pasha on 17 March 1867. After their official confirmation by Sultan 
Abdülaziz in the same day, the tasks and liabilities of both offices were sent back to the 
Ministry to require their immediate application on 19 March 1867.101 
When the new regulation of the Ministry102 is examined, it can be immediately 
seen that it had the same characteristics as the Naval Board had in the first phase of the 
naval administration in the same period. Broadly speaking, the Ministry of Marine was 
responsible for all the shipbuilding and maintenance tasks of the Ottoman navy and the 
provision of technological equipment needed by the Imperial Naval Arsenal. Therefore 
all the previous units of the navy, which had been commissioned for this purpose, were 
affiliated with the Ministry. Substantially high expenditures, such as constructing new 
ships or purchasing naval outfits, would be notified by the Minister to the Sublime Porte 
and the proposal would be submitted to the Sultan after scrutinizing. If the number of 
marines and warships needed to be increased, the decision would be made according to 
the mutual opinion of both the Kapudan Pasha and the Minister of Marine. The 
expenditures on the naval personnel such as clothing, catering, and salaries would be 
determined and submitted for the Kapudan Pasha’s review by the Board of Admiralty. 
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After the confirmation of the Kapudan Pasha, the Ministry had to be informed for the 
final approval. 
As clearly stated in this regulation, the main aims of the establishment of the 
Ministry were to provide order to the Imperial Naval Arsenal and to prevent the 
exceeding of the naval budget. Furthermore, the Minister became the top authorized 
officer of the Ottoman navy, with general authority for all areas of procurement except 
the naval recruitment process. However, Damat Mehmed Ali Pasha was not content 
with this decision and presented his resignation a month after the approval of the new 
regulation. Correspondingly, the Office of the Kapudan Pasha, which had carried on its 
existence for hundreds of years, was abolished by the order of Sultan Abdülaziz and the 
administration of the navy was transferred to the Board of Admiralty which became 
directly attached to the Ministry.103 
 
Structuring the Ministry of Marine: The Division of Workload and the 
Reorganization of Auxiliary Units  
 
After the foundation of the Ministry of Marine, the administration system experienced 
significant innovations and new auxiliary units needed to be established in addition to 
the Naval Board. We can observe this from the archival documents, which show that 
after 1867, the system of naval administration expanded on a great scale and it began to 
have a more complex appearance and its new structuring was determined by the 
regulations dated 1868, 1869, and 1873. 
We have explained in detail the tasks and the liabilities of the Ministry of 
Marine as the decision-maker of the naval administration during this period in the 
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previous section. At this point, we will try to clarify the alteration phases of the system 
after the regulation of 1863 by scrutinizing the areas of responsibility of the auxiliary 
units in the Ministry of Marine.  
 
The Naval Board 
 
We observe that, after about a year from the foundation of the Ministry, the structure 
and the functioning of the Naval Board was reorganized. Thus a document preserved in 
the Istanbul Naval Archive Museum shows that this arrangement was constituted on 9 
May 1868.104 In addition to this, we learn of the establishment of two new units called 
the Board of Economy and the Office of Naval Personnel set up in order to assist the 
Ministry from another document dated 17 September 1868.105 
Despite the above-mentioned changes, the Naval Board presented a similar 
constitutional characteristic in parallel with the system, applied in 1863 as the number 
of administrative staff totalled ten members, including one chairman and nine members. 
However the members were divided into two categories as permanent and temporary in 
1868, and it was decided that the permanent members would only be assigned for the 
works of the Naval Board while the temporary ones would be chosen among the 
officers who were commissioned in the Imperial Naval Arsenal. Items of the agenda to 
be discussed by the board would be indicated by the president, and if the consensus 
could not be achieved, decisions made by majority of votes would be also notified by 
the president to the Ministry. The members, whose votes were against the majority, 
were obliged to explain the reasons for their opposition to the Ministry in the new 
system. Additionally, it was emphasised in the new regulation that apart from the 
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president, the approval of at least four members would be required for decision making 
and a record book regarding the decisions made by the board would be kept on a regular 
basis to be sent to the Ministry at the end of every year.106 As is understood, these new 
items were added into the regulation of 1868 to ensure the functionality of all the 
members in the board, and to make better decisions—primarily on expenditures—by 
evaluating the contrasting opinions as the main tasks and responsibilities of the board 
were specified as the financial management of the navy after 1868.  
As previously discussed, the workload of the board was divided into different 
auxiliary units after the establishment of the Units of Navy, Order and Provision and the 
Manufacturing Board in 1863. However, the new regulation of 1868 indicated that all 
these units were abolished after the foundation of the Ministry of Marine in 1867, and 
their tasks and responsibilities were given to the Naval Board. Although they were 
replaced with the Board of Economy and the Office of Marines, we can say that the 
Naval Board’s scope of authority was rather expansive and the newly established boards 
remained as its assistants in some specific areas. As a result of this, the liabilities of the 
board were distinguished between three main sections as revenues and expenses, 
prospective reforms on the navy, and the naval personnel and the activities regarding 
shipbuilding and manufacturing on 9 May 1868. As the regulations of each section were 
only summarized in this document,107 it was not possible for us to make a detailed 
comparison between the regulations of 1863 and 1868, or to evaluate the alterations 
made in the board’s area of authority. However we found the continuation of this 
implementation in the Istanbul Naval Archive Museum that indicates that a separate 
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regulation for each section was prepared and that they were adopted on 8 September 
1868.108 Now, we will examine each section in separate headings. 
 
Revenues and Expenditures:  
Financial management remained the main area of responsibility of the board since it 
was first established in 1845. Thus, the principal purpose of regulations created to 
determine the tasks of assisting units was to provide a more economical framework to 
the naval treasury.  
In the regulations formed in 1868, the Naval Board became the only authority on 
the administration of the revenues allocated for the navy. The income revenue sources 
included proceeds obtained from coal mines; the tax revenues of Adalar, Kartal, 
Maltepe and Pendik piers and income gained from the shellfish exportation caught from 
the shores on the Imperial Naval Arsenal farmed out to third parties with a charge. The 
basic expenditures were specified as ammunition required for the storehouses of the 
Imperial Naval Arsenal; provisions, such as clothing and food, for the naval personnel, 
and timber and related materials that were needed for shipbuilding and 
manufacturing.109 For this reason, we can say that all the tasks and liabilities held by the 
Provision Unit and the Manufacturing Board in 1863 were given to the Naval Board on 
8 September 1868, as the income was mostly spent for the naval personnel and the 
Imperial Naval Arsenal.  
Further to this, new responsibilities were added into the existing articles adopted 
in 1863. Accordingly, the board members and the officers who worked in the 
storehouses were in charge of controlling available stocks and preparing reports at the 
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end of each year regarding the present condition and the approximate amount of 
required materials for the next year. With this implementation, the Ministry of Marine 
intended to determine if the materials were spent on unnecessary purposes, and to 
purchase the required equipment and provisions for the warships and naval personnel. 
In fact, in the 7th article of the new regulation, it was provided the office of finance in 
the Imperial Naval Arsenal was to be commissioned to keep the accounts of the naval 
treasury in an orderly manner, and it held the responsibility of informing the Ministry of 
Finance and the Ministry of Marine on a regular basis.110  
 
The Navy and the Naval Personnel:  
With the arrival of the new regulation, the Naval Board comprised whole duties and 
procedures carried out for the navy and the naval personnel, which had been under the 
supervision of the Navy and Order Units in 1863. Additionally, the implementation of 
new methods being experimented with in Europe—in order to keep the navy in a battle-
ready form and the communication between the Board of Admiralty and ship captains in 
relation to the instructions to be carried out in the warships—fell to the Naval Board. In 
addition to these, it held the responsibility for training of naval officers, instructors, and 
marines to be commissioned in the Ottoman navy by providing consistency in 
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Shipbuilding and Manufacturing:  
The third section of the Naval Board’s authority was designated for the construction and 
production works and it was composed of entirely new articles, unlike the other 
sections.  
 According to this, the operations carried out in the Imperial Naval Arsenal were 
divided in two main areas; construction and maintenance of iron plated and wooden 
ships under the supervision of the chief architect, and manufacturing and repairing of 
machinery and boilers held by the office of factories. To prevent interruptions during 
the course of operations, the responsibility of control over the storehouses—to 
determine if the stocks were sufficient and to monitor the level of construction and 
production each month—fell to the Naval Board. Furthermore, it directed the following 
of developments in the machinery engineering and architectural sciences and new 
inventions on naval industry in Europe.112 
As the productivity of all the operations depended on the existence of a qualified 
workforce, it was highlighted that the board would maintain a sufficient number of 
workers in the Imperial Naval Arsenal, and the wages would be determined according to 
their level of competence in order to pay everyone based on their expertise. In addition, 
the officers and workers, who caused the equipment to be wasted due to their low 
performance, laziness, remissness, or effortlessness, would be investigated by the Naval 
Board and, after their inquest, the report would be prepared by the board to be sent to 
the Ministry.113 The main purpose of these arrangements on the naval workers was to 
provide the completion of operations without any delay by keeping the number of 
employees at a certain level. We can understand from the 2nd article of the regulation 
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that the need for more local workers was a further reason for these applications, as it 
was explained with the following sentence that, “the primary importance of the Imperial 
Naval Arsenal was to be rescued from the dependency on foreign workers”. In order to 
resolve this problem, the Naval Board held the responsibility for the technical training 
of naval engineers and naval industry corps, and it was decided to recruit more students 
for the corps both from Istanbul and outside.114 
As is seen, the regulation of 1868 gave a very heavy workload to the Naval 
Board, as its authority covered all the tasks and liabilities of the auxiliary units 
established in 1863 and the regulations for the shipbuilding and manufacturing 
operations were newly specified under the terms of the period. 
However, the negative consequences of giving the responsibility of all these 
operations to a single unit must be understood in 1873 as the Naval Board, which kept 
its authority arranged by the regulation of 1868 until 1873, was again divided into four 
units called Navy, Order, Provision and Manufacturing. While the first document we 
found on this issue shows that the new regulation of this implementation was approved 
by the Ministry of Marine on 17 April 1873,115 according to the other document,116 this 
decision was made to regulate the Naval Board in accordance with the regulations 
carried out by the Der-i Şura-yı Askeri.117  
As a result of our archival research, we found the regulation of 1873 in the Şura-
yı Bahriye classification of the Istanbul Naval Archive Museum. With the title of 
Bahriye Meclisi’nin Vezaif-i Mahsusasına ve Terkib-i Devairine Dair Nizamname, this 
document confirms the reorganization of workload and its date of approval shown in the 
                                               
114 DMA, ŞUB, 1901, 53B-5A, 53B-6A (8 September 1868). 
115 BOA, A.MKT.MHM, 453-30-1 (18 April 1873). 
116 BOA, A.MKT.MHM, 453-30-2 (28 April 1873). 
117 It was a military council established in 1838 to deliberate all military problems of the Empire 
(Hanioğlu, 2011: 177). 
71 
 
first document. It also includes detailed information about each unit’s area of 
responsibility.118 In the first article of the regulation, it was emphasised that the Naval 
Board kept its characteristics of being the centre of all naval affairs, and the matters to 
be supervised by the auxiliary units summarized as follows: 
 Navy Unit: The determiner of new reforms in regard to the navy and dockyards 
and the implementation of regulations for naval personnel, such as their 
recruitment and training. 
 Order Unit: Controlling of progress payments on promotions to a higher rank, 
the approval of donations, and the preparation of award and punishment 
rulebooks. 
 Provision Unit: Supply and preservation of all required materials for the naval 
personnel and their transmission to the relevant departments. 
 Manufacturing Unit: Supervision of all the shipbuilding and manufacturing 
operations in the Imperial Naval Arsenal. 
In the 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th articles of the regulation, the tasks and liabilities of each 
unit were explained in detail. When we compare this with the regulations of 1863 and 
1868, it can be observed that the same articles were repeated in 1873. Thus the 
responsibilities of the Naval Board in 1868 regarding the revenues and expenditures 
were given to the Provision Unit, and the matters related to the navy and naval 
personnel were divided between the Navy and Order Units in 1873. The articles 
pertaining to the construction and production of the Imperial Naval Arsenal were copied 
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from the regulation of 1868 and the responsibility of these activities was given to the 
newly established Manufacturing Unit.119  
For this reason, the only difference between the administrative systems of 1863 
and 1873 was the abolishment of the Manufacturing Board and its transmission to the 
Naval Board in 1868. It was established again under the name of Manufacturing Unit in 
1873, but its area of authority was remarkably expanded. Correspondingly, we can say 
that the administration system implemented after the foundation of the Ministry of 
Marine was abolished in 1873 and the system of 1863 was re-established. This also 
confirms the failure of the naval administration in a period of ten years from 1863 to 
1873 and the alterations made after the establishment of the Ministry had a negative 
impact on maintaining consistency of administrative units.  
The return of naval administration back to its condition of 1863—in terms of its 
functionality—was not reflected in its structuring as the board consisted of nine 
permanent and four temporary members, not counting the president, after the arrival of 
the regulation of 1873. The temporary members were specified as the commanders of 
navy and the port of Istanbul, the Harbourmaster and the Minister of the Naval 
Academy. Furthermore the president of the Naval Board was also determined as the 
chairman of the Navy Unit and the appointment of vice-presidents to the other units was 
approved. Apart from the vice-presidents, the auxiliary units included two members and 
a head scribe.120 
When the last four articles of the regulation are examined, it can be seen that 
another unit, called general commission, was placed into the administrative mechanism 
in 1873. As is understood, this unit was established to discuss and finalise the affairs 
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considered of substantial importance. It was also made compulsory for the all assisting 
units to be gathered once a week under the presidency of the chairman of the Naval 
Board in the office of the Navy Unit. The issues to be discussed, solely by the general 
commission, were the preparation of new codes of practice or modifications on existing 
regulations and the decisions regarding the purchasing of required materials amounting 
to more than 227 pounds sterling. Furthermore, the responsibilities of demotions of 
senior officers and appointments of the officers whose ranks were higher than lieutenant 
commander were directed by the general commission. It also had the power to impose 
the penalty of execution or incarceration for more than three years.121 
The naval administration system configured in 1873 remained in operation until 
the end of the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz in 1876. Making new regulations after the 
arrival of the Ministry of Marine was perceived as an obligation and depending upon 
the unstableness of the executive units, frequent reassignments and dismissals were 
experienced by the administrative staff. Due to changing decisions in the course of just 
a few short years, which saw constantly altered regulations, expanded tasks and 
responsibilities and newly established units, a persistent administrative vision could not 
be developed. This had a negative effect on the purpose of providing consistency for 
both financial and naval administration, which was one of the biggest needs of the 
Ottoman navy, especially towards the 1870s.  
 
The Board of Economy 
 
Depending upon the acceleration of construction and shipbuilding activities and the 
increasing number of administrative and naval personnel towards the middle of the 
                                               




reign of the Sultan Abdülaziz, a new board called the Board of Economy was 
established on 17 September 1868 to assist the Naval Board pertaining to purchases of 
technical equipment and provisions.  
Data obtained from the secondary literature suggests that the Manufacturing 
Board established in 1863 was replaced with the Board of Economy on 18 March 1867. 
Apart from this information, it only includes the basic tasks of the board and the names 
of its members.122 However, a document we found in the Istanbul Naval Archive 
Museum clearly indicates that the Board of Economy was established on 17 September 
1868 as a new administrative unit.123 In addition to this, when we compare the 
regulations of 1863 and 1868 prepared for the Manufacturing Board and the Board of 
Economy respectively, it can be seen that their areas of responsibility were different 
from one another. As we mentioned before, the main tasks of the Manufacturing Board 
were determined to be the assurance that shipbuilding and manufacturing activities 
would be carried out in an orderly manner. On the other hand, the Board of Economy 
was founded for financial management and its liabilities were almost the same as the 
Provision Unit established in 1863. For this reason, we can say that after the 
abolishment of the Provision Unit on 8 September 1868, it was replaced with the Board 
of Economy on 17 September 1868. The board’s membership consisted of one chairman 
and five permanent members, and its main responsibility was determining the type and 
amount of the required materials with an appropriate price. In addition, board members 
were expected to conclude the tender offers and auction sales in the most accurate 
condition. Following the presentation of product samples by artisans and merchants, the 
prices and the way of payment were specified on a certificate to be controlled by the 
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board to finalize the purchases with a contract. In addition to this, the responsibility to 
prevent collusive tendering by investigating the general condition of the market was 
given to the board members.124  
 To provide more sources of income to the naval treasury, materials determined 
as unsuitable for use were sold through the way of auction sales by the Board of 
Economy. Furthermore the inspection of the expenditures and purchases of the 
storehouses of victuals, garment, munition, timber, coal, and wood in the Imperial 
Naval Arsenal and the coal stores of the other dockyards every four months fell to the 
board and the audit reports were presented to the Ministry.125 
As can be seen, this was essentially a continuation of the Provision Unit and 
after the re-division of the Naval Board in 1873, we see that the re-established Provision 
Unit had the same responsibilities as the Board of Economy. As we could not find any 
document that confirms the abolishment of the Board of Economy after 1873, it can be 
said that it was positioned in an assisting role next to the Provision Unit in terms of the 
workload relating to tender offers and auction sales until the end of Sultan Abdülaziz’s 
reign. 
 
The Board of Admiralty and the Office of Naval Personnel 
 
As previously mentioned, the Board of Admiralty was established as an auxiliary unit of 
the office of Kapudan Pasha on 11 March 1867. Following the abolishment of the 
Office a month after the foundation of the Ministry of Marine, the Board was positioned 
as the assistant of the Naval Board on affairs regarding to the Ottoman navy and the 
naval personnel such as determining the required reforms, carrying out the recruitment 
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process, and investigating the essential materials for the warships and navy personnel.126 
Comparing its tasks and liabilities with the Navy Unit established in 1863, the Board of 
Admiralty can be seen as an extended version of the Navy Unit after 1867. 
We found that another unit was established for the affairs of naval personnel on 
17 September 1868. This new office, called the Office of Marines, was for the routine 
operations of the navy and navy personnel and the implementation of military cases.127 
Accordingly, this office held the responsibility of carrying out the procedures regarding 
the marines, who participated in naval operations according to the recruitment 
regulations or voluntarily, the students of the Naval Academy and the naval industry 
corps. It also directed the distribution of naval pilots to the warships; promotions of 
naval personnel and the students of the naval industry corps; and determined the 
penalties for the officers who contravened against the military laws by reason of crimes 
and misdemeanours, such as theft or uncleanliness. The task of controlling the 
information pertaining to the students of the Naval Academy, who succeeded in the 
general examinations carried out at the end of each year, all fell to this department.128 
Considering the similarity between the two departments in terms of their areas 
of authority, it might be accurate to say that the Board of Admiralty was replaced with 
the Office of Marines in 1868, and eventually annulled in 1873 while its tasks and 
liabilities were divided between the re-established units of Navy and Order. However, 
we could not find any corroborating documents in Turkish archives to support this 
assessment. Therefore the Board of Admiralty and the Office of Marines can be seen as 
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the auxiliary units of the Navy and Order Unit after 1873, and they continued their 
existence in the naval administration until the end of the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz. 
As we could find no trace of another alteration or a new implementation for the 
Ministry of Marine after 1873, it can be said that naval affairs were administrated 
according to the system of 1873 until 1876. We can see all the units of the naval 
administration from the foundation of the Ministry to the end of this period from the 
diagram below: 
 
Figure 2. Second Phase of the Naval Administration (1867-1876) 
Constant changes made to the administrative mechanism from 1867 to 1876, 
brought about a problem of adaptation for the personnel to their tasks and 
responsibilities, which were unfamiliar in comparison to traditional administration 
methods implemented for centuries. For this reason, a stable administrative staff, who 
could handle the comprehensive modernization of the Ottoman navy, could not be 
constituted in this period. In fact we see that in a period of nine years between 1867 and 
1876, fourteen officers were assigned as the Minister of Marine and the office of the 
Ministry was transferred nineteen times when we take into account the repeating 




























officers and the governmental class that they belonged to. It also shows the appointment 
and dismissal dates and their terms of office as the Minister of Marine:129 
Table 2. The Officers, who were appointed as the Minister of Marine during the Reign of 
Sultan Abdülaziz 
The Name of the 
Officer 






İsmail Hakkı Pasha Scribal 
Class 
13 March 1867 8 March 1868 1 year 
Mahmud Nedim Pasha Scribal 
Class 
8 March 1868 11 September 
1871 
3 years and 6 
months 
Ferit Abdülhamit Pasha Scribal 
Class 
11 September 1871 7 December 1871 3 months 
 
Fosfor Mustafa Pasha Army 7 December 1871 29 January 1872 1 year and 2 
months 
Salih Hasan Pasha Army 
 
29 January 1872 3 March 1872 1 months 
Moralı İbrahim Pasha Navy 
 
3 March 1872 1 August 1872 5 months 
Sakızlı Ahmet Esat 
Pasha 
Army 1 August 1872 12 October 1872 2 months 
Fosfor Mustafa Sıtkı 
Pasha (second time) 
Army 12 October 1872 6 November 1872 1 month 
Mehmet Namık Pasha Army 
 
6 November 1872 5 January 1873 2 months 
Hüseyin Avni Pasha Army 
 
5 January 1873 16 February 1873 1.5 months 
Hasan Rıza Pasha Army 
 
16 February 1873 June 1873 4 months 
Kayserili Ahmet Pasha Navy 
 
June 1873 28 January 1875 7 months 
Sakızlı Ahmet Esat 
Pasha (second time) 
Army 28 January 1875 26 May 1875 4 months 
Mehmet Rauf Pasha Army 26 May 1875 20 September 
1875 
4 months 
Hasan Rıza Pasha 
(second time) 
Army 20 September 1875 October 1875 1 month 
Mehmet Namık Pasha 
(second time) 
Army October 1875 November 1875 1 month 
Hasan Rıza Pasha 
(third time) 
Army November 1875 13 January 1875 2 months 
İbrahim Derviş Pasha 
 
Army 13 January 1876 20 April 1876 3 months 
Abdülkerim Nadir Pasha 
 
Army 20 April 1876 6 May 1876 16 days 
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Considering the authority of the Ministry of Marine, which covered the 
administration and the modernization of the warships, dockyards, naval personnel and 
the naval treasury, it seems logical that the Minister, as the president and decision 
maker of naval affairs, should be chosen from among the officers, who had a good 
theoretical and practical knowledge and experience in the maritime field. However, 
when the table is analysed, it can be seen that while İsmail Hakkı Pasha, Mahmud 
Nedim Pasha and Ferit Abdülhamit Pasha belonged to the scribal class; Fosfor Mustafa 
Sıtkı Pasha, Salih Hasan Pasha, Sakızlı Ahmet Esat Pasha, Mehmet Namık Pasha, 
Hüseyin Avni Pasha, Hasan Rıza Pasha, Mehmet Rauf Pasha, Lofçalı İbrahim Derviş 
Pasha, and Abdülkerim Nadir Pasha were the officers of the army, and were originally 
commissioned for the land forces. Only two officers, Moralı İbrahim Pasha and 
Kayserili Ahmet Pasa, who had been trained and commissioned in the Ottoman navy, 
were familiar with naval affairs. In addition to this, Fosfor Mustafa Pasha, Sakızlı 
Ahmet Esat Pasha and Mehmet Namık Pasha were appointed to the same office for a 
second time in different terms, and Hasan Paşa held the same post for three separate 
times in the years of 1873 and 1875. The presidency of the Ministry was transferred two 
times in 1871; five times in 1872; three times in 1873; five times in 1875 and two times 
in 1876, and the majority of the assignees were dismissed in less than six months. 
Indeed, this table is sufficient to reveal the definite failure of the application of a 
new system copied from Europe onto a traditional administration structure, which was 
not ready to cover all required implementations with its administrative staff. Thus, in 
the period of Kayserili Mehmet Pasha assigned as the Minister of Marine for the second 
time on 7 May 1876, the Ministry was abolished and the Office of Kapudan Pasha was 
re-established on 1 June 1876. After his term of office, which was approximately seven 
80 
 
months, Mehmet Rauf Pasha was appointed for the same task on 1 January 1877 and the 
Ministry was founded again. On 11 May 1878, Hacı Vesim Pasha held the same 
responsibility and the Office of Kapudan Pasha was re-established following the 
annulment of the Ministry for the second time. On 8 January 1880, the Ministry was re-
established under the presidency of Bozcaadalı Hasan Pasha and this situation was not 
changed again until the end of the Ottoman Empire.130 As can be seen, consistency 
could not be achieved in the naval administration, even after the period of Sultan 
Abdülaziz and the Ottoman navy was deprived of the administrative and naval 
personnel who could operate one of the most powerful navies of its time. 
 
The Role of the British Mission in the Modernization of Ottoman Naval 
Administration 
 
The strong link established between Britain and the Ottoman Empire in naval relations 
was a natural result of Lord Palmerston’s approach towards the Eastern Question. After 
Sultan Abdülmecid’s approval regarding the instatement of British naval officers in the 
Ottoman navy in 1840, their directives and recommendations played an active role in 
progress made on naval modernization.  
Within the scope of this policy, Britain’s first intention was to guarantee the 
security of Istanbul and the Straits against a possible Russian attack by allowing skilled 
and experienced naval officers to enter the service of Ottoman Sultans, and in doing so, 
strengthening the Ottoman navy. Far from an altruistic gesture, enhancing efficiency in 
Ottoman naval affairs through naval advisors had advantages for Britain. In parallel 
with the inclusion of armour technology into the shipbuilding activities carried out in 
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the Imperial Naval Arsenal from 1861, the need for new technical equipment and skilled 
workers for the construction and maintenance of the warships considerably increased. 
As the facilities of the Imperial Naval Arsenal were not sufficient to apply these new 
technologies in terms of producing the required equipment and trained workers, their 
importation became compulsory for the Ministry of Marine.  
Britain was aware of the financial benefits of this importation to the British 
shipbuilding and ammunition companies. For this reason, British naval officers were 
used as the bridge for the communication between the Ottoman Empire and British 
companies in ordering new warships and required materials. In fact, they were still the 
officers of the British Admiralty and their first responsibility was to inform the 
Admiralty on a regular basis about the condition and development of the Ottoman navy, 
which also meant Britain had a good opportunity to observe the country on a first-hand 
basis. Among these officers commissioned in accordance with this purpose during the 
reign of Sultan Abdülaziz, Müşavir Pasha, Hobart Pasha, and Woods Pasha became 
prominent for their contributions to the modernization of the Ottoman navy. 
 
Adolphus Slade  
 
Adolphus Slade, who was also known as Müşavir Pasha, went into service in the 
Ottoman navy in 1850 and held this role up to 1866. Graduating from the Royal Naval 
College in Portsmouth with a gold medal, he spent three years in the South American 
Station and was commissioned in the British squadron at the Battle of Navarino in 
1827.131 After being promoted to lieutenant, Slade went to Istanbul in 1829 and upon 
the invitation of Kapudan Pasha Papuççu Ahmet Pasha, he participated in the Turkish 
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fleet that sailed to the Black Sea in the same year. After travelling a few years in the 
Ottoman Empire and Greece, he was advanced as commander in 1841 and 
commissioned in the brig called Recruit around the coasts of Spain and Azores. In 1849, 
he was promoted again, to captain, and due to the diplomatic crisis between the 
Ottoman Empire and Austria, known as Hungarian Refugees Problem, he was seconded 
by the Ottoman navy in 1849.132  
On 16 August 1850, he officially entered the service of the Ottoman Empire 
with the rank of rear admiral, which was higher than his previous rank given by the 
Royal Navy.133 Upon the outbreak of the Crimean War, he was invited for the meeting 
of the Naval Board by the Kapudan Pasha as an advisor, and appointed to a frigate 
called Nusretiye assisting the Ottoman fleet in the Black Sea.134 On 30 November 1853, 
he was stationed in Sinop when the Russian navy destroyed the Ottoman fleet in 
Sinop’s port at the time he commissioned in the steamer called Taif. Following the 
beginning of the raid, he had to go back to Istanbul to inform the government about the 
disaster.135 His criticism on the slow progress of the combined navy of the allied 
powers—particularly after the destruction of the Ottoman fleet in Sinop—caused a 
disagreement between himself and the commanders of the British and French fleets—
Admiral Dundas and Admiral Hamelin—resulted in a change of his position and 
assignment to the Imperial Naval Arsenal, which meant his removal from active 
operations.136  
Later he was awarded with the rank of vice admiral on 14 April 1858 and 
appointed to the presidency of the office of Harbourmaster in Istanbul on 6 July 1859. 
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In 1863, he was conferred with the second class order of Mecidiye. However, it was 
stated by the office of the Grand Vizier that employment of an officer with the rank of 
vice admiral was regarded as unnecessary after the establishment of the Court of 
Maritime Commerce in 1865. For this reason, the Kapudan Pasha was informed about 
the recommendation of the retirement of Müşavir Pasha but upon the request of Slade, 
he continued his service as a member of the Naval Board and his retirement was 
approved by Sultan Abdülaziz, with a monthly salary amounting to 4000 kuruş on 22 
May 1866. He was also awarded with a second class order of Osmaniye for his sixteen 
years of service in the Ottoman navy after the approval of his retirement.137 
 
Augustus Charles Hobart Hampden  
 
Slade’s successor was Augustus Charles Hobart Hampden, known as Hobart Pasha, 
who was the most effective British officer in the Ottoman navy as the naval 
modernization was directed by Hobart Pasha from his instatement to the end of the 
reign of Sultan Abdülaziz.  
He was born in Walton-on-the-Wolds, Leicestershire on 1 April 1822 as the 
third son of Augustus Edward Hobart, sixth earl of Buckinghamshire.138 Entering the 
Royal Navy in 1835, he continued his education in the ships called Rover and Rose, 
commissioned in Spain and South America respectively.139 In 1842, he attended 
Excellent at Portsmouth and later Dolphin, which was on duty in the Brazilian Station to 
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supress the slave trade between African coasts and South America.140 After 1844, he 
returned to Britain and was assigned to the Queen’s Yacht, Victoria and Albert, on 
account of his success in South America.141 In September 1845, he was promoted to 
lieutenant and appointed first to Rattler in the Mediterranean and later Bulldog in 
1847.142 In the same vessel, he was in charge as a first lieutenant in the Baltic station at 
the beginning of the Crimean War in 1854 and he took command of the Driver for a 
short time during the Battle of Bomarsund. He attended the flagship of Admiral Dundas, 
Duke of Wellington, in 1855 and was then advanced to commander.143 Until 1861, he 
took charge of the coastguard service in Dingle, County Kerry and later Malta. In 1861, 
he took the command of Foxhound in the Mediterranean and after his promotion to 
captain, he retired from the Royal Navy in 1863.144 In the meantime, the American Civil 
War was waging. Being in sympathy with the cause of the South, he participated in 
blockade running against the blockade of Southern ports imposed by the Federal Fleet 
and ordered by Abraham Lincoln in 1861.145 He took command of a double-screw 
steamer called Don and engaged in several passages into Wilmington and Charleston 
under a false name as Captain Roberts.146 During four years in America, his skilful 
seamanship gained him notoriety, and following his return from New York, he decided 
to make a continental tour during which he found himself visiting Istanbul in 1867.147 
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Upon the recommendation of his brother Lord Hobart,148 he was accepted by the 
Foreign Minister Fuad Pasha, who later offered him the chance to supervise the 
reorganization of the Ottoman navy. In their first conversation, Fuad Pasha explained 
the difficulty that the Ottoman government had suppressing the Cretan Revolt due to the 
aid received by the insurgents from Greece.149 The revolt had started in April 1866 due 
to the desire for unification to the mainland,150 which was encouraged by Greece.151 It 
gathered momentum, and complaints made by the Christian population regarding the 
local administration and taxation152 extended up to the British consul, who notified the 
British government about the possibility of further disturbance. On 18 May 1866, it was 
considered necessary by the Ottoman government to increase the number of warships in 
the coasts of the Aegean Sea, and the ships commissioned to chase the blockade-runners 
and to dispatch the troops to the island were divided into two fleets as Rumelia and 
Cezayir-i Bahr-i Sefid. The Rumelia fleet was ordered to cruise from Volos to Preveza 
in Yanya province to prevent the entrance of munitions and other forbidden materials 
under the command of vice-admiral Edhem Pasha.153 On 7 June 1866, three ships 
arrived in the island with 2520 troops on board154 and the total number of the Ottoman 
army in Crete reached 22000 on 27 July 1866.155 
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  Contrary to the Cretans’ hopes, Lord Clarendon and his successor Lord Stanley 
approached this problem as an internal affair of the Ottoman Empire and non-
intervention was determined as the policy followed by the new Derby government on 
this issue.156 Thus, the island would be an important station after the future opening of 
the Suez Canal, and continuation of the Ottoman sovereignty over Crete was for the 
benefit of Britain’s interest in the Indian trade route.157 Disappointed Cretans appealed 
to sympathetic Christian administrations and following the Russian attempts to persuade 
France, both countries informed Britain about their support for the Greek government’s 
attempts to apply pressure on the Sublime Porte to grant extended privileges to the 
island, and agree to the establishment of a similar administration to which existed in 
Serbia.158 In order to remove French intervention and to provide an answer to Russia’s 
concerns, Lord Stanley suggested to the Grand Vizier Ali Pasha to send a Christian 
governor to the island and set up a combined administrative board.159 However, the 
Ottoman Empire was determined not to make any compromises on the administration of 
the island and, upon the appointment of Mustafa Naili Pasha as the new governor on 10 
September 1866,160 the Cretans declared their independence one day later, and the aid 
provided by Greece considerably increased. Consequently, this caused Britain to forbid 
the British flagged ships from carrying Cretan refugees from January 1867161 and to 
warn Greek government not to expect help from other counties when a possible 
interruption emerged in their diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire. In spite of 
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Britain’s warnings, Russian, French, and Italian flagged ships cooperated in the delivery 
of the Cretan refugees to the mainland.162  
Although Mustafa Pasha was appointed to command the Ottoman fleet, he failed 
to prevent the Greek-flagged vessels loaded with munitions and provisions163 and this 
resulted in his replacement with İbrahim Pasha and Vesim Pasha. On 20 August 1867, 
Greek-flagged Arkadi loaded with arms and supplies,164 was blockaded and captured by 
the Ottoman steamer İzzeddin under the command of Hasan Bey while it was about to 
land to unload near the coast of Lakvince.165  This was the only success of the Ottoman 
navy against blockade runners during the revolt.  
During their conversation with Hobart, Fuad Pasha pointed out the defensive 
nature of the international law to the blockade-runners, as the Ottoman government 
were told that a blockade-running ship could not be chased more than ten miles from the 
coast, which led the revolt to be extended in scale; this was also the main reason for the 
failure of the Ottoman fleet against Greek-flagged ships.166 Upon Hobart’s 
recommendations to stop the blockade-running without violating any law, Fuad Pasha 
told Sultan Abdülaziz’s offer to him to be commissioned for the Ottoman government in 
their next meeting with the following statements:  
I have consulted His Majesty the Sultan, who desires me tell you that if you 
would wish to take the service with the Ottoman Government, arrangements can 
be made whereby you can do so, only you must take the risk and responsibility 
of offending your own people.167 
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Following his acceptance, he entered the service of the Ottoman navy on 30 
November 1867.168 As a result of Fuad Pasha’s concerns, Hobart was asked by the 
British Admiralty whether he entered into any engagement in directing the Cretan 
blockade by Turkish forces on 30 December 1867.169 In the same day it was noted that 
Captain Hobart was in Istanbul and was called upon to state if he had been acting in any 
naval capacity under any foreign government.170 However, a letter written by the British 
consul C. H. Dickson on 17 December 1867 shows that Captain Hobart was in one of 
the Imperial steam yachts called Tulia (Talia), which arrived at Canea with supplies and 
specie for the army. Following his arrival, he went to Candia to meet the Grand Vizier 
Ali Pasha.171 According to further correspondence, the British Admiralty was not 
pleased with his instatement and reported to the British consul at Canea to inform 
Hobart that the Admiralty could not allow him to engage in this service as it was 
contrary to the regulations of the Royal Navy.172 
Arriving at Crete on 17 December 1867, Hobart’s observations in Suda Bay 
expressed his conviction that the weakness of the Ottoman fleet originated from the 
Ottoman naval officers’ over-cautious approach towards blockade runners and their 
reluctance to break the international law, which rendered the warships powerless against 
their Greek opponents. However we understood from Woods Pasha’s recollections that 
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the ignorance of the law was not restricted to the Turkish officers. It was stated by 
Woods Pasha that upon Hobart’s recommendation, Grand Vizier Ali Pasha invited the 
captain of the French warship anchored in Suda Bay, and he was examined by Hobart 
Pasha regarding the reason for his presence in Cretan waters. Under the pressure made 
by the direct questions and answers of Captain Hobart, the French captain had to accept 
the illegality of his position and left immediately from the island.173  
After controlling the situation of the blockade, Hobart returned to Istanbul to 
inform Fuad Pasha about his views on the suppression of the revolt. We understood 
from a letter, which was sent to Lord Stanley from Henry Elliot, British Ambassador in 
Istanbul, on 4 January 1868, that his return was in the first days of 1868 and Hobart told 
Henry Elliot that he was under no engagement with the Turkish Government, but when 
the Cretan insurrection was over, it was not impossible that he might apply for the 
permission of the British Government to take employment in the Ottoman service.174 
After a week, we see that Hobart also tried to persuade the British Admiralty about his 
compliance with the regulations of the service of the Royal Navy, as he informed the 
Admiralty that his visit to Crete was of a private nature, and that he had not entered the 
Ottoman navy to direct the blockade of Crete.175 Lord Stanley’s opinion on Hobart’s 
situation was of great importance, as following Henry Elliot’s and the British 
Admiralty’s notifications, on 19 January 1868 and 6 February 1868,176 Lord Stanley 
stated that if Hobart entered the Ottoman naval services without the sanction of the 
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British Admiralty, his name would be struck off the list of Royal Navy.177 On the other 
hand, an imperial decree was issued on 19 January 1868, declaring the definite entering 
of Captain Hobart to the service of the Ottoman Government as a member of the Board 
of Admiralty178 and Captain Hobart acquainted the Royal Navy about his acceptance of 
entering the service of the Ottoman Navy as a member of the Board of Admiralty and 
Director-General of Naval Schools on 24 January 1868, and requested his name to be 
on the reserve list to be able to serve for the Royal Navy in case of war.179  
Archival data also shows that another British officer, Captain William 
Wiseman,180 had been already thought to have taken command in the Ottoman navy on 
11 June 1867. Following Sultan Abdülaziz’s visit to Queen Victoria in the same year, 
three officers of the Royal Navy were requested by the Ottoman Government on 28 
May 1867 to assist in improving the condition of the Ottoman naval service, and one of 
whom was to be commissioned as the member of the Board of Admiralty while the 
other two were to serve as instructors.181 Later, Captain Wiseman was deemed suitable 
for this task upon the recommendation of the British Admiralty, which took his service 
in the Ottoman navy for granted and even reported to him the observations of the 
French Ambassador in Istanbul on the state of the naval schools and military education 
on 5 June 1867.182 However, sending a British naval officer to assist at a council formed 
for the reorganization of the Turkish Navy in the crisis of the Cretan Insurrection and 
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the consistency of this arrangement with the neutrality and non-interference principles 
laid down by the British Government were later discussed at the House of Commons on 
13 July 1867.183 As a result of this, Lord Stanley informed the Royal Navy that 
Wiseman’s departure to Istanbul should be deferred until further orders on 16 July 
1867.184 The British Admiralty’s intention of Captain Wiseman’s instatement was also 
recorded in the paper named Daily Southern Cross on 25 September 1867, with the 
following statements:  
The Sultan was much satisfied with the administration of the Ottoman navy, and 
has expressed a wish to take back with him three English naval officers, in order 
to place such matters under their direction. Commodore Sir William Wiseman 
has already been selected and appointed as the head of the naval council at a 
salary of 3000 pounds sterling.185  
 
As is understood from another document, Captain Hobart’s simultaneous 
entering to the Ottoman navy caused a suspension on the appointment of Sir William 
Wiseman until the end of the Cretan insurrection.186 Explaining his understanding of the 
reaction of the Board of Admiralty, Hobart stated that he was nominated by the 
Ottoman Government as the civil member of the administration for the management and 
re-organization of the Naval Schools for a term of five years, and he had already drawn 
out several rules and regulations for the organization of Naval College. In addition, he 
stated that he did not act to seize this position, which was already placed for Sir 
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Wiseman.187 However, his efforts not to offend the British Admiralty would not be 
sufficient as his official resignation was approved by Lord Stanley on 18 March 1868,188 
and his name was removed from the list of the Royal Navy on 19 March 1868.189 
After the official declaration of his instatement, he was promoted to be a rear 
admiral after the efforts of Fuad Pasha.190 Captain Hobart became Hobart Pasha on 25 
February 1868191 and he was sent to Crete as the commander of the Turkish fleet. In 
contrast with the secondary literature, archival data shows that Hobart Pasha’s departure 
from Istanbul was on 6 December 1868,192 which indicates he could not have directly 
started his first task as a commander of the blockading squadron of the Ottoman navy 
due to the negative reaction of the British Admiralty. In fact, he spent nearly one year in 
Istanbul, trying to convince the Admiralty to provide his reinstatement in the Royal 
Navy.193 In his letter, dated November 1868, he explained his position in the Ottoman 
navy with the following statements:  
I have important duties here, in which I think I may say the interests of my 
country are concerned, such as entire charge of the naval schools, which, had I 
not undertaken, would have fallen (as the military schools have done) into the 
hands of the French. I have also the entire organization of the Turkish navy in 
my hands, an am otherwise employed in important positions.194  
 
He also pointed out Captain McKillop’s position in the Egyptian navy, which 
was similar to his employment in the Ottoman navy, but it would not be enough to 
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repeal Lord Stanley’s decision.195 For this reason, his removal from the Royal Navy can 
be considered as the reason for the continuation of the Cretan Revolt until 1869, as the 
peace was restored shortly after his arrival in Crete. 
Following his arrival, he determined that the island of Syra was the primary 
target as it was the main station of blockade runners for loading arms and provisions. 
With a fleet that consisted of two fast-despatch boats and a steaming corvette in 
addition to his flagship, a blockade runner—the Greek flagged Enosis—was seen by the 
Turkish squadron about eight miles away from Syra harbour, and its interception was 
ordered. Following Hobart’s signal to the despatch boats to follow Enosis, a blank gun 
was fired in order to check her flags, but it replied by firing an Armstrong gun, directly 
targeting the flagship of Captain Hobart. In his memoirs he states that according to the 
rules of blockade, an armed blockade runner was regarded as a pirate when she used her 
arms against a warship,196 which showed the insufficient knowledge of the Greek 
personnel on the international law, like their Turkish opponents. Enosis was chased by 
the Turkish boats until reaching the coasts of Syra, and one of the dispatch boats was 
sent to acquaint the governor of Crete, explaining that three blockade running ships 
were stopped by the Turkish squadron. This meant for several weeks they would not be 
able to move from their position, leading to the suppression of the Cretan Revolt as 
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insurgents would have no provisions of food.197 In parallel with Hobart Pasha’s 
thoughts, the Ottoman Government declared that supplies for the relief of the Cretans—
who were to be carried back to their country from Greece—would be sent by the 
Porte198 and the distribution of the supplies would be undertaken by the Ottoman 
officers without asking for any assistance from English or French naval officers,199 as 
this task would also be directed by Hobart Pasha.200 
Immediately after, the Turkish squadron anchored at the port of Syra and 
demanded assistance in arresting Enosis, which had committed an act of piracy. In 
addition to this, Hobart explained no ship should be allowed to sail from the harbour 
until the illegal action of Enosis was acknowledged. In reply, the administrators of Syra 
requested him to make a protest and to leave the island as the case of Enosis would be 
treated according to the international law, and they were unsure whether they would be 
able to control the population, serving as a subliminal threat to the Turkish occupying 
the island.201  
Being aware of Enosis’ definite departure to Crete after he left Syra, Hobart 
declined their demands and sent a dispatch boat to Izmir to ask for assistance from 
Istanbul. He was determined to stay in the harbour and noted in his memoirs that he 
would not hesitate to sink the blockade-runners named Enosis, Panhellenion, and 
Crete202 and anchored in the port in case they attempted to leave the island. The next 
day, he was warned again to leave the island, and was informed that a Greek frigate was 
on her way to capture him—dead or alive. However, Hobart steamed against her and 
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later discovered that she had no powder on board. Hobart’s insistent attitude on 
remaining on the island until the definite application of the international law to Enosis 
and her companions resulted in stopping the blockade running. As the previous 
concerns of Turkish officers on the law were now shared by the Greek authorities, they 
would not dare to sail again to Crete. After the arrival of Ottoman ironclads, Hobart’s 
later task was the distribution of insurgents in the Ottoman ship among the neighbouring 
islands, which also indicated the end of the Cretan Revolt that had lasted nearly three 
years.203 For his success in suppressing the insurrection, he was promoted to vice 
admiral on 28 January 1869204 and was later appointed as the Harbourmaster of Istanbul 
in addition to the presidency of the newly-established Naval Reforms Commission and 
his membership of the Board of Admiralty on 10 February 1869.205 Following his return 
to Istanbul on March 1869, he was awarded with the collar of the Legion d’Honour and 
the plaque of the Order of St. Joseph by French and Austrian Governments for his 
contribution in preventing a war from breaking out in Europe.206 
On 7 March 1869, he sent another letter to the British Admiralty to request his 
name to be added into the list of the Royal Navy.207 Upon being rejected again,208 his 
next letter shows his temper against the British Admiralty, as he stated that even though 
his instatement in the Ottoman navy without requesting permission was an indefensible 
mistake, his success in Crete brought general peace and it was universally recognized 
throughout Europe. Due to the inflammatory tone of some of the statements he made 
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about the members of the Admiralty at the end of this letter,209 it was decided by the 
Royal Navy that no reply was to be returned to Hobart Pasha on 31 May 1869.210 In 
contrast with the conflict between the two sides, the British Admiralty informed 
Ottoman Government that the Ottoman navy would be put in a good position by the 
guidance of Hobart Pasha on 17 May 1869.211 
As already seen, Hobart Pasha was placed in one of the highest positions in the 
administrative system of the Ottoman navy after the Cretan Revolt and he was primarily 
in charge of the preparation of naval reforms, which were being implemented into 
foreign navies, particularly in the Royal Navy.212 For this reason, the foundation of the 
Naval Reforms Commission should be accredited to Hobart Pasha’s instatement in the 
Ottoman navy, and the naval reforms made after 1869 were prepared and implemented 
under his direction. On 24 February 1870, he was assigned as the Minister of the 
training ships in addition to his presidency of the Naval Reforms Commission213 and 
due to his efforts in the modernization of the Ottoman navy, he was rewarded with a 
second class Order of Mecidiye and later the Order of Osmaniye on 7 March 1871 and 
23 November 1874 respectively.214 In addition to this, his contract was extended to ten 
years on 24 March 1871. Following his application to the Royal Navy on 16 October 
1874,215 his reinstatement was approved by the Admiralty and his name was placed on 
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the retired list on 2 December 1874.216 Towards the end of the reign of Sultan 
Abdülaziz, he was appointed as the commander of the Ottoman squadron, which was 
commissioned in the Mediterranean and consisted of the ships called Selimiye (frigate); 
Asar-ı Şevket, Necm-i Şevket, İclaliye (ironclad) and Resmo (steamer).217 After the 
dethronement of Sultan Abdülaziz, his service in the Ottoman navy was continued until 
his death on 18 June 1886.218 
 
Henry Felix Woods 
 
Another British officer was Henry Felix Woods, known as Woods Pasha, who entered 
the service of the Ottoman Navy in 1869. After graduating from Greenwich Royal 
Naval College, he firstly attended the training ship Rollo and was later appointed to a 
flag ship, Boscawen, in the Cape Station in 1858. Upon reaching there, he was first sent 
to another ship Archer, and then the commodore Charles Wise’s flag ship, Vesuvius, 
commissioned to chase slave traders.219 Following his return to Britain from Foreign 
Service, he was appointed to Rhadamanthus, an old paddle-wheel transport steamer, 
carrying boilers and heavy pieces of machinery between dockyards.220 After seven 
months, he attended Charybdis, which was about to proceed from Sheerness to East 
India, then later the Chinese Seas, which he remained on board from November 1860 to 
August 1863.221 In December 1861, the ship sailed from Hong Kong to Yokohama and 
he spent the following years in the stations located in the Far East until 1866, being 
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commissioned in Tartar on 1 September 1863,222 Kestrel on 25 November 1863223 and 
Cormorant on 23 January 1866,224 witnessing the bombardment of Kagoshima. He 
mentions in his memoirs that after leaving Japanese waters for Britain, they met an 
Ottoman corvette called Broussa at Mauritius on 26 October 1866 that was travelling to 
the Persian Gulf to command the Turkish squadron and tells much about the Turkish 
captain’s adjutant, who spoke perfect English, had spent some time in England, and 
made a short cruise with one of the British flagged ships. Woods also noted he would 
meet this person again as the adjutant of the Minister of Marine in Istanbul in one 
year.225 
Towards the end of 1866, Woods returned to Britain as a second master and later 
was assigned to Caradoc as the second commander in 1867. This was the dispatch 
vessel in attendance upon the British ambassador in Istanbul,226 and he had a chance to 
conduct close contacts with his Turkish colleagues. Upon the recommendation of 
Caradoc’s Captain Wilkinson, he took charge of the international commission, which 
was constituted to improve the entrance of the Bosphorus by a lightship and beacons, 
which were to be mounted along the coasts in the vicinity of the Black Sea entrance to 
the Bosphorus to prevent shipwrecks.227 His useful suggestions upon the correct 
position of the lightship and the beacons, the establishment of life-saving stations, and 
the life boats on each side228 captured the attention of the Ministry of Marine. After 
being allowed by the Admiralty to remain on the books of Caradoc,229 his success in the 
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commission resulted in a promotion in his rank to lieutenant.230 Moreover, Woods was 
thought to be suitable for the lecturer position in the Naval Academy, as the Naval 
Board arranged the modules to be taught in accordance with the teaching methods and 
contents applied in the Royal Navy. Upon his acceptance, a contract was made on 22 
October 1869, stating that he would give lectures both in the Academy and the training 
ship, teaching the modules of nautical sciences and was urged to work veraciously and 
heartily, following the instructions given by the principal of the school.231 His term of 
office was determined as four years with a monthly salary of 50 pounds sterling and he 
also received extra 50 pounds sterling once as a ration allowance. As his instatement to 
the navy required him to have a military rank, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel 
and the uniform was to be provided by the Naval Board. In addition, it was stated that 
he would not be able to receive retirement and travel allowance at the end of his term of 
office.232  
Following this, attempts made by the Ministry of Marine to receive permission 
for him to be commissioned for the service of the Ottoman navy resulted in the same 
year, and Woods’ request to enter the Ottoman Navy was approved by the Board of 
Admiralty, stating that his recommendations upon the position, form, and colour of the 
beacons eased the tasks of the international commission; he would be offered an annual 
salary of 500 pounds sterling by the Ottoman Government on 9 November 1869.233 
Sultan Abdülaziz’s approval was received on 24 December 1869 and he started his 
service as a lecturer in the Naval Academy in Heybeliada. During his four years in 
Heybeliada, he gave lectures in a variety of subjects, and a small brig was allocated for 
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the training of cadets under his command once or twice a week for a cruise around the 
Prince Islands. He described the students as successful, with an enthusiastic attitude 
towards learning, but mostly “inclined too much to imagine.”234  
For him, his task was irksome, but for the students it was beneficial in making 
progress in seamanship.235 In a short time, he became friends with the minister of the 
school, Eğinli Mehmet Sait Pasha236 and together they played an important role in 
turning the school into an Academy until 1872, when Hacı Ali Paşa was appointed to 
the same position. Following Ali Pasha’s criticism on his training of the students on 
board in the brig on the grounds that his teaching was about kaptanlık (seamanship)—
which Ali Pasha thought useless until the cadets were captains—Woods explained the 
importance of having a good grasp on nautical sciences and practical training for 
students before being appointed to the ships to know how to command on board and the 
main duties of a captain. This disagreement helped him to protect his independency as a 
lecturer, and prevented administrative staff from interfering in his teaching methods.237  
In spite of these good observations noted in his memoirs on the education of the 
students, remarks made by Captain James Graham Goodenough238 on Woods’ report to 
the British Admiralty on 14 June 1872 shows the main problem of the Ottoman navy 
was the training of the personnel, with the following statements:  
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Woods considers that the great weakness lies in the officers and men whose 
professional training and knowledge is very far below that of the officers and 
men of any other services.239 
 
In 1874, he was appointed first to the Hüdavendigar and later Muhbir-i Sürur 
training ships with the title of navigation instructor until 1875.240 Following Sultan 
Abdülhamid II’s accession to the throne, he continued his service in the Academy, 
mainly focusing on torpedo education, and was promoted as colonel for his services in 
the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-1878. He was also placed on the Naval Board after 
his promotion under Hobart Pasha.241 He organized a torpedo school on board the 
Hüdavendigar and continued to instruct torpedo application until the end of the 1880s. 
Being conferred with the rank of vice admiral on 9 October 1886,242 after the 
dethronement of Sultan Abdülhamid, his services as a naval instructor were determined 
as no longer required and he was retired from the Ottoman navy in 1911.243 
 
The Foundation of the Naval Reforms Commission under the Presidency of 
Hobart Pasha and the New Naval Code of 1870 
 
The first step taken by Hobart Pasha as the member of the Board of Admiralty was the 
establishment of the Naval Reforms Commission on 28 April 1869. According to its 
regulation, the main purpose of its foundation was to determine the naval reforms that 
were necessary for the modernization of the navy and the Imperial Naval Arsenal. For 
this reason, the required rules and regulations—including the intended reforms of 
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manufacturing, shipbuilding, military and administration units of the Arsenal, and the 
activities designed to bring the navy up to the desired level—would be prepared by this 
new commission, which consisted of a chairman and six members under Hobart’s 
supervision. Decisions taken at the end of each meeting were to be signed by all of the 
members and after their collection into a book, the proposed regulations and minutes 
would be sent to the Ministry of Marine at frequent intervals.244 Under his direction, the 
innovation made on the naval administration was the new naval code implemented in 
1870.  
Because of the radical change in the naval administration system after the 
foundation of the Ministry of Marine in 1867, and the appointment of Hobart Pasha as 
the director of the naval modernization, the preparation of a new naval code according 
to the new needs of the navy can be regarded as a possible implemented solution. 
However, data obtained from secondary literature suggests that the naval code of 1849 
remained in force until 1880, which means it was also implemented in the reign of 
Sultan Abdülaziz.245 We can confirm this claim to be accurate to at least 1870, as an 
archival document dated 6 June 1870 shows that a new naval code was included in the 
naval administration system from this date forward. In addition, it was written as 
introduction that “the new naval code was prepared through the translation from the 
naval code of Britain.”246 A proper regularity could not be achieved due to the absence 
of a sufficient naval code regarding the rules and regulations for the naval personnel, 
according to the remarks of the Naval Reforms Commission in the same document. For 
this reason, it was emphasised that the preparation of a new code was in operation by 
translating the selected part of the code of the British Admiralty, which was regarded to 
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have better application than other countries.247 In accordance with this purpose, the first 
section of the naval code of the British Admiralty was translated under the supervision 
of the Naval Reforms Commission and after making the required changes, it was 
presented to the Ministry of Marine. At the end of the document, it was also highlighted 
that the other parts of the code of the British Admiralty, which were selected as suitable 
for the adaptation to the Ottoman navy, would be translated respectively.248 Accordingly 
the first section of the naval code of Britain was adapted into the system carried out in 
the Ottoman navy by considering its applicability on 18 June 1870249 and it was 
submitted to the Office of Grand Vizier for approval on 21 June 1870.250  
The first part of the new naval code attached to the document, dated 6 June 
1870, was a regulation regarding the rules for the naval personnel in official 
ceremonies, consisting of 15 sections. Examining the naval code of Britain constituted 
in 1861, we can confirm that this was the naval code that the Ottoman Ministry of 
Marine took as a model in preparation for the new code of practice for the Ottoman 
navy in 1870. Thus the content of the third section of the code of the British Admiralty 
of 1861 was written on the same issue which consisted of 16 sections.251    
When all the articles included in these two naval codes are compared, it can be 
seen that the Naval Reforms Commission made alterations considered to be required on 
some private titles and terms used only for the British Admiralty during the course of 
translation. This comparison can be followed more clearly from the table below:252 
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Table 3. Comparison between the First Sections of the Queen’s Regulations of 1861 and 
the Ottoman Naval Code of 1870 
Third Section of the Queen’s 
Regulations of 1861 
First Section of the Ottoman  
Naval Code of 1870 
Summary of Each Part Number 
of Articles 
Summary of Each Part Number of 
Articles 
Royal Salutes and Flags 11 Royal Salutes and Flags 21 
Diplomatic Salutes 4 Salutes to Ambassadors and Consuls 4 
 




Salutes to the Grand Vizier, 
Governors of Privileged Provinces, 




Salutes to Officers 13 Salutes to the all officers of the Navy 9 
Salutes to Governors &c 5 Salutes to Governors and Civil 
Service Officers 
4 
Salutes in India 7 Salutes to the officers in Privileged 
Provinces 
2 
Salutes to Foreigners not 
of Royal Families 
5 Salutes to Foreign officers not of 
Royal Families 
5 
Salutes in General 6 Salutes in General 5 
Distinguishing Flags 8 Distinguishing Flags 4 
Distinguishing Pendants 3 About Gidons253 2 
Colours – Navy  2 Flags – Navy  2 
Colours – Not Navy 4 Flags – Commercial Fleet 4 
Military Honours  10 Naval Honours 10 
“The Victoria Cross” 1 --- --- 
Foreign Orders and 
Medals 
12 Foreign Orders and Medals 10 
Uniform 8 Uniform 6 
  
As seen from the table, while the 6th part in the third section of the code of the 
British Admiralty pertained to the official ceremony regulation followed by the Royal 
Navy for India, this was adapted to the Ottoman new naval code as the regulations for 
privileged provinces. The only part that was not included in the naval code of the 
Ottoman navy was the part titled “The Victoria Cross”. The rest of the articles in both 
codes were the same, apart from the changes made by the Ottoman officers in terms and 
titles, and, depending on the specific applications of both navies, removal of some 
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implementations and additional articles can be observed in the translated naval code of 
the Ottoman navy. 
Another example of this application was the new regulation for naval feriks, 
prepared by the Naval Reforms Commission on 23 June 1870.254 In general terms, this 
regulation included detailed information regarding the procedure, which would be 
carried out when necessary, on maintenance and repairing of the warships and transport 
vessels. The following statements in the same regulation confirm that this regulation 
was also received from the naval code of British Admiralty issued in 1861:  
For some time now, the current situation of the warships has been changed and 
modernized. Although the navy was put in a perfect order, inspection of the 
general service of warships, the number of officers and marines commissioned 
in ships and their training on a regular basis has become compulsory. As this 
controlling is being carried out in the Royal Navy according to the regulation 
written in the 44th section of the naval code of the British Admiralty which is 
now being translated for the Ottoman navy, officers who were commissioned 
with the title of ferik will be responsible with the task of inspection.255 
  
In addition to this explanation, two inspection forms, prepared separately for the 
warships and transport vessels, were attached to the same document. As a result of our 
research, we determined that these forms were included in the 41st section of the naval 
code of the British Admiralty titled Instructions for Commanders-In-Chief.256 This not 
only confirms the continuation of the translation process on the selected part of the code 
of the British Admiralty, but also shows the regulations implemented for the ship 
commanders, called süvaris after 1870, were adapted from Britain.  
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When both inspection forms are compared, it can be said that the form of 
Ottoman navy was a direct translation from the one used by the British Admiralty.257 As 
is understood from the form which consisted of 64 items, it was prepared in three main 
sections as the inspection of ship crew, readiness for action and technical equipment. 
The first section assigned to control the coherency of the ship crew with the rules of 
regulation on board. Accordingly it started with questions regarding the name of the 
ship, location of the station where the ship was commissioned, and the state of the 
logbooks and the other records of the ship, whether they were kept in an orderly 
manner, and continued with similar items such as the training of officers and marines, 
the sufficiency of provisions, and the convenience of living conditions. Questions 
located in the second section were in regard to the adequacy of naval ammunition; the 
state of cannons and other guns and the training of ship crew in terms of their 
competence in the usage of armaments, all paramount factors affecting the readiness of 
the ship for a sudden action. The last part was allocated to check the state of engines and 
boilers, and the questions were to control the capacity of the naval engineers 
commissioned in the ships for the maintenance and repairing of this equipment. Further 
to this, the Naval Reforms Commission removed six articles258 during the course of 
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translation and the articles numbered 5, 9, 11, 14 and 35 were partially altered in 
accordance with the system carried out for the Ottoman navy.  
In another document, dated 6 November 1871, it was stated that the translation 
of the regulations pertaining to the transportation of soldiers commissioned in the land 
army and quarantine procedure was completed and submitted to the Ministry of Marine 
for the confirmation.259 These regulations were included in the naval code of the British 
Admiralty in the sections numbered 15 and 23.260  
As seen, the regulations, subject to amendment by the Naval Reforms 
Commission according to the system carried out by the Royal Navy, were related to the 
warships and the naval personnel who were responsible in their operation. The need 
arose for making new arrangements on warships and the personnel was the foundation 
of the Board of Admiralty in 1867, as explained in a document dated 28 December 
1870.261 As mentioned in the previous section, the tasks and liabilities of the military 
side of the Ottoman navy were given to the Board of Admiralty under the supervision of 
the Ministry of Marine after the abolishment of the office of Kapudan Pasha in 1867. 
Depending on the acceleration observed in the number of ships and the naval personnel, 
the board’s area of responsibility was notably extended towards the end of 1860s.  
According to the aforementioned document, the Board of Admiralty was in 
charge of two main tasks; the implementation of procedures regarding the warships 
ordered from Britain and technical equipment used for the shipbuilding operations, and 
the direction of the manufacturing and construction activities carried out in the Imperial 
Naval Arsenal, together with the Board of Economy. To increase the functionality of the 
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members of the Board of Admiralty, the Naval Reforms Commission intended to 
restrict the workload of the board and to narrow its principal area of authority by 
translating the relevant parts of the naval code of British Admiralty. Accordingly, 
sections numbered 2, 3, and 4—regarding the ship commanders and commodores—
were translated and submitted to the Ministry of Marine. According to this, the ship 
commanders would not be directly connected with each other and act independently in 
the ship in which they were commissioned. These sections were the sections numbered 
4, 5, and 6 in the naval code of British Admiralty issued in 1861.262  
 Any evidence that proves the continuation of the translating process after 1871 
could not be found. This situation gives an impression that these activities were 
eventually completed at an indeterminable point. 
As already seen the process of taking the regulations of the British Admiralty as 
the model for the future modernization of the Ottoman navy was started in order to 
provide a more systematic framework for the workload of the Board of Admiralty. The 
sections to be translated from the Admiralty Instructions of the Royal Navy were 
determined and submitted to the Ministry of Marine by the Naval Reforms Commission. 
Considering the establishment date of the commission and the starting date of the 
translation process, which were 1869 and 1870 respectively, it can be said that the need 
for a new naval regulation appeared after the foundation of the Naval Reforms 
Commission, and was carried out upon the commission’s recommendation. In other 
words, the foundation of the Board of Admiralty and the Naval Reforms Commission 
played an active role in the adaptation of the British naval system into the Ottoman 
                                               
262 The Queen’s Regulations and the Admiralty Instructions for the Government of Her Majesty’s Naval 
Service, 1862: 27-51. The difference in the number of sections resulted from the inclusion or removal of 
some sections in different editions of the Admiralty Instructions as the similarity of their contents can be 
observed when making a comparison between the articles.  
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naval administration. According to the archival data, the sections numbered 3, 4, 5, 6, 
15, 23, and 41 of the naval code of the British Admiralty were translated and partially 
amended by the Naval Reforms Commission between 1870 and 1871 and following the 
approval of the Ministry of Marine, they were implemented in the same years. In the 
process of translation, the topics were limited to warships and the naval personnel, and 





After the foundation of the Ministry of Marine, we see that the system carried out 
between 1861 and 1867 was abandoned and the tasks and liabilities of the Navy, Order 
and Provision Unit were given to the Naval Board. The office of Kapudan Pasha was 
replaced with the Board of Admiralty for determining naval reforms, carrying out the 
recruitment process, and specifying the required materials for warships and naval 
personnel. The Board of Economy was established in place of the Provision Unit to 
assist the Naval Board in purchasing technical equipment and provisions in 1868. 
However, another division of the workload of the Naval Board is observed in 1873 and 
the auxiliary units were determined again as Navy, Order, Provision, and 
Manufacturing, which confirms the re-institution of the administration system of 1863, 
after ten years.  
 
The inadequacy of the Ottoman Government in the suppression of the Cretan 
Revolt of 1866 proved that the idea of the protection of the Ottoman Christians, which 
had been dispossessed from Russia with the Treaty of Paris after the Crimean War, 
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could not be undertaken any longer by western powers, as long as the planned military 
and naval reforms were implemented by the Ottoman Empire. As it was confirmed 
many times that the Empire’s fate was dependent on Britain, Sultan Abdülaziz was 
aware of the urgent transmission of the army and the navy to the desired capacity, which 
would make the Empire able to protect their lands and waters without being in a need of 
receiving aid from other countries. For this reason, the Cretan Revolt should be 
regarded as the main reason for the fundamental change implemented in the naval 
administration: the abolishment of the office of Kapudan Pasha and the establishment of 
the Ministry of Marine in 1867. The failure of the Ottoman navy during the operations 
against the blockade-runners displayed the incompetence of the officers concerning the 
operation of warships according to international law, and revealed the insufficiency of 
the naval reform programme carried out between 1861 and 1867. In fact, the revolt 
could only be suppressed after the entering of Hobart Pasha to the service of the 
Ottoman Government in 1867, and his success led the naval administration system 
carried out by the British Admiralty, to be more effective in the naval modernization of 
the Ottoman Navy, especially after 1869. Thus after Hobart Pasha’s appointment as the 
member of the Board of Admiralty and the president of the Naval Reforms 
Commission, we found that the regulations related to the Board of Admiralty’s area of 
authority were amended and relevant articles from the British Admiralty’s naval code of 










CHAPTER 4. NAVAL PERSONNEL: THE RECRUITMENT OF MARINES 
AND DIVISION OF WORKFORCE 
Introduction 
 
The comprehensive modernization programme that deeply affected the administrative, 
educational, and technological units that made up the Ottoman naval forces also forced 
the naval personnel to adapt to these innovations. As revealed from the archival 
documents, which propound this evolution most accurately, the workforce of the 
Ottoman navy was divided into four distinct categories, which were integrated into a 
hierarchic structuring based on rank in this period. Among them, the first and most 
numerous group was composed of sailors who were divided into two main divisions as 
officers and marines, and the rest consisted of the naval industry corps, the manpower 
commissioned under the supervision of high ranking and petty officers in the Imperial 
Naval Arsenal and other imperial dockyards. The civilian officers included doctors, 
surgeons, imams, scribes, clerks, and pharmacists who were employed as an auxiliary 
unit in accordance with the requirements of the naval personnel. 
 The successful finalisation of the naval reforms implemented during this period 
was mostly dependent on the adequacy of these units in terms of knowledge and skill in 
their assigned positions, and their coordination with each other. However, the 
continuous need for the foreign technical experts and labourers to direct the operation of 
warships, shipbuilding, and manufacturing activities carried out in the Imperial Naval 
Arsenal proved the insufficiency of natives and the inadequate nature of their training 
led the personnel being unable to keep up with the increasing pace of the modernization. 
Particularly in the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz, large sums were invested in armoured 
ships, technical equipment, and a qualified workforce. In majority, these were bought 
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from Britain, and this placed a huge burden on the naval treasury, confirming that 
dependency on the West was the biggest obstacle to overcome in the development of the 
existing system. To end this dependency, the Empire needed to have a sustainable naval 
manpower, which acknowledged that the inadequate and outdated nature of the training 
provided for the officers was the most important problem. For this reason, an innovative 
policy was followed to develop the naval personnel in terms of technology, and new 
reforms were put into practice in the training and recruitment of marines.  
Respectively, this present chapter will focus firstly on the marines, who were 
recruited in accordance with the conscription law, their origins, numbers, and 
recruitment process. In the second section, the developments of technical education and 
the naval industry corps, established as a way of solving the decreasing the number of 
foreign personnel employed in the manufacturing and construction stations in the 
Imperial Naval Arsenal will be evaluated by scrutinizing their structuring and working 
conditions.  
 
Naval Organization and Military Service after the Declaration of Tanzimat 
 
Military personnel formed the most numerous group of the Ottoman navy and consisted 
of two divisions, seferi and hazeri, which presented the staff commissioned in the 
warships and the personnel employed in the Imperial Naval Arsenal respectively. 
Recruitment of marines for these divisions could not be carried out efficiently due to the 
state’s political conjuncture before the Tanzimat reform era. The Greek revolt that broke 
out in 1821 led to the removal of the Greek sailors, who had entered the service 
especially for the operation of warships and in several branches of the Imperial Naval 
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Arsenal, including craftsmanship such as carpentry, caulking, and screw making.263 
This situation revealed the insufficiency of the number and the quality of technical staff 
as the biggest obstacle to the effective reorganization of the navy after the abolishment 
of the Janissary corps in 1826, and the destruction of the Ottoman fleet in the Battle of 
Navarino in 1827. In the presence of the persisting Greek rebellion and the increasing 
Russian threat, the government had to employ Genoese, Maltese, and Ragusan sailors in 
Pera and Galata without considering their religion, and also ordered the Egyptian and 
Algerian squadrons to combine with the Ottoman Navy in the Aegean Sea.264 In 
addition to this, recruitment of marines from the coastal districts, on behalf of the newly 
established regular army, Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye, was brought to the agenda. 
Later however, sailors from the Christian community living in the Cezayir-i Bahr-i 
Sefid province, and also Muslims on the Albanian shores and the Black Sea coasts, had 
to be hired as difficulties were being experienced in strengthening the fleet with soldiers 
who had been trained for the service of the land army.265 Thus the military organization 
of the Ottoman navy was formed in three main classes; efrad-ı harbiye, meaning 
marines recruited from the coastal districts in accordance with the regulation of the land 
army; mercenaries called as mariners and zabitans referred to officers who were in 
charge of the administration of the Ottoman fleet and the arsenals, and also the 
operation of warships. 
With the declaration of the Tanzimat in 1839, alterations made to the length of 
the military service and recruitment process provided the organization with general 
provisions in terms of structuring and functioning, and several measures were taken to 
stabilize the number of personnel as well. Thus the navy was experiencing difficulties in 
                                               
263 Walsh, 1836: 198. 
264 Walsh, 1836: 380-381. 
265 Mahmud Şevket Pasha, 1325: 33. 
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filling the quota allocated for the recruitment of marines. In fact, an imperial decree was 
issued just before the declaration of the Edict of Gülhane, stating that 1500 men would 
be recruited among 18-25 year-old Greek youngsters, who had experience in 
seamanship, as regular marines for a period of five years in the warships. If the desired 
number could not be achieved, it would be reinforced by the addition of Armenians and 
Catholics. Despite the negative reaction of the Christians, 1491 men among Christian 
Ottoman citizens served in the navy in 1837.266 Following the declaration of Tanzimat, 
within the scope of the principal of equality, military service was made to cover all the 
Ottoman citizens, including Christians. Another fundamental change was the reduction 
in the length of military service, which had been determined for a lifetime, to between 
four and five years, which was an important step taken related to the removal of the 
public’s negative approach to soldiering—a change first adopted by the decision of the 
Şura-yı Askeri (the Military Council) established in 1837. The reason for these 
arrangements was explained in the Edict with the following statements: 
It is the obligation of the subjects to procure soldiers for the defence of the 
homeland. However the size of the population in the recruitment zones has not 
been considered until now and for this reason some was claimed to provide more 
while others less. This has led all kinds of disorder to be revealed and damaged 
agriculture and trade. On the other hand, life-long military service resulted 
recruits to be fallen into despair and also prevented them to have families (which 
pointed out the declining number of the population). Therefore it is necessary to 
recruit those soldiers when necessary with a better regulation and to establish a 
system of recruitment with a term of service of four to five years.267  
 
This created suitable grounds for the development of military reforms, and new 
army regulation was introduced on 8 September 1843. However, it was not put into 
practice immediately, so as to allow refinement the details of new recruitment 
procedure. In 1846, the new regulation of conscription called Kur’a Nizamnamesi was 
                                               
266 Gülsoy, 2000: 30-33. 
267 Kaynar, 1991: 178. 
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adopted after the approval of Meclis-i Vâlâ and Sultan Abdülmecid. The most 
remarkable advancement of this 63-item regulation was the establishment of the new 
regular army called Nizamiye and the reserve army named Redif. Accordingly, 
conscripts for the Nizamiye army were referred to as muvazzafs and they would be 
selected among 20 to 25 year old subjects with a recruitment period of five years. 
Following the completion of active service, they would be transferred to the reserve 
army for seven years. Recruitment would be carried out through kur’a (drawing of lots) 
among male subjects whose age and health rendered them eligible. In addition to this, 
those who drew a low number in the kur’a would be also included in the reserve forces, 
which required one month’s training per year for all reservists. Ottoman territories were 
divided into five major military zones as Hassa, Dersaadet, Rumelia, Anatolia, and 
Arab provinces and reserve troops were specified according to each army zone which 
they were attached to.268 In addition to this, the number of men to be conscripted from 
sanjaks would be calculated by considering the number of redif soldiers and distributed 
in a proportional manner according to the population of each district. During the course 
of kur’a, carried out in April every year, a draw officer, doctor, and scribe were 
determined as the officials sent by the army and a draw council would be constituted in 
each district centre.269  
The system established with the Conscription Law of 1846 remained until the 
proclamation of the new army regulation in August 1869, and included also the marines 
recruited for the Ottoman navy. However, the length of naval service was stipulated to 
be a total of 15 years, including ten years in active service and five years in the reserve 
forces. In 1851, it was considered to be too long, and the length of the active service 
                                               
268 Zürcher, 1999: 82; Aksan, 2007: 410; Özcan, 2007: 525; Gülsoy, 2000: 39-40. 
269 Şimşek, 2014: 268, 275. 
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was decreased to 8 years. Furthermore, it was decided that 3000 of the total number of 
recruits who entered Ottoman military service each year would be sent to the Ottoman 
Navy from the same year.270 
The application of the conscription law of the land army to the Ottoman navy 
led the ranks of the naval officers to be changed in accordance with the ranks used by 
the army. As is known, after the Kapudan Pasha, the general commander of the 
Ottoman fleet, three other admiralty ranks, called kapudane, patrona and riyale, were 
given to the top officers of the navy, and these were replaced with reis (admiral 
general), ferik (vice admiral) and mirliva (rear admiral) respectively in 1854. In addition 
to this, the ranks of the officers commissioned in warships were also altered and 
captains in three-deckers, brigs, frigates, and corvettes were given the ranks of üç 
anbarlı süvarisi (three-decker captain), miralay (commodore), kaimmakam 
(commander) and binbaşı (lieutenant commander) respectively. For smaller vessels, 
lieutenants were assigned with the rank of buyuruldulu kaptan and this was later divided 
into two independent degrees as sağ and sol kolağalığı.271 
 
Recruitment of Naval Personnel in the Reign of Sultan Abdülaziz 
 
Application of the regulations prepared for the land army remained inadequate in 
meeting the need of qualified personnel to be commissioned in warships, which were 
technologically and numerically improved by the comprehensive modernization carried 
out in the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz. For this reason, a policy to concentrate on the 
                                               
270 Mahmud Şevket Paşa, 1325: 34. A letter, which written by Edward Joy Morris, the USA Minister 
Resident to Istanbul, shows that the allocated quota for the Navy was still 3000 in 1864 (Mr Morris to Mr 
Seward, 15 January 1864, United States Department of State Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs, 
Accompanying the Annual Message of the President to the Second Session Thirty-Eight Congress, 1864: 
376).  
271 Mahmud Şevket Paşa, 1325: 34-35. 
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coastal recruitment zones became apparent from the beginning of this period, and it was 
intended that recruits from these areas should be allocated exclusively for the needs of 
the Ottoman navy. In fact, in January 1864, main differences between the army and the 
navy were explained in detail in the official army and navy gazette, Ceride-i Askeriye. 
Emphasising the importance of having special knowledge and skills for entering the 
naval service, it was highlighted in this article that subjects recruited for the naval forces 
had to be familiar with seafaring so as not to experience difficulties when they were sent 
on seagoing operations. It was also recommended that the state should take advantage 
of having long seashores and coastal districts, of which should be regarded as the main 
resource of the Ottoman navy to fill the allocated quota for recruitment. As the Empire 
was surrounded by three seas and the deployment of army forces as mainly carried out 
by sea, the priority should be attached to the protection of coastal zones, which required 
an increase in the number of marines.272  
In accordance with this policy, the coastal provinces were allocated as the 
conscription zones of the Ottoman navy for the year of 1864. Thus a document sent to 
the office of Kapudan Pasha on 12 March 1864 shows that due to the alteration of 
marines—who completed their active service and were relegated to redif battalions—
conscription would be performed in the specified provinces, and the Kapudan Pasha 
was to be acquainted with the general population, the number of men eligible to be 
recruited (esnan-ı askeriye) [military recruitment age], and the quota allocated for the 
navy in each district. In addition to this, the total number of naval personnel 
commissioned in the warships, naval industry corps and the Imperial Factory for 
Twisting and Manufacturing of Rope and Cord (Riştehane-i Amire) was stated as 15749 
                                               
272 Ceride-i Askeriye, ‘Mevadd-ı Bahriye’, 3, 31 January 1864. 
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in the same year. It was also added that this number would be decreased to 14302 after 
the transfer of 1447 recruits to the reserve forces. As the needed number of personnel 
was 17500, 3198 is indicated as the quota of 1864 in the same document.273 The table 
below illustrates the name of the districts and the required number of men to be 
recruited for the Ottoman navy:274 
Table 4. Districts and Number of Men Allocated for the Ottoman Navy in 1864 
 
Sanjaks and Districts  
 
Population 
Number of Men  
to be Recruited 
Number of Men 
Allocated for the 
Navy 
Kaza-i Nefs-i Trabzon 6081 782 49 
Maçka 6459 640 40 
Vakfısagir 1644 186 11 
Akçaili 13898 1706 106 
Vakfıkebir 12562 1681 105 
Tonya 3456 506 31 
Görele 9313 1432 89 
Tirebolu 13542 1405 88 
Yomra 4856 530 33 
Sürmene 15595 1718 107 
Of 23224 3147 196 
Rize 27585 4048 253 
Hemşin 6419 919 57 
Kura-yı Seb`a 5884 810 50 
Liva-i Giresun Kaza-i Giresun 6008 934 58 
Piraziz 1759 254 15 
Akköy 2401 266 16 
Keşap 6318 912 57 
Pazarsuyu 2638 353 22 
Liva-i Bucak Kaza-i Arh  5654 772 48 
Ebülhayr 1770 304 19 
Ulubey 3032 352 22 
Habsamana 3872 423 26 
Çamaş 1514 188 11 
Bolaman 2213 258 16 
Aybastı 3540 416 26 
Perşembe (Pençşenbe) 5507 713 44 
Liva-i Canik Kaza-i Kavak 5374 583 36 
Çöreği 1147 125 7 
Fenaris 1169 175 11 
Keşderesi 2454 288 18 
Serkeş 3168 433 27 
                                               
273 BOA, İ.DH, 524-36120-002 (12 March 1864). 
274 BOA, İ.DH, 524-36120-003 (12 March 1864). The place names were checked individually for each 
district by comparing them from the original document and Sezen, 2006. 
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Meydan 1546 190 12 
Fatsa  2872 365 22 
Efraz 1969 264 16 
Ökse 3113 352 22 
Samsun 4731 422 26 
Bafra 8825 865 54 
Alaçam 4384 494 31 
Ünye 3749 481 30 
Terme 3116 292 18 
Akçay 3542 510 32 
Çarşamba (Çıharşanba) 6418 743 46 
Madenkapı 1184 136 8 
Ayvacık  5772 734 46 
Cevizderesi 1490 190 11 
Liva-i Gümüşhane  3739 503 31 
Kelkit 7927 1036 64 
Kavkas  2767 362 22 
Yağmurdere 1026 144 9 
Torul 6977 938 58 
Kürtün-i Bala 3448 338 21 
Kürtün-i Zir 2216 236 14 
Liva-i Kastamonu Kaza-i Hoşalay 8827 1109 69 
Cide 7387 865 54 
İnebolu 3989 472 29 
Liva-i Viranşehir Kaza-i Bartın 7660 1001 62 
Amasra 8335 999 62 
Tefen 691 105 6 
Gölpazarı 2111 280 17 
Liva-i Sinop Kaza-i Sinop 1515 147 9 
Keynolu nam Diğer Abana 7500 825 51 
Ayandon 3699 407 25 
İstefan 3772 497 31 
Gerze 2989 389 24 
Saray 5627 729 45 
Giregöz 1113 143 9 
Karasu 2831 323 20 
Çarşamba (Çıharşanba) 910 113 7 
Yaykıl 1869 236 14 
Liva-i Bolu  5065 626 39 
Hisarönü 2021 244 15 
Akçaşehir 1995 217 13 
Üskübü 2689 375 23 
Ereğli 9711 1148 71 
Liva-i Kocaili Kaza-i Şile 3736 422 26 
Kandıra 3464 382 23 
Karasu 1388 172 10 
Liva-i Gelibolu Kaza-i Gelibolu 3068 399 24 
Malkara 1837 245 15 
Keşan 1041 136 8 
Evreşe 630 90 5 
Meğri  756 111 7 
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İnöz 295 44 2 
Firecik 3554 482 30 
İpsala 1013 115 7 
Şarköy 1562 211 13 
Liva-i Tekfurdağı Kaza-i Tekfurdağı 3541 428 26 
İnecik 833 101 6 
Liva-i Erdek Kaza-i Erdek 293 81 5 
Paşalimanı 490 37 2 
Bandırma 1018 122 7 
Kapudağı 134 9 0 
Kemer 198 10 0 
Cezire-i Marmara 125 13 0 
TOTAL 411549 51714 3198 
 
As can be seen, the provinces, mostly inhabited by Muslims, were selected as 
the conscription zones due to the unreliability placed on the Greek subjects after 1821. 
This also explains the reason for the elimination of Anatolian coasts of the Aegean Sea, 
and also the Cezayir-i Bahr-i Sefid province from the recruitment process. According to 
the same document, the number of naval recruits in each district was determined by 
calculating one-sixteenth of the total number of men eligible to be recruited and the rest 
was left for the need of the land army. The diagram below shows the percentages of 
recruits allocated for the Ottoman navy in 1864 according to each sanjak:  
 


























As seen from the diagram, 3198 men enlisted for the allocation of the navy were 
from 13 sanjaks; nine were located on the Anatolian costs of the Black Sea, which 
provides 93.17% of recruits and the rest 6.74% quota was filled from the sanjaks 
situated in the shores of the Marmara Sea. Among recruitment zones, Trabzon and 
Canik came into prominence, as both supplied 52.78%, which signifies more than half 
of the allocated quota was met from the districts included in these two sanjaks.  
In 1865, it was considered necessary to decrease the length of active service to 
six years and the five years of service in the reserve forces was increased to six years. 
With this final amendment, the total length of the naval service was specified as 12 
years, and it remained without an additional alteration until the end of the reign of 
Sultan Abdülaziz. Furthermore, titles of petty officers in warships were replaced as 
gunner, boatswain, helmsman, and stoker in parallel with the titles found in European 
navies.275  
 
The Regulation of 1868 and the Proposal Regarding the Revision of the 
Conscription Law  
 
After the entrance of Hobart Pasha into the service of the Ottoman navy and the 
establishment of the Naval Reforms Commission, the existing regulation of conscription 
was reviewed and the official allocation of the coastal recruitment zones was brought to 
the agenda, with an official proposal presented by Hobart Pasha on 9 March 1868 for 
                                               
275 Mahmud Şevket Paşa, 1325: 36. In the same year, the number of men employed in the active service 
was recorded as 10900 by Edward J. Morris, the USA Minister Resident and the total amount was 33000 
with the inclusion of the reserve forces in his accounts. He also noted the monthly pay of the officers. 
According to this, officers ranked as admiral general, vice admiral, rear admiral, three-decker captain, 
commodore, commander, lieutenant commander and lieutenant were paid 227, 90, 27, 18, 13, 10, 6 and 
4,5 pounds sterling respectively in 1865 (Mr Morris to Mr Seward, 15 February 1865, United States 
Department of State Executive Documents Printed by order of the House of Representatives, during the 
First Version of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1865-1866: 279). 
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the determination of fundamental reforms to be implemented for naval recruitment, and 
also for the training of officers.276 This proposal was prepared based on the purpose of 
the official separation of the naval recruitment from the regulations of the land army. 
For our research, it has a great importance as the deficiencies of the system were clearly 
stated while possible solutions were explained in detail.  
It consisted of three main sections as the existing problems of the system; 
reasons for the non-applicability of the conscription law of 1846, and prospective 
reforms to be implemented as solutions. Accordingly, the main problem with naval 
recruitment was indicated as the process of the same regulation for both the army and 
the navy. Although sanjaks were located on the Anatolian coasts of the Black Sea and 
the shores of the Marmara Sea, in actual fact most of the conscription zones allocated 
for the Ottoman navy consisted of inland districts and a small number of coastal towns, 
which made up only about one-third of the total number of all districts. This led to 
endemic recruitment problems. 
For the Naval Reforms Commission, the draft age specified from 19 to 25 in the 
conscription law was not applicable to the navy. Most of the recruits, who were 
randomly selected by lots, were not familiar with seafaring and their ages were 
relatively old to be trained for maritime applications, which prevented them from 
performing their active service in an effective manner. In Hobart Pasha’s opinion, these 
recruits, who made their living mostly from agriculture and farming, had intense 
concentration problems due to the stress generated from the challenging nature of naval 
service, and also homesickness. That kind of psychological disorder prevented them 
from being fully engaged in their training, and a number of naval recruits developed a 
                                               
276 BOA, İ.DH, 589-41028 (9 March 1868). 
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tendency for malingering277 in order to be discharged from active service. These 
difficulties were particularly experienced by the new recruits, as the time they spent 
learning basic principles of seamanship not only lowered their enthusiasm, but also 
caused interruptions in the completion of affairs both in the navy and the Imperial Naval 
Arsenal. In addition to this, consistency in the number of trained personnel could not be 
achieved as the trainees were drafted into the reserve forces right after the end of their 
active service.278 Reserve marines were also not useful for the naval applications as they 
could not find any opportunities to apply what they learned during their active service 
when they returned to their hometown. In contrast to soldiers of the land army, this led 
them to be inadequate in case of a sudden call for immediate action. As indicated by the 
existing problems, Hobart Pasha highlighted the impossibility of providing trained 
marines and without qualified naval personnel, it was not possible to achieve the proper 
operation of heavy tonnage warships. 
As seen, the main reason for the insufficiency of the Ottoman navy in terms of 
personnel proceeded mostly from the origins of the recruits who were from the interior 
towns and engaged mostly in farming, which prevented them from developing a solid 
foundation in seafaring. As a solution, the alteration of the items regarding the naval 
forces in the conscription law of 1846 was proposed by the Naval Reforms 
Commission. The application of drawing of lots was decided to be continued as the 
needs of the navy for annual recruitment were more than 3000 marines, meaning it was 
impossible to meet the required number of marines through volunteers alone. However 
the requirement to be eligible for the naval recruitment was redrafted. According to this, 
                                               
277 American Psychiatric Association defines malingering as the intentional production of false or grossly 
exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms motivated by external incentives such as avoiding 
military duty, obtaining financial compensation, evading criminal prosecution, or obtaining drugs 
(Turner, 1997: 409).  
278 BOA, İ.DH, 589-41028-002 (9 March 1868). 
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as training of naval personnel was heavier than the land army, the recruits would be 
selected among youngsters from the districts that were located on seashores. For this 
reason, the inland districts would be entirely left to the land army, and the official 
allocation of all coastal towns would be provided to meet the needs of the Ottoman 
navy. The draft age for naval conscription would be determined as 16 to 22, with the 
priority given to 16 year-olds during the course of drawing lots. The selected recruits 
would be immediately sent on active service while others, who were between 18 to 22 
years old, were subjected to a preparatory training for a period of one to two years. As 
they would not perform service during training, their active service would be calculated 
when they turned 20. Recruits commissioned in the warships would be selected among 
16 to 18 year olds and those, who were between 18 to 22 years old, would be sent to the 
naval industry corps and also to the steamships as coal stokers. In addition to this, 
youngsters between 14 to 16 years old would be recruited to be trained in a training 
vessel to have an additional reserve force including 500 marines.279 
The proposal of Hobart Pasha was approved by the Board of Admiralty and sent 
to the Ministry of Marine on 19 March 1868.280 As understood, it was aimed at training 
naval recruits at a young age to prevent possible deviation from the learning process, 
and by decreasing the age limit from 19 to 16, the stress disorders deriving from 
homesickness would also be eliminated. However, another document shows that 
negotiations on the implementation of Hobart Pasha’s proposal were still being carried 
out nearly two years after its submission in the Bab-ı Vala-yı Serkaskeri (the Ministry of 
War). In response, the Ministry of Marine prepared an official memorandum to be sent 
to the Ministry of War on 30 May 1870, stating that the recruits enlisted according to 
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the conscription law for the Ottoman navy were not sufficient, even for the basic 
maritime applications and they were also not suited for naval training because of their 
age. Most of them had a tendency to malinger and there were numerous marines in the 
Naval Hospital waiting to be discharged with a medical report. For this reason, it was 
highlighted that immediate implementation of the proposed regulation of 1868 was 
urgently needed.281  
In parallel to this urgent need, the new law of conscription was issued on 8 
March 1870. It was stated in articles 67 and 68 that military recruitment would not be 
performed in the zones allocated for the Imperial Naval Arsenal, and men who wanted 
to be enrolled for the army voluntarily from these areas would not be accepted.282 In 
accordance with this, an application to be enlisted for the army on 2 January 1873 was 
rejected by the Naval Board, stating that the applicant was from Pençşenbe district, 
which was included in the navy’s allocation and the granting of his request would be 
contrary to the relevant article of the conscription law of 1870.283 In this way, the 
official allocation regulations seem to have been enforced. However the necessary 
removal of inland districts from the conscription areas of the Ottoman navy was not 
indicated in the same regulation, and also a new arrangement pertaining to Hobart 
Pasha’s proposal were not included.  
Between the first and fourth chapters of the new regulation, the procedure of 
drawing lots was explained in detail. According to this, three months before the 
conscription, the draw officers would be sent to the recruitment zones to prepare a 
record book, called esnan defteri, including the names of the male population who had 
reached the age of eligibility for military recruitment, i.e. 20 to 25 years old, by 
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comparing the population records of each district kept by the civil service (article 11).284 
During the course of the draft, all men recorded in that book were held responsible to 
attend in person, and they had a right to be represented by their fathers or relatives 
depending upon health or other excuses (article 15).285 In the presence of the draw 
council including draw officers, their assistants, judges, muftis, and other officers, the 
recruitment process would start with the roll call and later men eligible for the 
recruitment who attended the process would be notified in the record book by signing 
their name with a bold K (ق). The rest who did not attend the draft without presenting a 
valid excuse would be directly included in the active service (Article 16).286 For 
drawing of lots, two separate bags would be prepared by the draw council and each 
would include an equal amount of small pieces of paper in envelopes. In the first bag, 
these papers would be written with all the names of attendants, while a certain amount 
of papers in the second one—depending upon the number of conscripts required—
contained the phrase asker oldum (I have become a soldier) and the rest would be left 
blank. The names of recruits who drew envelopes written with this statement would be 
signed on the record book, and this process would continue until the last attendant was 
called by the draw officer (article 40).287 In addition to this, new soldiers would be 
given 25 days leave to complete their preparation (Article 44).288 As understood from a 
document, members of the Naval Board were commissioned to inspect this process and 
Captain Edhem Bey was sent to the allocated conscription zones on 8 May 1873 to 
check whether the draw officers performed their duties in accordance with the 
conscription law of 1870. While he was in charge of carrying out the investigation in 
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sanjak centres, his assistant Sabri Efendi was given the responsibility of controlling all 
districts under his supervision.289 On 2 December 1870, motivated by the insufficiency 
of the number of personnel commissioned in the maintenance of dry docks in the 
Imperial Naval Arsenal, it was also stated that the new recruits could not be 
commissioned at the very beginning of their active service, as they needed time to reach 
the desired minimum level of knowledge and skills of the naval processes. According to 
the same document, although the required number was determined as 23177, the present 
number of personnel assigned to the warships, the Imperial Naval Arsenal, naval 
industry corps, and the Imperial Rope Manufactory was 15188. For the same year, the 
number of marines to be drafted into the reserve forces was 2798. As seen, the required 
number of personnel for the year of 1870 appears as 10000 and the quota was 
determined as 5000 marines since the number of needed personnel was considered to be 
too high to recruit in one single year.290 The details regarding the allocated conscription 
zones can be ascertained from the table below:291 
Table 5. Sanjaks and Number of Men Allocated for the Ottoman Navy in 1870 
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As can be seen, the number of sanjaks allocated for the Ottoman navy appears as 
12 in 1870 due to the combination of Bolu and Viranşehir Sanjaks as one single 
conscription zone. Because of the high number of recruits, it was decided to divide the 
Sanjak of Trabzon into two different conscription zones. Bolaman and Çamaş districts, 
located in the Sanjak of Bucak in 1864, were removed from the naval conscription of 
1870; Şarköy district was included in the Sanjak of Tekfurdağı and recruitment was 
carried out from a total of 93 districts, which also indicates that the zones allocated for 
the Ottoman navy remained almost the same between 1864 and 1870. This also 
confirms that the approval of the proposal of the Naval Reforms Commission was still 
in progress and for this reason, the conscription law of 1846 continued to be 
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implemented in these areas, which included coastal and inland districts. The diagram 
below illustrates the percentages of the distribution of recruits according to the sanjaks: 
 
Figure 4. Distribution of Recruitment According to Sanjaks in 1870 
Similar to the naval conscription of 1864, Trabzon and Canik provided 58.42% 
of marines and 35.8% were recruited from the other Northern Anatolian sanjaks. The 
remaining quota of 5.76% was filled from the coastal towns around the Sea of Marmara. 
Due to the high number of marines that needed to be conscripted, one-twelfth of the 
total number of men eligible for recruitment was allocated for the navy. The balance 
between the distribution zones regarding the number of recruits could not be achieved, 
as the male population of draft age was different for each region. The Ministry’s efforts 
to include more men from the coastal towns were also effective in addressing this 
disparity.  
As confirmed by the archival data, the naval service was organized under these 
regulations until the end of the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz, apart from an amendment on 














Trabzon 1st Recruitment Zone














to the Ministry of War on 21 August 1873, explaining the non-applicability of the 
present regulation to redif marines. According to this, constituting the greatest part of 
the naval forces, their number reached over 33000, a significant amount more than the 
marines actually performing their active service. As they would be the main body of the 
navy in case of an active operation, their competence in seamanship and gunnery should 
be ensured. However, the present conscription law required only one month training for 
recruits in reserve battalions, and this was considered as insufficient by the Naval Board 
when the current condition of the navy was taken into account. It was also stated that all 
wooden vessels were to be replaced with the armoured ships, mounted with the newly 
introduced guns and equipment. As their efficient operation and proper maintenance 
required having well-trained personnel, longer training should be carried out by reserve 
forces to solve the problem of their potential unserviceability. To gain more knowledge 
and experience, especially on the newly invented equipment, the Naval Board suggested 
that all the marines in reserve forces would spend their first year of service in the 
Imperial Naval Arsenal to be trained for maritime applications. In addition to this, one-
fourth of the total number of recruits selected by lots for active service would be 
enrolled for the reserve troops in order to balance the number of marines in both active 
and reserve service.292 The aforementioned list illustrating the zones allocated for the 
naval conscription for the year of 1870 was also attached in the same document,293 
which gives an impression that the same regulation continued to be implemented and 
the number of districts as the resource of the naval recruitment remained 93 towards the 
end of the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz.  
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Developments in Technical Education 
 
From the late eigteenth century, Ottomans’ relatively late awareness on the adverse 
impacts of the European economic challenge, which started with the Industrial 
Revolution, led the Ottoman territories to become a major market for foreign 
manufacturers and decreasing interest in domestic goods affected local producers, 
resulting in a significant reduction of internal sources of income. As a rapid solution, 
Ottoman Sultans primarily focussed on introducing new industrial techniques by 
developing the production of military equipment, and by importing new tools and 
machines and accompanying manpower from foreign countries, which resulted in an 
increase in the amount of output in the short term. However, the importance of seeking 
to close the deficit that existed in the state’s treasury by enhanced use of available 
resources for transportation and raw materials were not considered, which meant that 
the Ottomans’ concept of establishing a military industry was perceived as opening new 
factories and construction sites to increase the amount of goods. This caused 
acceleration of the state’s dependency on western technology and the growing problem 
of foreign workers, who were employed with high salaries to operate, repair, and 
maintain technical equipment as well as training local artisans.294 There was also 
evidence of the inadequacy of guilds, which played a significant role in fulfilling the 
state’s own needs in training craftsmen to be employed in workshops. Following the 
rapid increase observed in the number of manufacturing stations to meet the 
requirements of military and naval forces, it became clearer that the functionality of 
local shops organized within the body of guilds was sufficient only for the cities’ public 
needs. For this reason, attempts regarding the establishment of technical schools started 
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from the Tanzimat reform era to create a qualified workforce to work in the factories. In 
accordance with this purpose, the first industrial school was opened in 1848 in 
Zeytinburnu, but training could not be started due to the inadequate number of 
instructors and lack of interest on the part of the public during the admission process.295 
In the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz, the most important attempt to increase the number of 
trained local craftsmen was the establishment of workhouses, which started with the 
efforts of governor of Nis, Mithat Pasha in 1863. In the same year, the first workhouse 
for orphaned children was established and later similar ateliers spread out into the 
provinces to train 5-14 year old children in tailoring, shoemaking, leather crafting, 
typesetting, carpentry, weaving, and thread making.296  
The total number of attendants was determined between 150 and 200 students in 
these workhouses, which did not require great expenses for the state as the sources of 
income mainly consisted of donations from public and private funds created by the local 
governments. The idea of protection for homeless children of immigrant families, and 
the increasing rates in productivity later evoked a positive reaction, and following the 
arrival of the regulation prepared by Mithat Pasha in 1871, the admission process and 
the administration of workhouses were connected with a general provision, which 
resulted in the opening of similar units in Rustchuk, Sofia, Izmir, Diyarbakır, 
Kastamonu, Erzurum, Baghdad, Adana, Crete, Konya, Edirne, Thessaloniki, Jerusalem, 
and Manastır between 1871 and 1873.297 According to the regulation of 1871, the 
students would be selected without differentiating between religion and ethnicity among 
12-13 year old orphaned children, and their relatives and guardians would not be 
allowed to discharge them from the school before the completion of their training. 
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While the school would be free for orphans—applicants, whose parents were alive—
were obliged to pay an annual tuition fee amounting to 500 kuruş.298  
After the appointment of Mithat Pasha—the governor of the Danube Province—
as the president of the Council of State in 1868, the existing preparations for the 
foundation of a high capacity workhouse in Istanbul were accelerated and training in the 
workhouse of Istanbul started in September 1868 under the name of Mekteb-i Sanayi 
(School of Industry), with a hundred students in the old sword factory in the 
Sultanahmet district. Later, a small factory was constructed near the school building and 
ateliers were set up for the practical training of pupils.299 In addition to this, the school’s 
64-item regulation was issued by the Council of State on 11 December 1868 regarding 
the principles of the training, the school’s curriculum and the administration.300 
According to this, training would be provided in two branches as the internal and 
external sections and the students enrolled in the internal branch would not be over 13 
years-old, would be registered as boarding students, and their number would not exceed 
500. The age limit for the external branch was specified as 30 and they would attend 
only the morning classes. The quota for these students was determined as 250 people.301 
While the practical training was mainly focused on different branches of craftsmanship 
such as ironworking, foundry, mechanics, architecture, mining, wood processing, 
tailoring, shoemaking, and bookbinding, the introduction of literacy, mathematics, 
geography, geometry, and chemistry was also included in the course programme as 
most of the students had not received education before starting their technical training in 
                                               
298 Yıldırım, 2010: 188 
299 Yıldırım, 2010: 212; Semiz and Kuş, 2004: 280. 
300 For the full text of the regulation of the School of Industry see Düstur, Birinci Tertip, II, 1289: 258-
267. 
301 Yıldırım, 2010: 221-222; Semiz and Kuş, 2004: 281. 
135 
 
the School of Industry. The table below illustrates the curriculum of the school 
determined according to the regulation of 1868:302 










































Characteristics  of 














Principals of basic 
devices such as 
lever, reel, inclined 












































As seen from the table, the length of education was determined as five years and 
the pupils, who were successful in their exams at the end of the first year, were entitled 
to the apprenticeship. The successful students of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th grades were 
gradually qualified as assistant foremen, eventually graduating from the school with the 
title of master. According to their daily schedule, while the theoretical modules were 
                                               




given to the students until afternoon, the rest of the day was allocated for the application 
of the courses regarding their assigned areas of craftsmanship.303  
In order to enable skilled students to closely follow the developments in 
European industry, a group of 20 students were sent to Paris on 13 January 1870. This 
first group began to receive training in the areas regarding turnery, bookbindery, 
foundry, forging, carpet making, upholstery, carpentry, pattern making, jewellery 
making, saddlery, shoe making, tailoring, engraving, tile making, and mechanics. The 
second group that arrived in Paris on 8 December 1872 consisted of 20 students from 
the School of Industry and Rustchuk Industrial Workhouse, and their training 
concentrated on tailoring, printing and typesetting, woollen drapery, weaving, carpentry, 
foundry, and woodworking.304 In 1873, a group of 17 students was sent again to Europe 
to be trained in machine and machine tools repairing, mechanics, cabinet making, 
foundry, jewellery making, glazing, and copper engraving.305  
The successful graduates were given the right to be employed in governmental 
organizations. Although students, who wanted to set up their own business, were 
supported both financially and institutionally by the government, the graduates were 
encouraged to be commissioned in the state sectors and employed in the establishments 
of the military industry to perform their compulsory military service. The School of 
Industry continued its activities with an expanded quota until the reign of Sultan 
Abdülaziz, and in spite of the negative impact of the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-
1878, the system of technical education regulated by the regulation of 1868 was 
maintained until 1882.306  
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The Naval Industry Corps 
 
The purpose of the proper adaptation of steam power and armour technology into the 
Ottoman naval industry made the establishment of new stations in the Imperial Naval 
Arsenal for manufacturing and construction of naval equipment and their repair and 
maintenance necessary in the period of Sultan Abdülaziz. However, efforts made to 
improve the existing factories and stores, and to open new ones, revealed an insufficient 
number of qualified personnel, creating a significant problem. To address this, 
applicable solutions was presented by the administrative units of the navy. Being 
perhaps the easiest way, the importation of manpower and technological knowhow was 
preferred primarily to reinforce the Imperial Naval Arsenal for the continuation of the 
activities without any interruption, but a major drawback of this solution was that the 
large salaries paid for these workers would lead to an increase in the existing fiscal 
deficit and, possibly, a conflict with their Turkish counterparts. For this reason, in 
parallel with the workhouses, the establishment of naval industry corps was seen as a 
more beneficial solution both financially and politically, helping to increase the number 
of local workers in the Imperial Naval Arsenal.  
The industrial corps founded name was “craftsmen troops” and its purpose was 
to strengthen the workforce of the Imperial Naval Arsenal in 1859.307 Following the 
acceptance of the proposal of the Naval Board to change the name of this organization 
as the “naval industry corps” by the office of Kapudan Pasha on 25 March 1863, the 
troops were arranged under this title from this date forward.308 When the archival 
documents regarding the recruitment process are examined, it can be seen that those 
who were employed in this corps were subjected to a preparatory training in a prior 
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organization, called “junior divisions” and successful attendants were sent to the naval 
industry corps to perform their military service. For this purpose, the junior divisions 
were established on 3 August 1862 following the preparation of the regulations by the 
Naval Board on the same date.309 The same regulation was expanded with the addition 
of new items on 22 December 1863 and 24 January 1864, containing more detailed 
concepts.  
Accordingly, being constituted as two divisions in parallel with the structuring 
of the naval industry corps, the junior divisions later included three units with the 
opening of a blacksmith division on 22 December 1863.310 Being very similar to the 
admission regulations of workhouses, those who would be employed in this 
organization were chosen among children who were living in Istanbul and between 13 
and 16 years old. Applications were made by their parents or next of kin (if they were 
orphans) with a letter, which included an approval letter from their guardians and a 
certificate, confirming that they were from Istanbul. Successful applicants were 
examined in the Naval Hospital and following that they were stated as fit, registration 
procedures were completed.311 As seen from the regulations, the Naval Board found it 
of great importance to recruit a certain number of children per year, so as to ensure the 
allocated quota would remain full. It was emphasised that the registered children were 
given the same uniforms and provisions, but their salaries were determined as 20 kuruş 
each, unlike the other marines.312 
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Students trained in the junior divisions until the age of 18, then were sent to the 
naval industry corps to start the compulsory military service. Evidently, we can derive 
from this that the term that they spent in junior corps was not regarded as a part of their 
compulsory military service but was accepted as an apprenticeship stage, and their 
period of service as marines was calculated from the starting day of their assigned 
position in the naval industry corps.313 However, they procured the title of “marine” 
from the day of registry, meaning they would be qualified for a pension if sustaining an 
injury that forced their retirement occurred during their training.314 As seen, in spite of 
the similarities in structuring to the workhouses, pupils recruited for the naval corps 
were subjected to the military regulations and following the completion of their 
education in the junior divisions, they were obliged to continue their training in the 
naval industry corps. Recruiting industrial corps was also seen as an alternative solution 
for the refugee problem, which emerged after the gradual migration process of the 
Ottoman population to Anatolia from the lost territories in the Balkans and Caucasus. 
Depending on this, it was decided to recruit eligible candidates among Circassian 
refuges from Trabzon, Canik, Gümüşhane and Sinop in 1863.315 
As the age limit was 16 for applicants, it was strictly prohibited to register those 
who were older than 16. On the other hand, it was decided that 18 year-old youths, who 
wished to be registered in the junior divisions, would be sent directly to the industry 
corps in order to fulfil their desire to have a profession in a military organization.316 In 
addition to this, it was deemed appropriate to confer a certain amount of gratuity and a 
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certificate from the Imperial Naval Arsenal to those naval craftsmen who successfully 
completed their military service by demonstrating their competence during their 
apprenticeship.317 During the admission period, letters stating the applicants’ request to 
spend their training in the warships could be accepted on the grounds that they would be 
given the same salary, provision, and uniform as those in the junior divisions. When 
they were 18 years-old, their military service was begun and they would deserve to be 
paid the full salary of a marine, which was 30 kuruş. The same as for the junior 
division, they would be qualified for a pension if an injury occurred during their 
apprenticeship.318 
 During their training, each student was expected to properly learn the craft 
branch, which was determined in accordance with the student’s capability, and their 
education also included the introductory featured modules such as literacy, drawing, 
defining the measurements, usage of scale, and basic mathematics under the supervision 
of naval officers ranked as lieutenant and sub-lieutenant, petty officers, and non-
commissioned officers whose technical expertise and experience was deemed 
sufficient.319 Furthermore, the successful students of the junior divisions were given the 
right to be commissioned in the naval industry corps as sub-lieutenant and lieutenant, 
and their advancement was deferred until being promoted as captain by the Naval 
Board.320  
In the Imperial Naval Arsenal and other determined positions, they were 
employed to be trained in several fields of artisanship as ironsmiths, steelmakers, 
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locksmiths, gunsmiths, carpenters, shoemakers, engravers, and sailmakers. In the 
regulations dated 1863 and 1864, these areas were highlighted as the most needed 
manufacturing stations by the naval industry and it was also stated that the consistency 
in the manufacturing activities also facilitated the workload of the Provision Unit.321 For 
this reason, it can be said that the main purpose of the Naval Board by the establishing 
auxiliary units, like the naval industry corps and the junior divisions, was to receive 
assistance from the younger members of the workforce to keep the level of production 
at a certain pace whilst also creating new work areas for the young population, who 
would gain a profession for a career at the end of their military service. This idea can 
also be followed in the 9th article of the regulation dated 1863 that each marine from the 
industry corps would be given a free toolset regarding their profession, and also a 
diploma of craftsmanship to help them in opening their stores following the end of their 
military service.322  
As mentioned, the number of junior divisions was increased to three with the 
addition of a blacksmith division in 1863. To be employed in this division, students 
were supposed to be competent in writing and reading and, after two years of 
preparatory training, successful students would be able to start their apprenticeship in 
the first grade of the blacksmith division. Failure of students in the preparatory phase 
resulted in their removal and they would be sent to the other divisions to be trained in 
different craft branches, forging in particular.323 On 14 June 1868, the Naval Board was 
informed by the Directorate of Factories that the number of students in each class was 
disproportional as it was allowed to accept 155 students for the first grade, which 
                                               
321 DMA, ŞUB, 1882, 41B-5A (22 December 1863); Ceride-i Askeriyye, ‘Mevadd-ı Bahriye’, 2, 24 
January 1864. 
322 DMA, ŞUB, 1824-106 (3 August 1862); DMA, ŞUB, 1882, 41B-5A (22 December 1863). 
323 DMA, ŞUB, 1882, 41B-5A (22 December 1863). 
142 
 
caused the size of other grades to be very low. For this reason, it was stated in the same 
document that the balance between classes would be provided by passing the students, 
who proved their competence in their present class, onto a higher degree.324 From the 
table below, the previous and current arrangements and also the number of students can 
be followed:325 
Table 7. The Number of Students in the Naval Blacksmith Corps in 1868 
Previous Arrangement  Current Arragement 
Name of the Class Size Name of the Class Size 
Junior Class, 1st Grade 155 Junior Class, 1st Grade 65 
Junior Class, 2nd Grade 45 Junior Class, 2nd Grade 55 
Blacksmith Class, 1st Grade 20 Blacksmith Class, 1st Grade 45 
Blacksmith Class, 2nd Grade 18 Blacksmith Class, 2nd Grade 35 
Blacksmith Class, 3rd Grade 16 Blacksmith Class, 3rd Grade 30 
Blacksmith Class, 4th Grade 14 Blacksmith Class, 4th Grade 25 
Blacksmith Class, 5th Grade 12 Blacksmith Class, 5th Grade 25 
Total Number of Students 280 Total Number of Students 280 
 
As seen, the number of students in the blacksmith division reached 280 by the 
end of the 1860s. Table 7 also gives information regarding the structuring of this 
division by indicating the first two years with the junior class as the preparatory phase 
of their apprenticeship. After spending five more years, they were qualified to be 
commissioned in the Imperial Naval Arsenal as blacksmiths. However, permanent 
reduction observed in the number of students passing the upper class and the low 
number of final year students proved that the intended number of graduates could not be 
achieved and unsuccessful students were transferred into the other craft branches.  
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After the establishment of the School of Industry in 1868, training started to be 
provided also by the school, and an increase was observed in the number of marines 
commissioned in the naval industry corps towards 1869. The table below shows the 
number of students in blacksmith division in 1869:326  
Table 8. The Number of Marines of the Blacksmith Corps commissioned in the 
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1 13 1.5 
2 2 3 
3 3 5 
4 2 8 
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It can be seen that the total number of students of the School of Industry enrolled 
in the blacksmith division reached 274 by the end of 1869. As seen from the table, they 
served a number of days per year without daily pay as part of their training, and the 
number of days served as an apprentice was increased as they advanced year by year. 
Marines in the same division, called askeri şakirdanı, were expected to offer longer 
service per year of between 20 and 40 days. However, a gradual decline is observed in 
the number of başıbozuk students in the blacksmith division as from a group of 18 in the 
1st year, only eight students remained by the Year 6 while the other group, which started 
                                               




with 13 students, gave only one graduate after five years. This confirms that the 
consistency in the number of graduates could not be achieved, indicating the failure of 
the system to reach the intended number of master blacksmiths in the beginning of the 
1870s. Another considerable element of the table is the employment of these students in 
the Yalıköşkü and Repair Factories, where British workers were mostly commissioned. 
This gives an impression that it was deemed suitable for those students to spend their 
apprenticeship under the supervision of British masters and foremen. The same 
document also gives detailed information about the number of marines and their 
assigned position in the manufacturing and construction stations of the Imperial Naval 
Arsenal in 1869:327 
Table 9. The Number of Marines Commissioned in the Construction Stations in the 
Imperial Naval Arsenal in 1869 
Construction Stations Number of Marines from the 
Naval Industry Corps 
Iron Foundry Factory 35 
Ironworks Factory 75 
Armoury Factory 67 
Boiler Factory 65 
Carpenter, Capstan, Oar, Pannier Store 40 
Cartwright Store 22 
Carpenter Store 40 
Lifeboat Store 45 
Sail Store 42 
Barrel Store 29 
Reel Store 34 
Painting Factory 49 
Pattern Factory 8 
Screw Making Store 24 
Caulker Store 43 
Carpenters for Dry-docks 95  
Ironworks Factory for Dry-docks 9 
Screw Making Store for Dry-docks 14 
Caulker Store for Dry-docks 17 
Sawmill and Reel Factory for Dry-docks 36 
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Cabinet Maker Store 75 
Engraver Store 14 
Total Number  878 
 
As understood, a total of 878 marines were performing their military service in 
different stations of the Imperial Naval Arsenal at the end of 1869. While the Carpenter, 
Capstan, Oar, Pannier Store, and Barrel Store were directed only by these marines, they 
were employed in the other stations under the supervision of local and foreign workers. 
As expected, their number of days to serve was higher than the students in the junior 
divisions and it was determined as 20 to 40 days per year. 
In addition to these divisions, the proposal of the Naval Board regarding the 
establishment of another class called riveters was approved by the Ministry of Marine 
on 17 May 1868.328 In this proposal, it was suggested that the rivets needed for the 
construction of steamers were manufactured by 27 foremen, who were brought from 
Britain with high salaries. For this reason, recruitment of the same number of students, 
who were from Istanbul and between 12 and 18 years old, was deemed necessary to 
train on rivet production under the supervision of British masters in the Imperial Naval 
Arsenal.329 On 12 June 1868, the statement of the Ministry was confirmed by an 
imperial decree and the rivet class in the junior division was established in this way.330  
As seen, students spent their apprenticeship and assistant foremanship in the 
Imperial Naval Arsenal until 1868 and after the opening of the School of Industry in the 
same year, their education was placed in a more institutional framework. After spending 
five years in the school, they were sent to the Imperial Naval Arsenal to perform their 
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In the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz, many reforms and amendments were implemented in 
order to meet the urgent need of the Ottoman Navy and the Imperial Naval Arsenal in 
terms of personnel. 
Naval service was determined as a total of 12 years and the districts located on 
the Anatolian coasts of the Black Sea and the shores of the Sea of Marmara were 
specified as the conscription zones allocated for the Ottoman Navy. During the 
recruitment process, drawing of lots was accepted as the selection method of the 
marines in accordance with the conscription law of 1846 and 1870 and reserve marines 
spent the first year of their six years’ service of naval training in the Imperial Naval 
Arsenal. However, as presented by Hobart Pasha in 1868, sufficiency of both active and 
reserve service, especially for the efficient operation and maintenance of warships, 
could not be achieved as most of the marines lacked the required knowledge—even on 
basic maritime applications. They were having difficulties to adapt into the challenging 
system of the navy and this seems the main obstacle preventing the successful 
accomplishment of naval modernization. However, archival data shows that his 
recommendations were only approved by the naval units and confirmation from the 
Ministry of War could not be obtained, which caused the regulations for the service of 
the land army to remain as the model for naval conscription. With the establishment of 
the naval industry corps, the state not only provided training and a profession for 
orphaned children, but also presented a beneficial solution to the problems regarding 
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immigration and unemployment. This was also a reasonable way to increase number of 
trained local personnel in the Imperial Naval Arsenal and prevented possible 
interruptions in manufacturing activities by recruiting a young workforce provided by 






















CHAPTER 5. THE NAVAL ACADEMY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF 




The Ottoman naval education system, which was organized by modelling the western 
institutions during the last quarter of the eighteenth century, was not fully settled until 
the 1860s. As seen in the first chapter, besides the constant changes in the 
administrative mentality and the regulation of the school according to the opinions of 
the administrators, the inconsistency of the Ottoman Empire in political relations with 
the Great Powers—particularly before the Crimean War—caused the foreign experts, 
who had been brought from abroad and commissioned into the navy, to rapidly return to 
their native countries at the beginning of the 1850s. According to a report prepared 
between 1842 and 1844 by Captain Baldwin Wake Walker, the new reforms could not 
be applied properly due to an inadequate number of teachers. In addition to this, some 
students’ attendance was poor, risking an underprepared workforce in maritime 
applications when they graduated from the college with the rank of sub-lieutenant. For 
this reason, it was deemed essential to increase the training courses regarding mapping 
and practice, and to arrange the course programmes in a scheme. Furthermore, a 
printing press must be instituted in order to print the textbooks.331 
 In 1842, Patrona Mustafa Pasha was appointed as the minister of the school. 
According to his layiha dated 1848, inequality in the military training system emerged 
due to the lower budget allocated for the Naval School compared to the budget of the 
Military Academy. To improve the training of the naval students, the number of 
teachers for the modules, named cerr-i eskal (mechanics), technical drawing, and 
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algebra, should be increased and the dismissal of students who failed in their class two 
years consecutively must be made obligatory. Furthermore, the pupils should be chosen 
from 14-16 years old, fit candidates whose families were involved in seafaring and, 
taking into account the capacity of the school, the student quotas must be determined as 
140.332 This proposal was approved by the Şura-yı Bahriye with two additional articles: 
English would become compulsory, while French lessons were made optional and two 
vessels would be assigned for the practical training of students. After its confirmation, 
the establishment of a İdadi Mektebi (senior high school) was brought to the agenda in 
order to prepare skilful candidates for the Naval Academy. As a suitable place around 
the Naval Academy’s current building could not be found, the school was again moved 
to Heybeliada on 14 December 1851. In that period, Müşavir Pasha was closely 
connected with the modernization of the naval training. Lieutenant Commander Emin 
Efendi was sent to the United States and returned with learning material that enriched 
the library with books regarding military procedures, ordinances, and shipbuilding 
applications. Towards the end of the 1850s, the Naval School rose to 150 students and 
became one of the most modernized educational institutions of the Ottoman Empire 
with its library, student dormitory, hospital, and pharmacy.333 
However, the replacement of the school building six times from its foundation in 
1775, to its transfer to Heybeliada in 1851, often led to interruptions in the training of 
the students. Despite the challenging nature of the educational programme at the Naval 
Academy, which required heavy investment, the budget of the army was typically 
greater in this period in order to prevent further land losses along the frontiers, with 
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Russia in particular. This budget gap for the naval education resulted in the reduction of 
interest in enrolling for the educational programme devised, but underfunded. 
Following the accession of Sultan Abdülaziz to the throne in 1861, the need for 
the newly-developed naval technologies to be adapted for the current system within a 
short period of time, emerged with the arrival of the armoured vessels added to the navy 
by way of purchasing and new construction. This situation brought about the need for 
qualified personnel to operate the increasing number of ironclads within a decade of his 
accession to the throne. However, it was obvious that the current status of the school 
was far from meeting this urgent need. For this reason, the Naval Academy was 
improved in terms of the quality of training and the resolution to this problem became 
one of the most important factors of the extensive modernization carried out in the same 
period.  
Accordingly, this chapter considers the progress of the Naval Academy and the 
reorganization of naval education in the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz. It starts by 
examining the primary criteria when selecting the students during admission process, 
and challenges the alterations made to rearrange the length of education and the student 
placement quotas whether they were sufficient to meet the expectation for the targeted 
number of qualified personnel. By detailed examination of archival sources, we have 
found that the Naval Academy was more properly regulated but it offered a far superior 
naval training during this period. The reasons for this will also be detailed by 
considering the nature of new training methods, the quality of the curriculum and the 
standards of teaching.  
In the final part of the chapter, we will focus more on the practical training, 
which allowed cadets and also marines to show their competence offshore. As 
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confirmed by archival data, this stage of naval education was undertaken in two phases: 
preparatory training carried out in harbour training ships and the offshore training of 
students in seagoing vessels. By scrutinizing the regulations arranged by the Ministry of 
Marine exclusively for the training of cadets’ in seamanship, everyday life in the ship, 
the routing of training vessels and application of courses will be detailed to have a clear 
understanding how they pursued their studies in a demanding practical environment and 
what difficulties they encountered during cruising. 
 
The Foundation of the Bahriye İdadi Mektebi (the Naval High School) and the 
Regulations of the Student Recruitment 
 
The training provided by the Naval Academy was included in the âli (higher) education 
system of the Ottoman Empire and represented the most prestigious and challenging 
programme of study in the nineteenth century. For this reason, it was not possible to 
register students without proper vetting, and the principal criteria for their admission 
included their age and previous schooling.  
However, the difficulties faced by pupils in the context of especially profession-
lead courses revealed the need for the establishment of a preparatory school in order to 
provide well-trained candidates.  
In accordance with this purpose, Bahriye İdadi Mektebi (the Naval High School) 
was established in 1852 alongside the efforts of the manager, Patrona Halil Pasha, and it 
was decided that successful graduates of İdadi Mektebi should be chosen for the student 
admission process of the Naval Academy, which would be carried out during the holy 
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months.334 According to the new regulations accepted by the school’s administration, 
priority would be given to the children of military and civilian officers of the navy until 
the first graduating class of the Naval High School’s students. If a sufficient number 
was not achieved, 14 to 16 year old, healthy candidates, who were able to recite the 
Quran, would be accepted for the entrance examination.335 For the entrance exam of 
high school candidates, the age limit was 11 to 13.336 After being taught the 
introductory parts of the technical courses until their graduation, the students would take 
another exam to register to the Naval Academy. 
The number of registered students in the Naval High School appears in an 
archival document dated 11 March 1865 as 88. Realising a potential inadequacy in this 
number, it was suggested in this document that the quota of 1865 should be 100, with 
the addition of 12 more students, for the purpose of creating a sufficient amount of 
skilful candidates for the Naval Academy. Thereafter, ten students should be added each 
year from 1866 onwards to increase the quota of the school to 150 by 1870.337 Another 
document dated 25 July 1873 shows that these recommendations were accepted. In this 
official protocol penned by the Naval Board to highlight the same problem, the period 
of study was specified as four years and the admitted students spent their first year in a 
preparatory class called ihtiyat or mübtedi sınıfı. Accordingly, despite the order 
designed to keep the naval personnel at a certain number, in accordance with the 
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decision regarding the application of new technologies to the Ottoman Navy, the Naval 
Academy failed both in the administration of the navy and in the practical training of 
naval cadets in particular. Due to the inadequate student admissions, the expected 
number of graduates to be commissioned both in the Navy and the Imperial Naval 
Arsenal proved unachievable. For this reason, the quota of the ihtiyat or müptedi sınıfı 
totalled 60, while the size of each of the other three reached only 44. Because of this, 
the period of study was adjusted to four years, with the additional one preparatory year, 
and the total number of students went up to 192 in 1873.338 As a result, the Naval 
Academy became an institution which provided education for a total of eight years 
along with one preparation year; three years in high school and four years of higher 
education.  
In spite of these arrangements regarding preparatory training exclusively for 
naval cadets, it was proposed on 29 January 1865 that all other education should be 
combined to include the high schools of navy, army, artillery, and military medicine.339 
Although the reason for this is not specifically mentioned in the document, it seems 
likely that its purpose was to reduce the additional cost incurred by the foundation of 
separate high schools for each unit of the military services. As is understood from a 
statement in another document dated 27 August 1876, it is possible to say that this offer 
was not put into practice until ten years later. The document stated:  
The imperial decree regarding the transfer of the military high schools to the 
combined high school is now issued after the decision taken by the commission 
which had been constituted last year. In this respect, the students of the Naval 
High School were to be sent to the Umumi İdadi Mektebi (General Military 
High School).340 
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As a result of our archival research, we have confirmed the exact date of the 
Naval High School’s transfer to the General Military High School as 10 June 1875. The 
first archival document about this decision was a verdict, which registered the Sultan’s 
approval for the Ministry of Marine’s proposal with an imperial decree dated 30 May 
1875.341 Following this decision, the high school students were transferred to the 
General Military High School, located in Hasköy, with a group of 14 servants on 10 
June 1875.342 However, this new combined military education led to new problems that 
developed quickly as was underlined in a document sent to the Ministry dated 17 
November 1875:343 
Within the framework of our main purpose to modernize the naval education, 
the Naval High School students were sent to the General Military High School 
after the Sultan’s approval. As the curriculums of these schools are different 
from each other, it has been decided that the students of the Naval High School 
should start their education with the first grade students of the General High 
School, so as to prevent a possible conflict between the modules which may 
affect students’ performance negatively. However, due to this situation, it will 
not be possible to receive high school graduates into the Naval Academy for at 
least three years. In accordance with the Academy’s regulations, the students of 
the Department of Navy in the Naval Academy should be sent to the training 
ship after receiving three years of theoretical education. Following the 
completion of practical training, it is expected for them to participate in the 
Navy. If we wait for the high school graduates for three years, the education of 
the Department of Navy in the Academy should be delayed for the same period. 
 
In order to avoid problems that might arise from this situation, it was suggested 
to combine the modules belonging to the upper classes with the first grade lectures of 
the students coming from Heybeliada. Through these measures, their graduation period 
would be shortened. In addition to this, 25 graduates of the General High School would 
be chosen to be registered for the Naval Academy for the year 1875 after completing 
their compulsory preparatory modules in English language. Although these 
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arrangements helped prevent a reduction in the number of prospective students for the 
Naval Academy, intensifying the course programme of the Naval High School students 
and forcing General High School graduates—who received basic military training and 
were not familiar with the Naval Academy’s advanced naval education—produced 
unsatisfactory results.  
A document dated 20 June 1878 not only confirms this information, but also 
shows that another school called Mekteb-i Rüşdiye-i Bahriye (Naval Junior High 
School) was opened in Kasımpaşa in order to train students for the General High 
School.344 According to the statements in the same document, the number and the 
educational competence of these two schools’ graduates, who had passed the exam to 
enter the Naval Academy, was still insufficient. While at least 50-60 students were 
expected to be successful in the entrance examination of the Naval Academy, this 
number was limited to 18-20 students in the years between 1875 and 1878. This 
situation led to the low number of officers qualifying for the Navy. Accordingly, the 
preparatory schools, whose purpose was to train future officers who were capable of 
properly completing higher naval education, accomplished little except to introduce 
additional expense for the Navy Treasury. In order to familiarize the high school 
students with the difficult training in the Naval Academy, it was essential to teach 
practical training courses and English language at beginner level. For this reason, it was 
decided the Naval High School should be separated from the General High School and 
be retransferred to the Naval Academy. In addition to this, the administration of the 
Naval Junior High School was directly attached to the Ministry of Marine.  
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In 1883, it was highlighted that there was an inadequacy in the required number 
of the students at the Naval Academy since the Kasımpaşa Junior Naval High School’s 
graduates, who had achieved exams success, were no more than 15-20 in total. In order 
to prevent this situation, 20 students of the military junior high school, who had trained 
as candidates for the Military Academy and Military Engineering schools, would be 
sent to the Naval Academy every year. However the number of students who entered 
the Naval Academy between 1875 and 1878 confirms the failure of the students from 
the Military Academy in the entrance examination, as this number was still fewer than 
20. Despite this, the same method was carried out to increase the number of cadets 
towards the mid-1880s. 
According to an official memorandum prepared in 1885 by Stracke Pasha, who 
was a German expert in the Ottoman Navy, the number of naval preparatory schools 
ought to be organized like the Military Academy, which had more than one high school. 
Taking into account the longer time it took for the naval officers to upgrade their ranks 
in comparison with the army officers, this inequality was to be eliminated. In addition to 
this, discipline could not be provided in the school as usually the children of the 
Imperial Naval Arsenal’s workers were admitted to the Naval Junior High School. This 
situation also led families containing high ranking Navy members to seek to avoid 
sending their children to the same school. The aforementioned reasons combined to 
result in a reduction in the number of prospective students.345  
As can be seen, the matter of training students for the Naval Academy could not 
be efficiently implemented, even after the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz. While the main 
objectives of this preparatory education were to familiarize students with the practical 
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courses and to train officers who would bring to an end to the dependence on foreign 
experts—both in the Navy and the Imperial Naval Arsenal—the inclusion of Naval 
High School with the other military schools, combined with its later retransfer to the 
Naval Academy contributed to the instability of preparatory naval education.  
As is known, talented pupils were being chosen among the children of naval 
officers for the Academy before 1852. With the establishment of the Naval High 
School, the priority was given to the successful graduates who were admitted to the 
Naval Academy after being approved by the Medical Office.346 In addition to this, it 
was decided that the student admission was to be carried out among the graduates of 
junior high school and children of the officers who were commissioned in the navy with 
a rank of captain.347 The age limit was specified as 14, which was strictly enforced as 
shown by an applicant who was refused in 1868 on the grounds that he was too old, at 
the age of 16.348 Other notable points about the recruitment process included the 
decision not to force high school graduates to apply for the Academy and the decision to 
admit students who showed enthusiasm towards naval training. By these means only 
candidates, who were aware of the school’s challenging curriculum and its location in 
the middle of Marmara Sea and distance from Istanbul’s social environment, would be 
accepted.  
A document dated 12 May 1874 shows that drawing of lots was accepted as the 
method for selecting the departments of the students registered in the school, explaining 
that a more suitable way could not be found. According to this, in one case a student, 
who had drawn his lot for Shipbuilding, requested to change his course to the 
Department of Navy. The majority of the students wished to register for the Department 
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of Navy as shown by this example, and demand for Shipbuilding and Machinery 
Departments, which would train architects and engineers for the Imperial Naval 
Arsenal, was very low. For this reason, it was underlined that changing the total number 
of registered students in each department according to students’ desire was contrary to 
the regulations and the number of students in the departments should be kept in 
balance.349 The reason for the lack of students’ desire for admission to the Shipbuilding 
and Machinery Departments can be explained by their more difficult training 
programme, which required learning a newer technology, mostly from English lecturers. 
Furthermore, while the students of the Department of Navy spent their last two years in 
a practice ship, the other departments stayed in Heybeliada for a total of four years.  
A document dated 22 September 1875 shows that students, who were living 
outside of Istanbul, were also included in the recruitment process.350 Some of these were 
sent to the Ministry of Zaptiye (Gendarme) and to the administrative offices of junior 
high schools in Edirne (Gelibolu-Tekfurdağı), Manastır (Ülgün), Cezayir-i Bahr-i Sefid 
(Bozcaada, Limni, Midilli, Sakız, Rodos), Kıbrıs, Girid, Aydın (Kuşadası), Konya 
(Antalya), Kastamonu (Sinop, Bartın, Ereğli), Trabzon (Trabzon, Giresun), Canik 
(Samsun, Ünye), Suriye (Trablusşam, Beyrut, Akka, Sayda), Trablusgarp (Trablusgarp, 
Bingazi), and Bağdad provinces. Accordingly, it was stated that junior high school 
graduates from these coastal provinces of the Empire were deprived of their right to 
apply the Naval Academy, as the agreed amount of students had been provided each 
year from Istanbul until 1875. As their families mostly gained their livelihood from 
seafaring, admission of these students would be beneficial.  
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For this reason, it was decided that 14-15 year old volunteer graduates were to 
present themselves at Istanbul at the beginning of June every year in order to take the 
entrance examination of the Naval High School. After the announcement of the results, 
the unsuccessful applicants would be sent to the Kasımpaşa Naval Junior High School 
and would also be joined to the naval industry troops for a period of one year. At the 
end of the year, they would take the entrance exam again. If they failed for the second 
time, some who volunteered would be registered in haddad (blacksmith) classes and the 
others would be allowed to return their hometowns.  
Izmid was added to those provinces one year after in another document and it 
was requested that the previous students of these junior high schools, who wished to 
take the entrance examination of the Naval Academy, should not be kept waiting for the 
final exams as they needed to be in Istanbul by June. This latter group should take the 
exams immediately after their graduation and be sent to Istanbul by the province that 
they came from.351 As is seen, the student admission system was rolled out beyond 
Istanbul to the above mentioned coastal provinces by the end of the reign of Sultan 
Abdülaziz. Despite the lack of interest among prospective students and a low number of 
graduates, who were expected to be commissioned in the Imperial Naval Arsenal, 
student enrolment without participating in the entrance exams was strictly prohibited. 
This might be the most important evidence of the positive results obtained from the 
reforms in naval training carried out in this period. 
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Length of Education 
As has been mentioned before, the changes carried out to strengthen the new 
educational system negatively affected the stability of the period of training, and the 
courses to be taught in the Naval Academy. The length of naval training was a period of 
four years for the Departments of Navy and Shipbuilding in the reign of Sultan 
Abdülaziz, and a new department called Machinery was established to train machinery 
engineers. In fact, it was stated in a document dated 19 July 1863 that a new curriculum 
was prepared on the grounds that the old one was inadequate, as the textbooks utilized 
in technical courses had become out-of-date. According to the new list of the courses 
prepared for the Navy, Shipbuilding, and Machinery Departments, each of them was 
divided into four classes.352 Another document, which was sent to the Ministry of 
Marine on 25 July 1873 with the purpose of raising the number of students of the Naval 
Academy so as to train more officers for the Imperial Naval Arsenal and the Navy, 
confirms this classification.353 Further to this, a commission was established to teach the 
courses with a better format on 20 April 1875 and according to its report, the training 
period was extended for one year as the former period of study was considered to be 
insufficient when the content of courses included in the revised curriculum was taken 
into account.354 Accordingly, the theoretical training of the students in the Department 
of Navy would be increased from two years to three years, and they would be sent to a 
training ship with the title of sub-lieutenant, like the students of the Military Academy.  
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After two years of practical training, successful graduates would be 
commissioned in the various units of the Navy with the title of lieutenant. The training 
period of the Machinery and Shipbuilding Departments would also be extended from 
three to four years and the students would gain the rank of sub-lieutenant at the end of 
three years due to the more difficult nature of the courses, in comparison with the 
Department of Navy. After spending one more year in the Academy, they would be sent 
to the Imperial Naval Arsenal with the rank of lieutenant. However, the aforementioned 
two documents dated 1863 and 1873 confirm the period of study of these two 
departments as four years. In this case, one might claim that it was lowered to three 
years between 1873 and 1875 but an archival document establishing this assumption 
could not be found. In addition to this, the number of classes included in the Department 
of Navy was recorded as four in the exam lists of the Naval Academy in 1875 and any 
information relating to the fifth year was missing.  
Although these points might give an impression that the proposal of the Naval 
Commission was refused by the Ministry, three archival documents preserved in the 
Istanbul Naval Museum Commandership Archive prove the opposite. Thus the first 
document dated 17 June 1875 reveals that the length of theoretical study for the 
Department of Navy was upgraded to three years with the acceptance of new 
regulations. Because of this reason the students, who finished their second year, should 
not be sent to the training ship.355 In other documents dated October 1875 and 
December 1875, it is stated that the fourth year students of the Navy, Machinery and 
Shipbuilding Departments were given the rank of sub-lieutenant after completing three 
years of theoretical training.356 However, this new system remained in force only for 
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one year and the Ministry decided to revert back to the previous in 1876. Accordingly it 
was decided on 18 May 1876 that graduates of the Senior High School had to learn the 
same topics during the length of training for the Department of Navy, which had been 
extended to nine years in total in 1875 with the additional year for theoretical training in 
the Naval Academy. For this reason, the period of study was decreased to four years 
again for this department.357 In addition, it was decided that the theoretical training 
would continue to be three years only for the current students, who needed to take their 
last two years’ lectures in one year due to the reduction in the length of theoretical 
study. For the prospective students, two years of theoretical training with the new 
curriculum was approved. By this way, it was aimed that all the registered students to be 
commissioned in a training ship for practical training after the successful completion of 
the first two years of study. In this way, the length of training was revised once again 




Towards the middle of the 1860s, the Ministry of Marine made an attempt to increase 
the number of students enrolled in the Naval Academy. Accordingly, while the total 
number of the students registered for the Senior High School and the Naval Academy 
was 180 in 1855, this figure went up to 260 in 1869 and reached 303 in 1870, consisting 
of 183 high school students, 104 students in the Department of Navy, and eight students 
each in the other departments.358 According to these documents, the total number of the 
first grades (final year students) of the Navy, Machinery and, Shipbuilding Departments 
                                               
357 DMA, MKP, 4463-34-1-3 (18 May 1876); DMA, MKP, 4463-32-2 (May 1876); BOA, İ.DH, 733-
60062 (28 September 1876). 
358 Sayaci, 236-238. 
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were 13, three and one respectively in 1869 and 25, three and two in 1870. Assuming 
that all the students successfully graduated, it can be confidently said that the school did 
not meet the expectation for the targeted number of qualified personnel.359 In fact, it was 
decided in July 1873 to increase the number of students from 296 to 368 with the 
additional 72 students enrolled in order to raise the number of graduates of the 
Department of Navy up to 40, and to four each for the Machinery and Shipbuilding 
Departments.360 According to this, while the quota of high school students reached 192, 
the quotas of each class in the Navy, Machinery, and Shipbuilding Departments were 
determined as 40, two and two respectively. Table 10 illustrates the total number of 
students of the Department of Navy, which was the most preferred field of study among 
the graduates of Senior High School, between 1869 and 1876.361 
Table 10. The Total Number of Students of the Department of Navy between 1869 and 
1876 
Classes 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1875 1875 1876 
4 30 37 27 34 37 43 42 40 
3 29 31 33 34 34 35 41 33 
2 30 22 22 30 33 34 35 33 
1 17 30 30 22 52 33 34 26 
Total Number of 
Students 
106 120 112 120 156 145 152 132 
  
When the table is analysed, it can be seen that the quotas were increased 
approximately 24% between 1869 and 1876. These figures confirm that the offer to 
raise the student quotas was approved by the Ministry of Marine and the specified quota 
for the fourth grade had reached around 40 towards the end of the reign of Sultan 
                                               
359 Although the main purpose was to increase the number of registered students and graduates, practices 
contrary to the regulation of student admission were avoided. Thus the application of Mehmet Efendi, 
who wanted to be registered in the Department of Navy on 30 November 1868, was rejected due to the 
age limit which appeared as 14 in the same document (DMA, MKT, 4463-28-1-2 (30 November 1868). 
360 BOA, İ.MMS, 46-1982 (25 July 1873); DMA, MKT, 174-89 (14 July 1873); BOA, A.MKT.MHM, 
459-64 (25 July 1873); DMA, MKT, 181-123 (22 August 1873). 
361 Sayaci, 233. 
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Abdülaziz. As previously highlighted, the admission regulations were stringently 
enforced: the application of Cemal Efendi to be a student of the Department of Navy 
was refused on the grounds that the quotas of each department were limited by the 
Ministry of Marine and had reached full capacity in 1875.362 However, it is clear that 
these arrangements did not result in a considerable increase in the number of final year 
students. Corresponding with this, the total number of the Department of Navy pupils 
decreased from 132 to 51 between 1876 and 1877 and this number did not reach 100 
again until the beginning of the 1890s. The main reason for the remarkable decrease of 
61% in the decade prior to 1877 can be explained with the announcement of the treasury 
insolvency in the end of the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz, combined with his successor 
Sultan Abdülhamid II’s decision to reduce the budget allocated for the naval affairs. 
Indeed, the applications to increase the number of the students and lectures in terms of 
quality and quantity, and to purchase the textbooks and the necessary equipment mostly 
from Europe required a larger budget than what Sultan Abdülhamid II was intending to 
allocate. Upon the failure to produce the required results after these amounts of 
expenditures, and because of the forthcoming Russian threat, Sultan Abdülhamid II 
preferred to concentrate on the land army. This situation caused the navy to remain a 
secondary priority for state planning and expenditure for the remainder of the century. 
 
Education and the Curriculum 
 
When courses that were taught in the Academy are examined, it can be seen that the 
curriculum was expanded to a great extent from the middle to the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century. As is seen the length of the education and the student quotas, the 
                                               
362 DMA, MKP, 4463-3-2-1 (24 March 1875). 
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curriculum was also subjected to many changes. The inadequate number of lecturers, 
coupled with a lack of translated textbooks caused fundamental problems in the 
successful deliverance of naval training. Courses offered until the beginning of the reign 
of Sultan Abdülaziz included mathematics, geometry, algebra, technical drawing, 
navigation, mechanics, physics, French, Arabic, and English.  
To analyse the aspects of the new education system and the expansion of the 
technical expertise, it is essential to scrutinize the courses taught in the Naval Academy. 
In order to achieve a better understanding, we will compare the curriculums of the 
Naval Academy in the years of 1863, 1875, and 1876 in this section. This archival 
information, which we found in the Istanbul Naval Commandership Archive and the 
Prime Ministerial Ottoman Archive, bears considerable importance as it includes 
original records kept by the Ministry of Marine. Accordingly, in a document dated 19 
July 1863, it is stated that a naval commission was established in order to modernize the 
naval training as the current course programme and the textbooks were out-of-date. 
Table 11 and Table 12 illustrate the new curriculums of the Naval High School and the 
Naval Academy’s departments presented by this commission in the same document.363  
 
Table 11. The Curriculum of the Naval High School in 1863 
Name of the Class Name of the Courses 
First Year Arabic Verbs, Arabic Grammar, Religious Principles, Reading, 
Calligraphy  
Second Year Arabic Grammar, Mathematics, Principles of Persian, Writing 
and Spelling 
Third Year Method of Reading the Quran, Algebra, Shipbuilding, History, 




                                               
363 DMA, ŞUB, 1865-79-80 (19 July 1863).  
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Table 12. The Curriculum of the Naval Academy in 1863 









First Year Second Year Third Year Fourth Year 
Geography Spherical and 
Plane 
Trigonometry 
Astronomy  Cosmography and 
Navigation 
Method of 









Physics  Chemistry Translation 
Historical Texts 
in English 






Rigging Practice Landscape and 
Mathematics  
Cartography 



















































Speaking in English 






Method of Using 
Oil Painting 
Method of Using Oil 
Painting 


































Shipbuilding Method for 
Drawing Ship 
and Mechanics of 
Ship 
Method for Drawing 









Mechanics Translation and 
Speaking in English 
Method of 
Coloration 
Geometry Translation and 
Speaking in 
English 
Method of Using Oil 
Painting 
 Method of 
Coloration 




It can be immediately seen from the tables that high school education intensified, 
mainly to develop the reading, writing skills, and the religious knowledge of the pupils 
starting from the beginning of 1860s. One would have expected that English would 
serve as the primary foreign language in the syllabus of the Naval High School, 
considering the fact that the technical courses of the Naval Academy were mostly given 
by British lecturers and the greater part of the textbooks were originated from Britain. In 
actual fact however, greatest importance was attached to the learning of Arabic and 
Persian grammar, and English was not included in the course programme. Besides the 
exclusion of practical training, mathematics, algebra, and shipbuilding courses were 
taught only in the last year of the Naval High School as introductory modules. Although 
this implementation may be seen as a right decision to prepare students for an advanced 
technical training, the technical courses included in the curriculum of the Naval 
Academy—such as spherical and plane trigonometry, differential mathematics and 
integral, conical calculation, geometry, astronomy, mathematics of machinery, and 
mathematics of shipbuilding—specifically indicate a concentration in the curriculum on 
mathematics. For this reason, it is quite irrational to expect a high school graduate, who 
was given only basic mathematics in his last year, to pass these courses successfully, 
which required students to possess sound knowledge of advanced mathematical 
processes in a relatively short time. These factors appear as the most remarkable 
deficiencies of the preparatory education in 1863. 
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It would be useful to recall that the courses constituting the last two years’ 
curriculum of the Department of Navy were being taught in the training ship. In spite of 
providing cadets a chance to practise what they learned from the theoretical aspects of 
the courses, carrying out this relatively late practical training together with the 
theoretical courses continuing with the same intensity cannot be considered as a good 
decision. Furthermore, practical courses were not included for either the Machinery or 
the Shipbuilding Departments. As can be seen from the tables, these students, who were 
to be commissioned in the factories of the Imperial Naval Arsenal as shipbuilding 
engineers and architects, were graduated without being provided practical courses 
during their four years of theoretical training. Instead of this application, the training of 
Machinery and Shipbuilding Departments should have been carried out at the premises 
of the Imperial Naval Arsenal itself. In doing so, the education of these three different 
areas would have been given in balance, and at the same time. For this reason, the 
decision to keep all the students in Heybeliada and to remove shipbuilding and 
machinery education from the Imperial Naval Arsenal should be taken into account as 
another reason of the observed failure in the modernization of the naval education in 
this period. 
During the 16-year reign of Sultan Abdülaziz, while the number of students 
registered for the Department of Navy was around 35, the quotas for the other two 
departments were not over three students. This shows that student quotas were not 
considered when the course programmes were arranged by the Naval Commission, as 
the curriculums of Machinery and Shipbuilding Departments included mostly the same 
courses. Retrospectively, it seems it would have been more beneficial to combine their 
mutual modules in one single department to save time and to reduce costs.  
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On 13 July 1866, the Kapudan Pasha visited the Naval Academy to review the 
content of lectures and the level of students. He participated in the modules regarding 
shipbuilding, navigation, machinery, and English. In his speech addressing the Sultan’s 
contribution to the modernization of the Ottoman Navy, he emphasised that the 
successful accomplishment of the naval reforms was fully dependent on the proficiency 
of students in their area of study. He also stated that cadets would be responsible not 
only for the security of life and property of the personnel, but also the effective 
operation of the warships and the proper usage of the naval equipment following their 
graduation.364 
In August 1875, the deficiencies of the preparatory education must have been 
recognized as the syllabus was revised and made more applicable. Table 13 and Table 
14 show the exam result charts of the Naval Academy, which we found in the Mektepler 
Catalogue preserved in the Istanbul Naval Commandership Archive.365 
Table 13. The Curriculum of the Naval High School in 1875 
Name of the Class Name of the Courses 
Preparatory Year  Reading, Religious Principles, Calligraphy, Spelling, Arabic 
Alphabet, Mathematics, Turkish Alphabet, Practicing in Persian, 
Painting.  
First Year Method of Geometry, Introduction to Algebra, Method of 
Spelling, General History, English, Painting.  
Second Year Method of Geometry, Algebra, Ottoman History, English, 
Clerkship, Science of Perspective, Painting.  
Third Year Plane Trigonometry, Conical Calculation, Mechanics, English, 
Method of Clerkship, Method of Coloration, Cartography. 
Fourth Year Geometry, Spherical Trigonometry, Physics, Chemistry, 









                                               
364 Ceride-i Askeriye, ‘Mevadd-ı Bahriye’, 132, 28 July 1866. 
365 DMA, MKP, 4464-2-10 (August 1875).  
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Table 14. The Curriculum of the Naval Academy in 1875 






The Department of 
Navy 
Second Year First Year 
Nautical Astronomy Navigation 
Science of Gunnery Astronomy  
Navigation Science of Gunnery  
Science of Naval War Definition of Rigging 
International Law Natural Geography 
Science of Torpedo Prize Law 
Nautical Cartography Principles of Shipbuilding 
English Definition of Machinery 
Sword Drill English 




The Department of 
Mechanical Engineering  
and  
The Department of 
Shipbuilding 
Second Year First Year 
Science of Machinery and 
Shipbuilding 
Introduction to Astronomy 
Drawing of Machinery and 
Shipbuilding 
Definition of Rigging 
Differential Calculus Principles of Shipbuilding 
International Law Definition of Machinery 
English Drawing of Machinery and 
Shipbuilding 
Sword Drill English 
 Sword Drill 
 
In 1875, English was added into the curriculum of the Naval High School from 
the first year and profession-specified modules continued to be taught at the 
introductory level. Although this new programme seems ideal for the purpose of 
preparing pupils for an advanced mathematical training, giving the same subject 
repeatedly for many years had a negative impact on student performance. When it is 
compared with the syllabuses of 1863, which had not included the newly introduced 
courses—such as those in prize law and international law—one can see the 
improvement as these two new modules helped students to improve their personal skills, 
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including building their abilities in judgement and strategic insight. The students of the 
Machinery and Shipbuilding Departments were in the same exam result chart. Even 
though this confirms that the modules of these departments were integrated after 1875, 
this highly advanced course program still did not have a practical training course.   
As previously mentioned, a new curriculum was prepared after the decision 
made to decrease the length of education from five to four years in 1876. To avoid the 
current students being affected negatively from these new adjustments, the existing 
course programme was continued until their graduation, and the new curriculum was 
put into action for the prospective students. Because of this reason, the courses prior to 
the training ship were arranged as three years for existing students and two years for 
new students. Table 15 and Table 16 illustrate these programmes and the point scoring 
system required to pass the modules successfully.366 
 
Table 15. The Current Curriculum of the Naval Academy in 1876 
Name of the 
Class 
















Theories of Spherical Trigonometry and Its Practice (60) 
Mechanics (60), Astronomy (60) 
Navigation and the Usage of Compass (90) 
Nautical Astronomy and the Usage of Observation Equipment 
(180)  
The Usage of Chronometry (30) 
Method of Nautical Cartography (30) 
Science of Navigation and its Practice in the Training Ship 
(120),  
Science of gunnery included gunpowder, military cartridge and 
gunnery shooting (120), Torpedo (30) 
Science of Navigation (30)  
Principles of Navigation (30) 
Shade lining in the Practice of Geometry (30) 











                                               
366 DMA, MKP, 4463-34-1-5 (18 May 1876); BOA, İ.DH, 733-60062 (27 August 1876).  
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Natural Geography included the maps of main currents, 
magnet, wind and temperature (30) 
Principles of Machinery (30), Principles of Shipbuilding (30)  
Method of Clerkship (90), General History (60)  
English included naval history and translation (270) 
Cartography (30), Military Hygiene (15) 
Machine Gun Practice (60) 











Theories of Spherical Trigonometry and Its Practice (30) 
Algebra (30), Geometry (90) 
Differential Mathematics and Integral (120) 
Mechanics of Solids (75), Mechanics of Liquids (75) 
Mechanics of Gases (30), Imposition Force of Objects (30) 
Trigonometry (30), English (360) 
Method of Clerkship (120), General History (90) 
Principles of Machinery (30), Principles of Shipbuilding (30) 
Science of Machinery (60), Science of Shipbuilding (60) 


















Theories of Spherical Trigonometry and Its Practice (30)  
Algebra (30), Geometry (90) 
Differential Mathematics and Integral (120) 
Mechanics of Solids (75), Mechanics of Liquids (75) 
Mechanics of Gases (30), Imposition Force of Objects (30) 
Trigonometry (30), English (360) 
Method of Clerkship (120), General History (90) 
Principles of Machinery (30), Principles of Shipbuilding (30) 
Science of Machinery (60), Science of Shipbuilding (60) 






















Table 16. The New Curriculum of the Naval Academy accepted from August 1876 
Name of the 
Class 
 








of Navy  
(First and 
Second Year)  
 
Nautical Astronomy and the Usage of Observation Equipment 
(120) Nautical Mapping and the Usage of Chronometry (30) 
Science of Naval War (30), Science of Gunnery (60) 
Science of Navigation (60), Principles of Navigation (30) 
Dispatching soldiers to the Land (30) 
Torpedo (30), English (210) 
Spherical Trigonometry (60), Mechanics (30) 
Principles of Shipbuilding (30), Principles of Machinery (30) 
Navigation and the Usage of Compass (90)  
Natural Geography (30), Cartography (30)  
Military Hygiene (30), Machine Gun Practice (60)  















Theories of Spherical Trigonometry and Its Practice (30) 
Algebra (30), Geometry (90) 
Differential Mathematics and Integral (120) 
Mechanics of Solids (75), Mechanics of Liquids (30) 
Mechanics of Gases (30), Imposition Force of Objects (30) 
Trigonometry (30), English (360) 
Principles of Machinery (30), Principles of Shipbuilding (30) 
Science of Machinery (60), Science of Shipbuilding (60) 

















Theories of Spherical Trigonometry and Its Practice (30) 
Algebra (30), Geometry (90) 
Differential Mathematics and Integral (120) 
Mechanics of Solids (75), Mechanics of Liquids (75) 
Mechanics of Gases (30), Imposition Force of Objects (30) 
Trigonometry (30), English (360)  
Principles of Machinery (30), Principles of Shipbuilding (30) 
Science of Machinery (60), Science of Shipbuilding (60) 










The combination of courses such as astronomy and cartography and the removal 
of mechanics, shade lining, method of clerkship, and general history courses from the 
existing programme were the most considerable changes made for the Department of 
Navy. In the syllabi of Machinery and Shipbuilding Departments, method of clerkship 
and general history modules were excluded. In addition to this, the total grade to pass 
from the modules was reduced from 1515 to 990 for the Department of Navy and from 
2240 to 2030 in the other sections. The main purpose of this arrangement was to 
increase the number of graduates to be sent to the Navy and the Imperial Naval Arsenal 
by making the method of passing the modules easier. The introduction of this wide gap 
between the passing grades for the navy in comparison with the other departments 
appears to be another mistake. Increasing the number of naval engineers and architects 
should have been recognized as the main goal of the modernization to reduce the 
Ottoman naval industry’s dependency on the West. However, high graduation 
requirements prevented the achievement of the targeted number of graduates.  
When the passing grades are compared for each department, the modules that 
required the highest grade are stipulated as English, nautical astronomy and the usage of 
observation equipment, and navigation and the usage of compass for the Department of 
Navy. The most important courses of the other departments were drawing of 
machinery/shipbuilding, English, mathematics of machinery/shipbuilding and 
differential mathematics, and integral calculus respectively.  
When the syllabus implemented for the Royal Navy in the same period is 
examined, it can be said that it was quite similar to the course programme of the 
Ottoman Naval Academy. Indeed, the Royal Naval College of the British Navy was 
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transferred from Portsmouth to Greenwich and the following curriculum was 
constituted in 1873:367 
 Pure Mathematics included geometry and calculus 
 Applied mathematics included mechanics, optics and theories of heat, light, 
electricity, and magnetism 
 Applied mechanics, theories of structures, and machines 
 Nautical astronomy, surveying, meteorology, and chart-drawing 
 Experimental science, physics, chemistry, metallurgy 
 Marine engineering, naval architecture 
 Fortification, military drawing, and naval artillery 
 International law, law of evidence, and naval courts martial 
 Naval history and tactics, included naval signals and steam evolutions. 
 Modern languages, drawing, hygiene, naval, and climatic. 
While 1500 points was enough to graduate from the College, it was compulsory 
to collect a total of 500 points from algebra, geometry, and trigonometry courses and 
400 points for the modules regarding navigation and nautical astronomy. This 
application created some problems for the British Royal Navy on the basis of keeping 
the number of students balanced, as was also the case in the Ottoman Navy. In fact, the 
total number of cadets decreased from 237 to 180 towards the beginning of 1880s due to 
the intensity of the technical courses.368 
The considerable similarity between two different countries’ naval education 
suggests that the newly prepared curriculums of the Ottoman Naval Academy was 
                                               
367 Lambert, 2006: 43-44. 
368 Lambert, 2006: 44. 
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adopted from Britain. Indeed, new teaching procedures were arranged under the 
supervision of British experts, like Woods Pasha, and Ottoman bureaucrats, who 
received their education in Britain, like Eğinli Mehmet Sait Pasha, along with textbooks 
and other course materials that were mostly purchased from the same country. In 
addition to this, the total grade to pass was similar for both the British and Ottoman 
Naval Academies, which appeared as 1515 in the new curriculum of Ottoman Naval 
Academy implemented in 1876 and 1500 for the British Naval College in 1873. This 
confirms that British naval training methods were taken as a model to modernize the 
Ottomans naval education. It also explains the system established to qualify for 
graduation from the Ottoman Naval Academy, which was based on scoring the required 
number of points from each module. However, the preparatory naval education in 
Britain was being provided in a training ship and advanced technical courses were made 
optional for the officers registered in the Royal Naval College.369 For this reason, 
copying a developed naval education system without considering the practical training 
and the level of students being admitted resulted in the Ottomans’ attempts to 




As mentioned in the previous section, the final two years of education for the 
Department of Navy in the Naval Academy was allocated for the practical training in 
the school ship. Specifically, application of the courses related to navigation and 
gunnery practice, which was being taught from a theoretical perspective in the first two 
years of the same department, was of great importance. So much so, it was decided in 
                                               




1847 that the students were to be sent to the training ship accompanied by naval 
instructors. After cruising in the Mediterranean for a while, their route would be set to 
France and Britain. In preparation for this, Müşavir Pasha released an official 
memorandum in 1851, indicating the assignment of the Peyk-i Zafer370 as the Naval 
Academy’s training ship.371  
In the beginning of Sultan Abdülaziz’s reign, a brig class ship called Nüvid-i 
Fütuh372 was assigned as the training ship, considering the need of the students for 
practical education. As is understood from the same document, there was another 
training ship anchored at Heybeliada. However, the training carried out with this ship 
was not adequate and the students sailed to Marmara Sea together with the naval 
instructors in Nüvid-i Fütuh, which was repaired and equipped for its new task.373 On 12 
November 1864, it was stated that the ship, which had been cruising in the Marmara Sea 
for the practical training of cadets from May, was sent to the Imperial Naval Arsenal as 
the students returned to the Naval Academy for the oncoming winter.374 In this period, 
the training carried out in the harbour training ships like Nüvid-i Fütuh should be 
regarded only as a supplementary part of the theoretical education, as the area of 
application for the modules related to navigation and observation was limited to the 
Marmara Sea, particularly around Heybeliada, which was not sufficient for the cadets 
who would be appointed in seagoing warships after their graduation. 
This inadequacy in the practical part of officers’ training was recognized after 
the foundation of the Ministry of Marine and the Naval Reforms Commission, and an 
                                               
370 She was built in Sinop and launched in 1841. In 1856, she was sent to be fitted with steam engine in 
Portsmouth and decommissioned in 1878 (Langensiepen and Güleryüz, 1995: 142). 
371 Soydemir, 2007: 61. 
372 Being constructed in the Imperial Naval Arsenal, she was launched in 1842 (Düzcü, 2012: 82). 
373 Ceride-i Askeriye, ‘Mevadd-ı Bahriye’, 20, 28 May 1864.  
374 Ceride-i Askeriye, ‘Mevadd-ı Bahriye’, 43, 12 November 1864. 
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increase in the content of the practical training was provided, making it roughly parallel 
in content with the theoretical education. Application was mainly focused on the 
courses which included commanding and manoeuvring of the ship and gunnery 
practice. For teaching of these modules, it was decided by the naval board to employ a 
captain, a lieutenant, two gunners, and a navigation instructor from the Royal Navy with 
an appropriate salary for four years. In addition to this, a language teacher was 
requested from the same institution for the English lectures.375  
According to our archival research carried out in the National Archives of 
Britain, this request was approved by the British Admiralty Board on 21 May 1869, as it 
was written in the same document that a captain, two gunners, and an instructor would 
be chosen to send to Istanbul, and Admiral Sydney Dacres would be informed after the 
selection was completed.376 On 29 September 1869, the Board of Admiralty decided to 
send five naval instructors with a £600 annual salary and five first class gunners, who 
were to receive £250 per annum, to the Ottoman Navy.377 A short time later, Henry 
Felix Woods’ request to enter the service of the Ottoman Navy was confirmed, stating 
that he would be offered an annual salary of £500 by the Ottoman Government.378 
Although the reason for the change in the number of the officers to be assigned to the 
Ottoman Naval forces was not stated in the document, the simultaneous request of 
Henry Woods might have influenced this decision as it would not be necessary anymore 
to choose another captain after his application. Another document dated 12 October 
                                               
375 DMA, MKT, 75-166 (1 April 1869). 
376 TNA, PRO, ADM 12-820 (21 May 1869). 
377 TNA, PRO, ADM 12-820 (29 September 1869). 
378 TNA, PRO, ADM 12-820 (9 Nov 1869). 
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1869 shows that these officers would be selected among the personnel of the Royal 
Navy’s gunnery training ship, named HMS Excellent.379 
In parallel with the instatement of Woods Pasha and, later, the appointment of 
Hobart Pasha for the presidency of the Naval Reform Commission, we see that the 
practical training was also made compliant with the methods carried out in the Royal 
Navy, like the theoretical education by the increasing number of British officers 
commissioned in the Ottoman Navy. The proper application of the practical training 
specifically arranged for the Department of Navy was also transformed into a more 
systematic framework in 1870.380 As indicated by archival documents, from this date 
forward, practical training of pupils consisted of two phases. In the first stage, cadets, 
who had successfully completed the first and second grade of the theoretical education 
in the Department of Navy, were sent to a harbour training ship for the preparatory 
training on board for a period of three months. At the end of this period, they were 
subjected to an examination process and afterwards the second phase of the practical 
training was started in a seagoing training vessel for a period of two years.  
First Phase of the Practical Training 
 
In accordance with the new system, a ship-of-the line called Fethiye381 was appointed 
on 2 March 1870 as the preparatory training ship for the students of the Department of 
Navy and also for the marines, who had been recruited according to the conscription 
law.382 According to the instructions sent to the ship’s captain, Mustafa Bey, by the 
                                               
379 TNA, PRO, ADM 12-820 (12 October 1869). 
380 This can also be observed in the School’s curriculum as it was prepared as four years until 1870s and 
afterwards a division in the course programme was appeared in the curriculum of the Department of Navy 
which was prepared separately for the first two years and the last two years. 
381 Following the completion of her construction in the Imperial Naval Arsenal in 1853, she was 
commissioned in the Ottoman navy in 1858 and sent to Plymouth to be fitted with the machinery in 1859. 
She remained in the service of the Ottoman navy until 1911 (Langensiepen and Güleryüz, 1995: 142). 
382 DMA, ŞUB, 53B-50B (2 March 1870); Vak’a-nüvis Ahmed Lütfi Efendi, vol. 12, 1989: 112. 
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naval board, the main responsibility of the officers was determined as the supervision of 
the training of cadets and marines in addition to keeping the ship in optimum condition. 
383 To carry out this task, a team of instructors and marines were ordered to accompany 
the captain, and they were divided into two groups according to the tasks related to 
cleaning and maintenance of the ship and the training of students and marines. The table 
below includes detailed information on the number of officials and their ranks which 
composes of the crew in company with the captain:384  
Table 17. The Crew of Fethiye for the Preparatory Training of Cadets and Marines in 
1870 
Ship’s Crew for the duties related to 
cleaning and maintenance 
Ship’s crew for the duties related to training  
Numb
er 
Rank of the Personnel Numb
er 















1 Imam 1 Major Colonel 
1 Sağ Kolağası (Major Colonel) 1 Major Colonel 
2 Sol Kolağası (Major Colonel-one as 
munition keeper) 
2 Lieutenant 
4 Lieutenant (one as munition keeper) 1 Sub-Lieutenant 
3 Sub-Lieutenant  10 Gunner 
1 Ship-of-the Line Scribe 10 Boatswain  
1 Frigate Scribe 5 Chief Helmsman 
1 Brig Scribe 5 Petty Officer 
1 Doctor 1 Lieutenant For Musket 
Drill 1 Surgeon 1 Sub-Lieutenant 
1 Pharmacist 6 Petty Officer 
150 Marines 5 Bölük Emini385  
For other 
instructions 




--- --- 2 Bugle instructor 
--- --- 2 Call instructor 
Total Number of Personnel: 171 Total Number of Personnel: 55 
                                               
383 DMA, ŞUB, 53B-50B (2 March 1870). 
384 DMA, ŞUB, 53B-50B (2 March 1870). 
385 In warships, marines were divided as groups called bölük and bölük emini was responsible to supervise 
the division that he was appointed to with the rank of lieutenant (Nutki, 2011: 38).   
386 Workers included in the çakmakçı class were responsible for the maintenance and repair of the small 
arms such as musket (Nutki, 2011: 49). 
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As is seen, the crew consisted of a total 226 attendants, not counting the captain, 
cadets, and new recruits. Unlike the other training provided on board, exams related to 
gunnery practice were applied by a commission consisting of officers from the navy and 
new recruits were selected as 30, ten and five marines from ship-of-the lines-frigates, 
corvettes, and other smaller vessels to be sent to Fethiye in order to provide continuity 
in the training of the naval service.387 
The method of training for both cadets and marines consisted of exercises 
regarding the usage of cannonball, musket, sword, compass, machinery, signal rocket, 
and accurate targeting. In addition to wall knot, non-slip knot, and sewing, drills 
including fire and dispatching soldiers to the land via using boats in case of an action 
were also included in the training programme. Furthermore, an introduction to 
navigation was considered necessary for the naval cadets to be included in the training 
of Fethiye, and it was recorded in the same document that an instructor was requested 
for the Naval Academy for this purpose. In gunnery practices, officers, and students 
were given the right to a total of ten basic cannon shots, and also one for the newly 
invented signal rockets and guns while the marines had the right to target practice a total 
of seven times with cannon balls, and two times with the newly arrived muskets. For all 
classes, it was compulsory to practise with guns and muskets unloaded once and twice a 
month respectively, and drills regarding attack to the land via boats were carried out 
once a month in a specially arranged area so as not to disturb the locals.388  
To prevent interruptions in the preparatory practical training, the captain of 
Fethiye was acquainted with the measures taken by the Ministry of Marine. 
Accordingly, a logbook regarding the level and competence of the students and marines 
                                               
387 DMA, ŞUB, 53B-50B (2 March 1870). 
388 DMA, ŞUB, 53B-51A (2 March 1870). 
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would be prepared each month to be sent to the Naval Reforms Commission. Every 
Thursday afternoon was allocated for the cleaning of the ship and the captain was 
responsible for monitoring the hygiene and cleanliness of the crew’s uniforms and 
tarpaulins. Friday was determined as the holiday for the students and marines, who 
would not be allowed to leave the ship until late afternoon, and latecomers’ names 
would be notified to the Naval Reforms Commission. In addition to this, all required 
tools and materials would be sent from the storehouses of the navy and officers, to those 
who had been already commissioned in warships but still wanted to participate in some 
exercises. They would have full permission to join the training exercises of Fethiye.  
As is understood, Fethiye was arranged mainly for the initial entry training of 
the marines and a quota was allocated for the third grade students of the Department of 
Navy as orientation training, which aimed to make them familiar with the naval 
equipment and armaments before their intense practical training in the seagoing vessel. 
Through this measure, it was expected they would become accustomed to the discipline 
on board, and their adaptation to naval life would be smoother, leading to a possible 
increase in their performance. As we did not find any archival evidence to confirm that 
this application was started before 1870, it can be said that it was started after the 
establishment of the Naval Reforms Commission under the presidency of Hobart Pasha 
in 1869. 
According to the published memoirs of Süleyman Nutku Bey, who was a student 
in the third grade of the Department of Navy in 1873, the Peyk-i Zafer was 
commissioned to carry out the orientation training as the harbour preparatory training 
ship, which refers to the replacement of Fethiye with this ship in the same year.389 
                                               
389 Nutku, 1993b: 8. 
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According to his accounts, following their arrival to the ship, students and marines were 
divided into groups and given uniforms by the officers. During their three months of 
preparatory training, every Thursday was allocated for the cleaning of their uniforms 
and tarpaulins, and the personnel paid considerable attention to tidiness and keeping the 
ship in good order. He also adds that education on board in Peyk-i Zafer was 
considerably easy when compared with the syllabus of Hüdavendigar,390 which was the 
seagoing training frigate that cadets would be sent to after the orientation. They were 
acquainted in detail by the captain with the rules and disciplinary regulations they 
needed to follow in order to avoid punishment.391 
When the accounts of Nutku and the documents related to Fethiye are compared, 
pertaining to the content of the first phase of the practical training, it can be seen that 
they, in most cases, correspond. For this reason it can be said that the same procedure 
was carried out for the training of Peyk-i Zafer and Fethiye, which were assigned for the 
same task in different years. This application was continued without any evidence of 
alteration until 1875. 
 
Second Phase of the Practical Training for Marines 
 
The second instructions sent by the Ministry of Marine to the captain of Fethiye, shows 
that the second phase of the practical training for the marines was started in July-August 
1871, and Selim Bey was appointed as the new captain to supervise their education.392 
According to this, successful attendants of the first phase of training were responsible 
                                               
390 She was constructed in Izmit and launched in 1860. In 1864, she sailed towards Southampton to be 
mounted with the machinery and boiler and remained in the service until 1890 (Langensiepen and 
Güleryüz, 1995: 144).    
391 Nutku, 1993b: 8-9. 
392 DMA, ŞUB, 1901-79 (July-August 1871). 
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for showing their competence offshore in this stage. Furthermore, it was decided that 
the captain would act in accordance with the directives given by the Mediterranean 
Commandership during cruising. In parallel with this, the ship would proceed to Lesbos 
after passing through the Dardanelles Strait, and steam towards the port of Izmir to call 
at port for a few days for maintenance purposes. Afterwards the cruise would continue 
along with the Syrian coasts of the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and end in the port of 
Suda on the island of Crete. During the cruise, she would proceed only by sail, and 
usage of coal to run the machinery would not be allowed for the crew unless they 
encountered adverse weather conditions. In addition to this, the captain was in charge of 
controlling the orientation of marines with the rules and regulations on board, and the 
observations and analysis of their performance during cruising.393 At the end of this 
two-phased and relatively short education, the Ministry of Marine intended the marines 
to have sufficient general knowledge concerning seamanship, and to be more 
experienced in the usage of naval equipment. In addition to this, it provided them with a 
better understanding of the discipline codes required on board ships before being sent to 
the warships, which was necessary to assure respect for, and good communication with, 
their superiors. 
 
Second Phase of the Practical Training for Students of the Department of Navy 
 
As indicated, after finishing their three months education in the harbour training ship on 
May 1870, the successful pupils were sent to the seagoing training vessel to complete 
their remaining two years of education in the Department of Navy. We see that the 
Hüdavendigar steam frigate was commissioned as the new training ship for the sea-
                                               
393 DMA, ŞUB, 1901-79 (July-August 1871). 
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training of the cadets on 3 May 1870, and the main procedures and principals of the 
practical training were explained by its comprehensive Code of Practice.394 When these 
newly-prepared regulations are analysed, they can be grouped under three headings as 
the route of cruising, teaching of the courses, and providing discipline among pupils.  
Accordingly, the first routing of the ship was in the direction of the Aegean and 
Eastern Mediterranean ports including Çanakkale, Izmir, Rhodes, Marmaris, Cyprus, 
Tripoli, Beirut, Sayfa and Jaffa. In the second phase, she would continue to cruise the 
Western Mediterranean, visiting the Arsenal of the British Royal Navy’s Mediterranean 
fleet in Malta; the ports of Algeria, Gibraltar, Carthage, Minorca, Marseilles; the French 
Navy’s Arsenal in Toulon, and the Italian ports of Genoa, Naples, and Messina 
respectively. After its return to Malta, she would steam to the port of Suda in Crete, 
Kos, Chios, Lesbos, and Thessaloniki, with the final destination of her journey being 
Istanbul.395  
When the memoirs of Woods Pasha and Nutku, who were the navigation 
instructor and a student on board the Hüdavendigar in 1873 respectively, are compared 
with the new Code of Practice prepared in 1870, it can be said that the above-mentioned 
route was partially altered and its content was narrowed. According to their notes, the 
ship first proceeded to Thessaloniki and Volos ports in the Aegean Sea and anchored at 
Vlore and later Suda Bay in Crete during the winter. In March 1874, she steamed 
towards the North Africa ports. After calling at Benghazi, Tripoli, and Tunisia, she 
returned to Istanbul through the ports of Suda and Çanakkale.396 According to Nutku, 
the primary focus of training was given to the modules relating to navigation and 
astronomy. Furthermore, procedures regarding the safety were prepared in accordance 
                                               
394 DMA, ŞUB, 1901, 53B-54A (3 May 1870). 
395 ŞUB, 1901, 53B-57A (18 April 1870). 
396 Woods, 1924b: 21-25; Bal, 2003: 5-11. 
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with the instructions carried out in the British flagged ships. The Turkish officers were 
Giritli Faik Paşa397 and Selim Bey as the captain and the commodore respectively.398  
Students’ progress in the field of gunnery was specified as the main target for 
improvement in the new agenda of practical training carried out on board the 
Hüdavendigar. For this reason, cannons of various diameters and the required amount 
of munitions would be provided from the Imperial Naval Arsenal and placed on the 
deck of the ship. Considering the need of students to learn steam technology and the 
usage of steam engines during cruising, it was recommended to keep the duration of 
cruising on the high seas longer. To improve students for commanding the ship in rough 
weather conditions, it was also advised to sail by using wind power.399 
When it was necessary to land for educational purposes, such as examining the 
structure of a port or a foreign country’s arsenal, one or two officers would be 
commissioned to accompany the students. Each student was responsible for keeping a 
logbook which should include useful information about quantities of guns, 
ammunitions, and personnel of foreign warships, along with additional comments made 
by the student himself. The captain and the instructor would also keep notebooks to 
submit the Ministry of Marine after completion of the cruise regarding the cadets’ 
performance on the courses and their consistency in good discipline. In addition to this, 
another book, called the fault book, would be kept by the naval instructor in order to 
make a record of disobedient actions. Accordingly, students, who committed offences 
such as drunkenness and disobedience, would be sentenced for a few days of 
imprisonment with reduced rations. If they committed these offences again, they would 
                                               
397 Faik bey was the Turkish officer of Broussa that Woods met at Mauritius on his way to Britain from 
Japan on 26 October 1866 (Woods, 1924b: 19). 
398 Bal, 2003: 4-5; Woods, 1924b: 19-20. 
399 DMA, ŞUB, 1901, 53B-54A (3 May 1870). 
187 
 
be isolated from the other personnel and expelled from the Naval Academy following 
the return to Istanbul.400 It may be seen that the authority on the practical training was 
shared between the commander of the ship and the teaching instructors. However 
students’ performance in the courses and their collaboration to keep discipline on board 
at the required level were under the control of the Ministry via the record books kept by 
the ship crew. As is seen from the table below, in the same document, the daily schedule 
of cadets was also explained in detail:401 
Table 18. Daily Schedule of Cadets in Hüdavendigar Training Ship 
Time Works Navigation Gunnery Seamanship 
6.00 Waking up, making tarpaulins 
and putting them on the bulwark 
   
7.00 Breakfast     
8.00 Being ready for the roll call    




9.00  3rd grade 4th grade  
10.30  4th grade 3rd grade  
12.00 Lunch  
1.00  4th grade 3rd grade 3rd grade 
2.30  3rd grade 4th grade 4th grade 
4.00  Musket Drill 
5.00 Dinner 
6.30-7.30  Engaged in negotiation 
7.30-8.30 Grades to be gathered for night observation carried out by turns. 
9.30 Bedtime 
 
Another document dated 17 February 1874 gives detailed information regarding 
the curriculum of Hüdavendigar, the number of students in each class, their names, and 
the required points to be collected by cadets to pass the modules. Table 19 presents this 
information:402 
                                               
400 ŞUB, 1901, 53B-55A (3 May 1870). 
401 ŞUB, 1901, 53B-58A (14 April 1870). 




Table 19. The Curriculum of Hüdavendigar Training Ship in 1874 








Third and Fourth 
Grade  
of the Department of 
Navy 
Usage of Observation Equipment 20 (Definition and 
Usage, each 10 points) 
The Method of Navigation through 
Using Observation Equipment 
80 points 
 
Navigation via Using Chip Log 
20 (Mapping and Usage 
of Chip Log, each 10 
points) 
Mechanism and Manoeuvre of the Navy 45 points 
Practice in Seafaring 30 points 
Definition of Lighthouses 25 points 
English 40 points 
Gunnery Practice 45 points 
Sword Drill 20 points 
Musket Drill 20 points 
Carpentry 35 points 
Ottoman History and Writing 30 points (each 15 
points) 
Drawing of Solid Objects 20 points 
Practice in Signalling 20 points 
 
Confirming the implementation of a point scoring system before 1876, this 
course programme also proves that the length of education for the Department of Navy 
was four years in 1874. In comparison with the theoretical education carried out in the 
school building and the training ship anchored for the students in Heybeliada, the 
modules devoted explicitly to seafaring (30 points) and navigation (80 + 20 points) were 
becoming more prominent in the course programme of the seagoing training ship. In 
other words, while six years of theoretical education was mainly focused on 
mathematical sciences, the new syllabus of the Hüdavendigar was organized to develop 
students’ skills in seamanship in their last two years in the Naval Academy. In both 
classes, the points to be collected by students were specified as 450. When we analyse 
the exam charts of the students from the same document, the average student success 
appears as 401. We can also observe that high number of cadets successfully passed the 
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examinations related to navigation and gunnery sciences, such as usage of observation 
equipment; the method of navigation through using observation equipment; mechanism 
and manoeuvre of the navy; practice in seafaring, and gunnery practice. Even though 
this can give an impression that the programme was successfully implemented, the 
desired number of officers, who would be commissioned in the navy after the 
completion of practical training, was still very low.  
Following Hüdavendigar’s return to Istanbul in spring 1874, the steam frigate 
Muhbir-i Sürur was appointed as the new seagoing training ship for the Naval Academy 
in October 1874.403 The reason for this replacement, which can be found in the 
observations of Woods and Nutku that Hüdavendigar, was deemed to be no longer 
seaworthy404 as her maneuverability was not sufficient because of her weight, which 
also complicated her progress particularly by sail. As the angle of rolling was 38-40 
degrees when she started to yaw, water could not be prevented from flowing into the 
ports and this also caused difficulty for the personnel carrying out their daily tasks.405 
Being aware of the importance of seagoing training for the cadets and the problems that 
they encountered because of the technical insufficiencies of Hüdavendigar in their first 
cruise to the Mediterranean, it is very difficult to understand the purpose of the Ministry 
of Marine in appointing Muhbir-i Sürur,406 another old and heavy frigate, for the longer 
cruise. Her insufficiency for an extended field trip was also indicated by Woods, stating 
that she had a “small steam power and her coal-carrying capacity was very limited.”407 
                                               
403 DMA, ŞUB, 1901, 53B-48A (6 October 1874); Bal, 2003: 12; Woods, 192b: 25. 
404 Woods, 1924b: 25. 
405 Bal, 2003: 7. 
406 She was constructed in Alexandria and sent to Britain to be mounted with steam engine in 1849. 
Following her return to Istanbul, she was commissioned in the Ottoman navy in 1850 (Langensiepen and 
Güleryüz, 1995: 143). 
407 Woods, 1924b: 25. 
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According to the instructions sent by the Ministry of Marine to the Muhbir-i 
Sürur’s captain on 6 October 1874, the first phase of the cruising was plotted to be in 
the direction of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. This routing was also confirmed 
by a notification sent by the Foreign Office to the British Admiralty on 2 November 
1874.408 Accordingly, after calling at the Dardanelles and Lesbos, the Muhbir-i Sürur 
would proceed to Port Said via Rhodes, and then via the Bab-el-Mandeb to Aden. 
Along the same route, she would continue to cruise along the West Indian Coast and 
after visiting the Arsenal of Mumbai and the port of Karachi, she would return to 
Muscat. By passing through the Strait of Hormuz, she would steam to Bandar Abbas 
and later, the last destination of the first phase of cruising, Basra. The second phase 
would be started from Basra on May 1875. Through Hormuz Strait, the ship would 
proceed to Indian Ocean again after calling at Socotra Island and Bab-el-Mandeb and 
then return to Mocha to continue cruising along with the ports of the Red Sea including 
Hudaydah, Jeddah, Suez, Port Said, and Alexandria. On her way back to Istanbul, she 
would steam first to Alexandretta and later Rhodes and Lesbos. After visiting Volos and 
Thessaloniki, she would reach Dardanelles and her journey would be ended in 
Istanbul.409  
Although the name of the captain was not stated in the same document, we learn 
from Nutku’s accounts that he was Çerkez Mehmet Muzaffer Pasha and his commodore 
was Nakkaş İsmail Bey. As understood from the aforementioned instructions sent by the 
Ministry to Muzaffer Pasha, he was given many responsibilities in assuring this long 
cruise was conducted in an orderly manner. First of all he was warned about the usage 
of steam power, and it was stated that the frigate would proceed only by wind power as 
                                               
408 TNA, PRO, ADM, 12-941 (2 November 1874). 
409 DMA, ŞUB, 1901, 53B-48A (6 October 1874). 
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long as it was not possible to use the sails in some cases, such as in the course of entry 
and exit through narrow straits and ports, and coal would not be used unless it was 
absolutely necessary. When a decision was made by the captain and other chief officers 
on using the coal stocks to operate the ship by steam power, the Ministry of Marine 
would be notified by a protocol prepared by the captain, stating how many hours that 
the machinery and boiler was required to be run. During the course of entry and exit 
from ports, the ship would be kept out of any kind of danger and the responsibility to 
take required measures would be held by the captain. In addition to this, he would pay 
great attention to teaching the modules regarding the practices of manoeuvre, the 
tidiness of students’ uniforms, and compliance of their behaviour with the naval 
regulations both on board and ashore.410 As the places to be visited by the crew were 
foreign ports and coasts, no one would be allowed to leave the ship unless information 
had reached the captain about these places’ current situations. If there were no perceived 
threats, cadets would be allowed to disembark in accordance with the regulations 
included in the naval code. Provisions would be spent under the supervision of the 
captain, who was also responsible in preventing excessive usage of supplies.411 
Further to the regulations regarding safety and expenditures, the main focus of 
the instruction pertained to the training of cadets, which was also directed by the 
captain. Accordingly, students’ progress in the practical training would be monitored 
and their obedience and time-keeping was measured through adherence to the timetable. 
Although the syllabus was not included in the same document, the names of the 
modules were the calculation of altitude to find the latitudes and longitudes, navigation, 
                                               
410 DMA, ŞUB, 1901, 53B-48A (6 October 1874). 
411 DMA, ŞUB, 1901, 53B-49A (6 October 1874). 
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and the usage of machinery, gunnery, sword, and musket.412 This gives an impression 
that the curriculum of Hüdavendigar continued to be carried out with the inclusion of 
geographical calculations and the usage of machinery, which addressed the most 
problematic deficiency in the practical training implemented in Hüdavendigar. In 
addition to this, the mapping the ports of call was made compulsory for the students in 
the regulations of Muhbir-i Sürur, and it would be demonstrated by the navigation 
instructors in detail. Complementing the course hours, students would be engaged in the 
manoeuvre practices and in the case of an encounter with a foreign flagged ship, the 
official salutation would be performed by the crew and the students would be informed 
about this application in detail.413    
As understood from Nutku’s observation, the routing of the training ship had to 
be altered due to problems encountered during the cruise. Accordingly—following her 
departure from Istanbul—Muhbir-i Sürur proceeded directly to Port Said and after 
passing through the Suez Canal, she called at the port of Hudaydah and anchored at 
Kamaran Island for one month. While there, the students followed the instructions to 
map the port of Kamaran under the supervision of navigation instructor Woods Pasha, 
as indicated in the regulation sent by the Ministry to the Captain Muzaffer Pasha on 6 
October 1874. After leaving Kamaran on December 1874, the ship passed Bab-el-
Mandeb and without calling at the port of Aden, continued to cruise around Socotra 
Island. Once here, Nutku mentions that the crew deserved to be warned as they were 
using the machinery not suitable to the southern parts of the island, which included 
shallow areas, although using steam power was forbidden apart from necessary cases in 
                                               
412 DMA, ŞUB, 1901, 53B-48A (6 October 1874). 
413 DMA, ŞUB, 1901, 53B-48A (6 October 1874). 
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the instructions given by the Ministry.414 Upon reaching Ras Fartak, she called at the 
Kish Island and entered the port of Basra. There, it was understood by the crew that due 
to the mouldy biscuits and the stagnant water adding to the humidity, dysentery was 
spread among the personnel and resulted in the death of 19 people. Blaming the 
Ministry for these losses, Nutku continues his criticism with the following statements: 
The tasks and liabilities in arranging seagoing training vessels were not carried 
out properly and on time which made the cruise torturous for the personnel. An 
opinion was formed among the students that we had to get used to difficulties 
and deprivations as provisions allocated for the training ships could not be 
compared with the foods given to the foreign flagged ships. The capacity of the 
ship was not considered as they embarked a hundred and fifty, perhaps two 
hundred people, instead of a hundred. For this reason, the Turkish marines 
whom we left in the Red Sea were the victims of these omissions.415 
 
Muhbir-i Sürur departed from Basra and upon the direction of Ras Tanura, 
reached Karachi, and later Mumbai. In this port, requesting assistance from the Ministry 
was deemed necessary to purchase coal and students continued their training ashore. 
Their close relations with locals caused an official notification made by the British 
officers to leave the port after 13 days, and they helped the crew by purchasing coal 
without waiting the response from Istanbul. They left Mumbai on March 1875 and 
passed the Arabian Sea in 15 days. As is understood from Nutku’s observations, another 
one was added into existing difficulties experienced by the crew when they were trying 
to reach the port of Jeddah. Around Kamaran Island, the machinery stopped working 
due to a broken probe and steam erupted out of the ship in various places, caused by 
corroded exhaust pipes. Under these circumstances, they had to seek haven at the port of 
Trinkitat on the African coast, and spent 15 days until the machinist Hüseyin Bey 
repaired the machine. During this time, Nutku mentions that although a kind of 
                                               
414 Bal, 2003: 12-13. This information shows that the personnel tried to carry out their tasks in accordance 
with the regulations dated 6 October 1874.  
415 Bal, 2003: 15-16. 
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disobedience was avoided among the cadets, credited to the wise direction of the 
Captain Muzaffer Pasha, it caused the students and the personnel to become despondent 
following the occurrence of food shortage. In this port, everybody blamed the 
government for haplessly overlooking the requirements of this long cruise, such as a 
strong vessel and a determined budget which should be enough for meeting at least the 
basic needs of the personnel and the maintenance of the naval equipment. The 
conditions were bad; it was even decided by the captain to allocate remaining biscuit 
crumbs only for the students following the consumption of all the biscuit stocks. In the 
meantime, an Egyptian steamer carrying coal and biscuits reached Trinkitat to assist 
Muhbir-i Sürur. With the arrival of this aid, she steamed first to Jeddah and later Suez 
where they had to wait for days due to the insufficient coal supplies. After their arrival 
at Suda port, another order was issued; the students of the fourth grade in the 
Department of Navy were divided into groups to participate in the cruise of the Turkish 
squadron that consisted of four corvettes under the commandership of Bozcaadalı Hasan 
Pasha. This fleet included the Muhbir-i Sürur, which proceeded to Tripoli and after 
visiting Tunisia, the final year students returned to the training ship.416 Following 
coaling in Suda Bay, the cruise for a period of two years ended in Istanbul. 
On 9 May 1876, Muhbir-i Sürur was commissioned once again for the same 
purpose, but this time the content of her cruise was narrowed, limited to the Anatolian 
coasts of the Mediterranean, which adjustment was likely influenced from the problems 
encountered in her previous journey. According to the new routing, she would proceed 
                                               
416 The squadron under the command of Hasan Pasha consisted of the following corvettes; Edirne, 
Muzaffer, İzmir and Mansure. The cruise was performed under sail in accordance with the instructions 
and the squadron had to be sent to from Tunisia to Klek due to the disturbances in Herzegovina and 
Bosnia (United States Department of State Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 




to the Dardanelles following her departure from Istanbul and continue to steam towards 
the Western Mediterranean, visiting Thessaloniki, Volos, and Crete. From there, she 
would pass to Cyprus and call at the ports of Antalya, Kilis and Marmaris. On her way 
back to the Aegean Sea, she would cruise along the coasts of Western Anatolia and her 
journey would end in the Dardanelles.417 As is understood from the last article of the 
instructions sent by the office of Kapudan Pasha to the commander of Muhbir-i Sürur 
on 15 November 1876, the political tension between the Ottoman Empire and Russia 
resulted in the transfer of the routing of the training ship to the Black Sea after seven 
months. Accordingly, the cruise would start from Istanbul to the Rumelian coasts of the 
Black Sea including Burgas, Varna, and Balchik and she would continue to steam 
towards the Anatolian coasts, calling at the ports of Ereğli, Sinop, Samsun, Trabzon, 
and Batumi. Her last destination was determined as Sinop and the captain held the 
responsibility of informing the office of Kapudan Pasha about their arrival. He was 
briefed that they would stay in this port to await further orders. Due to the increasing 
importance of the Black Sea shores, he was also in charge of preparing reports on the 
political conditions of the ports and informing the Kapudan Pasha via telegram.418 
As seen, the practical training for cadets in the Department of Navy was carried 
out in a two-phased system, which included a three-month orientation period in a 
harbour training ship, followed by practical training for a period of two years in a 
seagoing training vessel. In the period of Sultan Abdülaziz, while Fethiye and Peyk-i 
Zafer were commissioned for the orientation of the students and naval recruits, Nüvid-i 
Fütuh, Hüdavendigar and Muhbir-i Sürur were assigned for the third and fourth grade 
students’ offshore training in both Ottoman and foreign waters in 1864, 1873, and 1874 
                                               
417 DMA, ŞUB, 1901, 53B-189A (9 May 1876). 




respectively. As is confirmed by archival data, detailed instructions and intense trip 
programmes were prepared by the Ministry to provide cadets with more experience in 
seamanship and navigation in various areas in the Mediterranean, Red Sea, Indian 
Ocean, and the Black Sea. However, the accounts of officers and students—who 
participated in training trips carried out in Hüdavendigar and Muhbir-i Sürur in person, 
like Woods Pasha and Nutku—show that the declining situation of the naval treasury 
was not taken into consideration by the Ministry of Marine due to the intention to apply 
the system of the British Admiralty properly to the Ottoman Navy. The longest trip 
organized in Muhbir-i Sürur confirmed that increasing problems, such as food and 
water shortage, inadequate amount of coal, and epidemics, caused the routing to be 
changed and interruptions to be observed in the cadets’ training programme. 
As is shown, the ships of which the modern Ottoman Navy was now composed 
of, either by way of purchasing or by means of new construction, were operated by 
steam power; even the ships inherited from the previous period were mounted with 
steam engines. In this case, it should be expected that the graduates of the Departments 
of Navy and Machinery of the Naval Academy would have acquired exceptional 
practical experience with and knowledge of the operation of steam engines while at sea. 
Conversely however, only a single module regarding steam technology was offered in 
the entire two-year course programme on board the training ship.  
In addition to this, prohibition of the usage of coal appears as the other important 
oversight of this training programme, as the students missed out practising the usage of 
machinery and also manoeuvring exercises when the ship was operated by steam power. 
For this reason, practical training in this period can be considered as an ideal 
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programme for the age of sail, but it was far from meeting the essential needs of steam 
and armoured ships. 
 
Conclusion 
As clearly presented, apart from the constant changes made on the length of education 
and school curriculum, the number of the graduates was far from adequate to meet the 
desperate need of the navy in their intentions of bringing an end to the dependency on 
Western aid. Instead of trying to apply the British system in a relatively short time, the 
following questions should have been discussed on the basis of decisions taken by the 
Ministry: (1) Were the graduate students able to meet the expectations in respect to the 
heavy investment allocated from the budget of the Ministry of Marine? (2) Was the idea 
of spending a long and tiring eight years in Heybeliada generated by the naval 
bureaucracy supported by the marine officers? (3) Would technical expertise provide 
officers the necessary infrastructure for determining the required strategy during war-
time? 
In parallel with the technological changes, the Ottoman Empire intended naval 
education to have a more systematic structure by modelling itself on European navies, 
which consisted of armoured, heavy tonnage and steam-operated ships. For this reason, 
traditional training methods carried out using practical expertise in the age of sail were 
transferred into the school buildings. However, the above documents confirm that the 
students—who still lacked sea and military experience after six years of theoretical 
education and with an additional four years preparatory training—were incapable of 
mastering the naval strategy required in the integration of technical expertise, local 
intelligence, historical insight, and individual understanding. The main purpose of the 
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new training ought to have provided the students with training that would adequately 
prepare them for contemporary military equipment and practical strategies in order to 
gain advantage against the enemy during war.419 If achieved, it was envisioned such a 
graduate would be able to make decisions instantly, and manipulate wartime situations 
in favour of the Ottoman Navy in the most dangerous part of his military task, by 
combining technical information obtained from school and his own understanding.  
To achieve this aim, the preparatory education should have been transferred 
from the school building to the training ship, mirroring the methods carried out in the 
same period for the Royal Navy. By integrating technical education and the exchanging 
of experiences, the students not only would acquire the basic maritime knowledge but 
also understand the discipline of the ship at a young age, and start their higher education 
with this awareness. On the other hand, while the students of the Royal Navy were 
awarded with the rank of sub-lieutenant immediately after completing their preparatory 
education,420 the same rank was given only after six years for the Department of Navy 
and seven years for the other departments in the Ottoman Naval Academy. Training 
students with a long and challenging theoretical education without giving them a rank 
can be seen as another negative factor affecting their motivation. Arguably, the main 
targets of the naval reforms should have considered greater concentration on the 
practical training at an early period of the naval education, and promoting trained 
officers who would be able to implement the right naval strategy. As seen, the Ottoman 
naval bureaucracy—which suffered an unstable structure concerning the length of 
education, the curriculum and the student quotas—resulted only in an increase in the 
number of students, without providing trained officers to meet the needs of the newly 
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constructed ships. Overall, taking into consideration the myriad shortfalls discussed, this 























CHAPTER 6. THE ADVANCEMENTS OBSERVED IN NAVAL 




As an administrative centre, the Imperial Naval Arsenal of Istanbul represented the 
main area of the Empire’s maritime affairs. This large organization was the office of the 
Grand Admiral, as well as the construction site of new ships.421 In the seventeenth 
century, the Arsenal appeared to be a large complex which consisted of slipways, 
cellars, storehouses, and the main administrative building called the Divanhane. For use 
of the naval personnel, there were also a mosque, prison, prayer room, bakery, kitchen, 
and a bathhouse. Adapting to the emerging trends in the shipbuilding technologies, the 
physical structure and the working system of the Tersane-i Amire were gradually 
changed under the influence of foreign experts, who were employed especially after the 
Battle of Çeşme in 1770. In this present chapter, we will first examine these western-
oriented effects on the evolution of the technical modernization by focusing on the 
measures taken to revive the local industry and the construction of dry dock number one 
in the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz. In the following section, the organization and structure 
of the Imperial Naval Arsenal will be considered by analysing the workforce 
commissioned in the manufacturing and construction stations. As a result of our 
                                               
421 After the conquest of Constantinople by Sultan Mehmed II, the port of Kadırga located in the south of 
the peninsula was used as a small scale dockyard in addition to Gallipoli until the establishment of Galata 
Shipyard in the reign of Sultan Selim I. When it was completed under the supervision of Grand Admiral 
Cafer Pasha in 1515, the Galata Shipyard occupied a space from Galata to Kağıthane and included around 
200 slipways that could accommodate the construction of at least 150 galley-type warships. For this 
reason, the first use of the term tersane, to characterize the organization in which ships have been built 
and equipped, has been observed for the Galata Shipyard in the Galata harc-ı hassa defters, dated 
between 1527 and 1528.  (Uzunçarsılı, 1988: 397, Bostan, 1992a: 2-5). The origin of the term “tersane” is 
based on the Arabic word of “daru`s-sina`a” which has been used by various Mediterranean countries 
such as Spain, Portugal, Italy and Malta. According to early Ottoman documents, the word “port” was 
used to refer the dockyards until the beginning of the sixteenth century. From that period, the Ottomans 
started to use the term “tersane” or “tershane” which had been translated into Turkish from the Italian 
term of “darsena” (Bostan, 1992a: 2). 
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research in the Istanbul Naval Museum Commandership Archive, we found the 
numbers and monthly salaries of foreign and local personnel, clearly representing the 
increasing British influence on the local industry, while enabling us to make a 
comparison between the numbers and the monthly salaries local and foreign workers. 
By using this useful information, the working conditions of these two groups will be 
examined in the following section. 
In the second part of the chapter, we will focus more on the Ottoman naval fleet 
in the age of ironclads. By analysing the introduction of armour and explosive shells to 
warship design between 1853 and 1861, their impacts on the emergence of Ottoman 
armoured navy and the names and technical features of the Ottoman ironclads will be 
detailed in the relevant section. The second part will be concluded with a comparative 
table, ordering the numbers and total tonnage displacements of armoured battleships of 
European naval powers. 
The third part has been reserved to consider the naval treasury and cost of the 
naval modernization. Accordingly the allocation of the naval treasury, its distribution 
and the amount of loans that concluded this period with the announcement of the state’s 
bankruptcy will be detailed. In the final part of the chapter, the rise of torpedo and its 
impacts on the naval policy of the Sultan Abdülhamid II will be examined to have a 
better understanding on the reason for the passivation of the Ottoman Navy in the 
Golder Horn until the 1890s. 
The Modernization of the Imperial Naval Arsenal 
The Construction of the Drydocks 
 
Until the end of the eighteenth century, Ottoman battleships, transport ships, and 
merchant vessels were constructed in slipways on land called çeşm or göz. However, 
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this traditional method led to some difficulties when it came to launching and laying 
completed vessels on the stocks.422 In addition, when large ships such as ship-of-the 
lines were to be launched, the launching speed could not be arranged accurately because 
of the weight of the vessels and grounding problems that were encountered frequently.  
 The French shipbuilding engineer Le Brun, who was commissioned to 
participate in the naval modernization activities of Sultan Selim III’s era, proposed a 
new method to solve this problem. According to his proposal, ships would be built on 
land up to their portholes and the construction of the deck portion would be 
accomplished after launching. In the same period, ships began to be built in dry docks in 
a similar process. Besides allowing repair, maintenance, and fitting procedures to be 
completed in a quicker and easier way, these structures also enabled the hull of the 
vessels to be built in a dry environment thanks to their double-edged doors and bailing 
pumps.423 The estimated construction time was stipulated by Le Brun as approximately 
three years. However, this offer was rejected at first on the grounds that the cost of the 
dry dock was too high. Later on, the Sublime Porte was persuaded that although ships 
kept and maintained in European dry docks remained in service for at least 40-45 years, 
the Ottoman vessels lasted only about 15 years. 
 Following the decision to build a dry dock in the Imperial Naval Arsenal, a 
group of new experts were brought from Sweden adding to those already present from 
France, and both groups were asked to prepare a report regarding their proposals for 
construction. According to the French project, the dock had to be built on water. After 
dredging and underwater blasting to open the required channels, a very large caisson 
would be submerged and the water would be pumped out to enable the construction of 
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423 Zorlu, 2008: 68. 
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the quay walls. Unlike the French proposal, the Swedes insisted that building the dock 
on land was a better idea. Accordingly, after determining a suitable place for the 
construction, the working area would be surrounded by driving sheet piles in order to 
operate the excavation works in a dry pit. In this way, the dry dock would not only cost 
less, it would also be built on a more solid foundation. As a result of the negotiations, 
the French proposal, which would cost two times more than the Swedes’, was rejected. 
It was decided that the Swedish group, led by the engineer Rhode, would be employed 
for the construction work after a six-month trial period. From the beginning of trials on 
4 June 1796 to the official starting date on 4 February 1797, preliminaries such as 
manufacturing the workbenches and pumps, excavation of the specified area, which was 
next to the Zahire Ambarı (granary) at the Imperial Naval Arsenal, and building a new 
gate, railing, and stone pavement were completed.424 
Primary requirements of a dry dock of this size were to supply and bring the 
basic materials such as timber, stone, lime, and iron. The expenditures spent for these 
purposes would be covered by the budget allocated from the new treasury. Accordingly, 
timber was brought from Kidros, Cide (pinewood), Misivri, Ayholu, Sergen Mountains 
(oakwood), and Iznikmid (hornbeam), while stones were shaped in İstinye quarry and 
lime and iron were mostly supplied from Pendik.425 For the most part, the same sources 
of supply were used for the Ottoman ship construction in later decades. In addition to 
this, a special kind of soil called boçlana was brought from Santorini and Değirmenlik 
islands, as well as being imported from Italy.426 
The first dry dock of the Imperial Arsenal, which cost approximately 6809 
pounds sterling and is known today as dry dock number three, was completed in 
                                               
424 Zorlu, 2008: 58-59; Bostan, 1992b: 74-75; Müller-Wiener, 2003: 82-83. 
425 Bostan, 1992b: 77.  
426 Bostan, 1992b: 78; Zorlu, 2008: 59; Gencer, 2001: 52-53. 
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1800.427 It brought a new approach to Ottoman shipbuilding practice and created a 
suitable environment for the intense naval modernization after the reign of Sultan Selim 
III. It also provided a technological model for the construction of future docks. Despite 
being damaged by the sea water seeping into the sheet piles and necessity for repairs in 
1801, 1807 and 1814, it continued to be used in the Imperial Naval Arsenal for a long 
time.  
After the introduction of steam power into the Ottoman Navy in the period of 
Sultan Mahmud II, dry dock number two was built with similar methods by Abdülhalim 
Efendi, a lecturer in the Mühendishane and his foreman Manol (Manuel), who were 
employed in the construction of the previous dock between 1821 and 1825.428 In 
addition to having the same features such as dimensions, construction techniques, and 
design identical with European made dry docks, these docks also brought a new and 
modern look to the Tersane-i Amire. 
In parallel with the rapid increase in the numbers of newly built and purchased 
ships during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz, the existing dry docks were renovated and 
new ones were built.429 The first dry dock of this period was the largest dock430 of the 
Imperial Naval Arsenal, known as dry dock number one today. Indeed, the decision to 
build a new dock was made in 1857 but it was not actualized due to the financial 
crisis.431 Although it is uncertain when this was brought to the agenda again, the permit 
for construction was authorized approximately five months before Abdülaziz’s 
accession to the throne on 26 January 1861. Provided that there would be enough space 
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to build the seaport, the surface of the dock would never be covered and the 
construction of new buildings in the construction site would not be permitted.432 
Although there is no definite evidence concerning the official starting date of 
construction, the agreement was signed with the French engineer de Lef to build the dry 
dock in April 1864.433 In this case, it can be said that construction works started in the 
early years of the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz. 
The finishing date for the dry dock has been identified in a recent study as 
1861.434 However, the information obtained from the archival sources show that this 
cannot be possible. In fact, it was stated in the Ceride-i Askeriye issued on 18 June 1864 
that the excavation works for the ground of the dock had been underway for several 
years, which confirms the construction was still ongoing in 1864. In addition, we learn 
from the same issue of the Ceride-i Askeriye that the process to drive the stakes in the 
roads of the harbour, which were required to seal the construction works, began on 4 
June 1864.435 Accordingly, the method of Swedish engineer Rhode, who had been in 
charge of building dry dock number three, was still underway in this period as the 
students of Rhode like Vasil Efendi were the leading figures of the new dry dock’s 
construction team. In addition to this, a map of Golden Horn, which we found in the 
National Archives of Britain and was sent to the Admiralty on 15 November 1864 by 
Edward H. Wilkinson, a lieutenant in HMS Caradoc, shows the locations of the main 
units of the Imperial Naval Arsenal with some additional information.436  
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Figure 6. Dry docks Area of the Imperial Naval Arsenal, 1864 (TNA, PRO, MPI 1-727-8) 
 
If we take a closer look at this map we can see from top left to right: the location 
of the Imperial Naval Arsenal, dry docks area, coal store, and the floating bridge that 
connects Karaköy and Eminönü—known today as Unkapani or Atatürk Bridge. The 
other floating bridge—which was ordered from G. Wells Company—is known as 
Galata Bridge today. Also, we can see boat houses for state barges; the line that shows 
the border for the ships that should receive a confirmation from the Health Office to 
pass it; English Factory, and Gun Wharf. 
This information not only confirms the statements in the army and navy gazette 
but also gives us a clue about the estimated finishing date of the construction work, 
which was determined as 1868. Another archival document dated 11 October 1865 
explains the reasons for building a new dry dock in the Imperial Naval Arsenal as well 
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as giving an idea regarding the end date of the construction. The ongoing construction 
of the Iron Foundry and Ironworks Factories restricted the buildable areas in the 
Arsenal, thus the area around dry dock number three that was used for the cleaning and 
maintenance of the wooden ships was insufficient for the large armoured ships in terms 
of its dimensions. For this reason, it was emphasized that the new dock must be ready 
within nine months in order to prevent the naval treasury from incurring great expenses. 
To prevent excessive expenses, it was decided around 100 stonemasons, 50 carpenters 
and an appropriate number of farmers should be employed to complete the construction 
at the appointed time.437 Based on this information, it can be inferred that the dock was 
completed in July 1866. Despite using methods similar to Selim III’s era for its 
construction, the new dry dock differed from the previous one with its bailing pumps, 
which were operated by steam power instead of horse power.438 
An official document sent from the Naval Assembly to the Ministry of Marine 
on 12 July 1871 shows that at a later stage, the Arsenal was in need of a small floating 
dock, which was called in the same document as filotunduk. The statement of reasons 
for building this dock, which could be deployed in the desired area on the seaside, was 
explained in detail. Due to the fast growing number of the armoured ships, this new 
dock was essential for their maintenance and cleaning. It would also be used for the 
renovation of the steamers belonging to the Hazine-i Hassa (the Sultan’s Privy Purse) 
and the other small steamboats built from wood or sheet iron. In addition, it would 
cover its expenses at short notice by serving foreign ships and merchant vessels for their 
repairs and maintenance. In consequence, the construction had to start as soon as 
possible as it would also be an “auspicious inception” for the future construction of a 
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bigger dock, which would be used for large armoured ships. Apart from the timber, 
which would be supplied from the stocks of the Imperial Naval Arsenal, the expenses, 
including the cost of workers, were calculated as approximately 4587 pounds sterling.439 
On the same date, a letter including the demand of İşkodra Province to build a facility 
for the cleaning of armoured pontoon boats and the maintenance of merchant ships was 
sent to the Interior Ministry. As is seen from the remainder of the letter, this decision 
was approved by the Imperial Naval Arsenal on the grounds that a floating dock would 
be built instead of a facility on İşkodra Lake. In addition, it was pointed out that the 
construction should start immediately and the costs would be met by the Province and 
not be demanded from the budget of the Arsenal.440 
Towards the end of 1872, it was determined that the dry dock number three in 
Kasımpaşa failed to fulfil the needs of increasing number of armoured ships and needed 
to be widened by around 30 metres. In addition to this, the construction of a new dock 
in İzmir was proposed by the Naval Assembly for the maintenance of the wooden ships, 
whose number had increased by the use of the coastguard and local transportation. It 
was also highlighted in the same protocol that the expenses of the construction would be 
covered by the Ministry of Finance.441 As is understood from another letter sent to the 
Ministry of Marine on 14 October 1873, the stipulated width of the dry dock number 
three was found to be insufficient and it was decided to extend it to a length of 
approximately 129 meters. The construction work was assigned to Vasil Efendi, the 
architect of the Imperial Naval Arsenal, provided that the renovation would be 
completed in 14 months, with a portion of the necessary materials being donated by the 
Arsenal. The other expenses, amounting to 19,350 pounds sterling, were requested from 
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the Naval Treasury’s 1871-1872 budget with the condition that 1683 pounds sterling 
would be paid in advance and the rest month-by-month as the construction advanced.442 
On 1 June 1874, an official protocol was sent from the Naval Assembly to the Ministry 
of Marine. According to this document, it was decided that dry dock number three 
should be further extended from 129 meters to 152 metres based on the Naval 
Assembly’s report prepared to determine the required width. The estimated cost of the 
construction was around 58,917 pounds sterling, and it would be paid for by the Naval 
Treasury’s budget for the following year.443 
As is seen, the number of active docks in the Imperial Naval Arsenal reached 
four towards the end of the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz, including the construction of dry 
dock number one and the small floating dock in Kasımpaşa. The techniques of Swedish 
engineer Rhode continued to be applied in this period and steam power began to be 
utilized for bailing out excess water. In addition to these developments, the construction 
of small floating docks in İşkodra and İzmir were undertaken, primarily for the 
maintenance of transport vessels. Another notable point regarding the dry dock building 
is the increase in the scale of construction. While the construction of dry dock number 
three had cost around 6809 pounds sterling, the budget allocated for the extension of dry 
dock number three was 19,359 pounds sterling after 70 years. This budget needed to be 
increased to 58,917 pounds sterling one year later. These figures confirm that there was 
a phase increase in the expenses of the materials to be used for the construction, their 
transportation, and the wages of the workers, a trend especially apparent in the mid-
1870s. It is also possible that the big jump witnessed in 1873 resulted from the 
underestimation of project cost established in the protocol dated 14 October 1873. 
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Additional Buildings, Factories and Manufacturing Activities 
 
The Imperial Naval Arsenal, which was continuously enhanced in terms of capacity and 
infrastructure—adapting to the developments in the new shipbuilding techniques from 
the sixteenth century to the nineteenth century—was expanded through additional 
buildings built for the maintenance of new vessels and as a result its capacity for 
manufacturing naval equipment was substantially increased between 1861 and 1875. 
With its buildings, dry docks, stores, and factories, the Arsenal occupied a space over 
two kilometres long between Golden Horn and Pera during the reign of Sultan 
Abdülaziz.444  
As is known, the first industrial plants of the Ottoman Empire were the large and 
small scale dockyards which included the dry docks and ateliers that provided 
production of naval equipment. With the involvement of steam engine in the Ottoman 
shipbuilding technology, the network of railways shifted largely to the Golden Horn 
Basin in order to transport the required coal for the battleships of the Ottoman Navy and 
the steamships of Şirket-i Hayriye Company. Because of this, the Golden Horn became 
the main industrial area of the Empire with new factories being built mostly to serve the 
war industry.445 In the Imperial Naval Arsenal, the first industrialisation movements 
were started with the purchase of steam engines from Britain during the reign of Sultan 
Mahmud II. In parallel with this, the first factories of the Arsenal were built in 
Aynalıkavak in 1831 and they were fitted with three machines which were bought from 
Britain and operated by steam power. These machines were used for the manufacturing 
of copper plate, cannonball shaping, and polishing.446  
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The main purpose of the establishment of these factories was to produce 
domestic versions of the machines previously imported in order to reduce costs. In 
accordance with this purpose, the business volume of the existing factories was greatly 
enhanced and new factories and additional buildings were built in the Imperial Naval 
Arsenal to apply the new techniques in shipbuilding technology during Sultan 
Abdülaziz’s period. One of the first steps undertaken for this policy was the foundation 
of the Commission for the Reformation of Industry, which started its activities in 1864. 
According to its Code of Practice, the main tasks of the Commission were to combine 
the branches of the Ottoman industry, which were progressively decreasing, gather them 
under a single company and purchase new machineries by releasing its shares. Besides, 
providing importation facilities and tax exemptions, the foundation site of the 
administrative buildings would be reserved by the Empire for the company owners, and 
the government offices would be encouraged to purchase their needs from domestic 
manufacturers.447 As is seen, the Sublime Porte aimed at keeping the prices and the 
quality of production at a certain level and reducing the expenditures of ministries and 
other offices. Therefore manufacturing and mass production would be increased, giving 
the Ottoman Empire a strong place in the international market, whilst reducing their 
own reliance on foreign goods and technology. 
Among these companies founded during the period of the Commission for the 
Reformation of Industry in the years between 1864 and 1874 were the Dökümcüler 
(smelters) and Demirciler (ironsmiths) Companies, which were founded on 14th April 
1868 and 29th April 1868 respectively.448 The primary function of these companies were 
the production of a wide variety of equipment such as cannonballs, chain, gun collars, 
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steering wheels, copper nails, rib frames, rudder pintles, shaft bearings, hinges, screws, 
and numerous machinery parts to be used in military, naval, and industrial applications. 
In order to encourage the increase of production, these companies were exempted for 
six years from the customs and stamp duties required for imported machinery and raw 
materials. After the establishment of the School of Industry in 1868, industrial 
infrastructure—required to increase the productivity of the Imperial Naval Arsenal and 
to supply skilled workers and cheaper equipment—was prepared. Within the framework 
of these steps taken to revive the Ottoman industry, the main manufacturing and 
shipbuilding areas in the Imperial Naval Arsenal were subjected to a series of 
innovations in order to revise the existing working system and to tailor their productive 
capacity for the growing number of warships. Especially after the establishment of the 
Ministry of Marine in 1867, a more systematic framework for the factories was 
introduced and, upon the establishment of the Naval Reforms Commission, the 
modernization of the Imperial Naval Arsenal was focused more specifically on the naval 
industry from 28 April 1869.  
 
Local and Foreign Personnel and Their Working Conditions 
 
As well as being responsible for the productivity of the dockyards, military and civil 
personnel of the Arsenal were also in charge of implementing and monitoring the 
reforms decided by the Naval Reforms Commission. Accordingly, the success of the 
planning reforms depended greatly on the naval workforce, who can be divided into two 
main categories as the civilian employees of the Ministry of Marine and the workmen of 
the Arsenal. In order to supervise and monitor them, the administrative units attached to 
the Ministry were reorganized in 1867. Based on the documents preserved in the 
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Istanbul Naval Museum Commandership Archive, the names of these units, which give 
an idea about the working conditions of the naval workers according to new regulations 
in Abdülaziz’s era, were as follows: Amele Yoklama Odası (the Labourer Roll Call 
Unit), Bahriye Muhasebesi (the Finance Office of the Arsenal), Jurnal Odası (the Log 
Unit), Bahriye Yoklaması (the Naval Roll Call Unit), and Muvakkıt Odası (the 
Timekeeping Unit). 
When the regulations of the Labourer Roll Call Unit are examined, it can be 
immediately seen that this unit was held responsible to keep the number of the workers 
at a certain level, so as to prevent a possible decrease in the production. Accordingly, 
the main task of this unit was to maintain a record book that included the names of the 
permanent personnel employed in the Arsenal, the starting day of their employment and 
salaries, and to keep a roll call book regarding the arrival and departure times of the 
workers together with icmal (summary) and tevzi (distribution) books at the end of each 
month, which was to be submitted to the Director of the Imperial Naval Arsenal. 
Foreign engineers employed in the naval factories would also have a record book, 
including their names and a summary of the articles of their contract, in order to carry 
out disciplinary procedures when necessary. In addition to this, the unit would be 
informed regarding the dismissals or the hiring of new employees by the Manufacturing 
Council with an official memorandum. After updating the records, it would send a 
certificate that showed the names and wages of these workers to the Finance Office of 
the Arsenal. 449 
The Finance Office of the Arsenal was mainly in charge of the payment of the 
workers’ salaries on a regular basis. For this reason, a copy of the record book held by 
                                               
449 DMA, TRS, 392-3A (3 January 1867). 
215 
 
the Labourer Roll Call Unit was kept by this unit to calculate the salaries correctly. As 
in seen in its Code of Practice, a separate book including the names, wages, and a 
summary of each contract was to be maintained for foreign engineers employed in the 
naval factories or steamships.450 This application shows that there were different 
procedures for salary payments of the foreign and local workers, which had the capacity 
to cause a conflict of interest between these two groups. 
The Log and the Naval Roll Call Units recorded the information about the 
military personnel. The Log Unit, which was responsible for keeping the daily worker 
logs, helped the Labourer Roll Call Unit to prepare summary and distribution books at 
the end of each month. This was also necessary for the preparation of other books, 
including the salaries of the Naval Industry Corps.451 Keeping these books showing the 
names and the salaries of marines was the main task of the Naval Roll Call Unit, which 
was also in charge of sending a copy of these books to the Log Unit at the end of each 
month.452 
The Timekeeping Unit was established to arrange the working hours of the 
factories and to ensure the punctuality of the workers. According to its regulations, 
marines, non-military officers, and local and foreign workers who were employed in the 
factories of the Imperial Naval Arsenal, were to be at work at the specified time. They 
would leave their IDs allocated by the factories in the drawers of the timekeeping unit’s 
room before starting the work. The first part of the drawer was reserved for the IDs of 
the punctual workers and would be closed five minutes after the starting time of work. 
The second and the third parts of the drawer were for the workers who were late for 
work and would be closed at ten and 30 minutes after starting time. The workers, who 
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came to the factory after closure of all three parts, would not be accepted until the end 
of the lunch break. There would be a deduction based on the missing working hours for 
those who had to leave their IDs in the second and third parts. In addition to this, 
workers were required to take their IDs in the lunch break times. At the end of each 
break, they would leave the IDs in the parts of the timekeeping drawer in the same 
fashion as the morning practice. The starting times of work of the workers after lunch 
breaks would also be recorded in the daybooks.453 The table below clearly shows the 
marking methods of the timekeeping unit’s officers: 
Table 20. Marking Method of Timekeeping Unit for Controlling the Punctuality of 
Workers 
 
Starting Time of the 
Work 
The Signs ticked off according to the marks which were kept in the 




coming workers for 
maximum ten minutes) 
Third Part (late-coming 





















½ X  
Those who were absent in 
the morning and started 






. ¼  
 
. ½  
Those who were punctual 
in the morning and absent 




Those who were absent 
during all working day 
. .   
According to an archival document regarding the factories and commissioned 
officers, the active factories, store houses, and their administrative officers with their 
ranks are listed as follows:454 
 
                                               
453 DMA, TRS, 392-7A (28 April 1869); DMA, TRS, 392-8A (28 April 1869). 





























 5  2 1 1     
Armoury Factory 
 
 3  2 1  1    
Yalıköşkü Factory 
 
1 2  1 1      
Repair Factory 
 
  1    1 (British) 1   
Boiler Factory 
 
 1 1        
Rolling Mill and 
Iron Foundry Facs. 
1          
Pattern Factory 
 
 1         
Manufacturing 
Department 
2 13 2 5 4 1 2 1   
Shipbuilding 
Department 
          
Mast Store 
 
          
Rudder Store    3    2 1 
(Greek) 
 
Cartwright  and 
Scaffold Stores 
        1 1 
Oar Store 
 
 1  2       
Ironsmith and 
Carpenter Stores 
 1  1 1      
Table 21. Active Factories, Store Houses and Their Administrative Officers with Their Ranks in the Imperial Naval Arsenal in 1870
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As is seen, the Imperial Naval Arsenal acquired a more corporate structure, 
particularly after the establishment of the Ministry of Marine in 1867. The main tasks of 
each unit making up the administration of the Arsenal were explained in detail. Another 
document dated 12 September 1872 confirms the existence of sailcloth supply depots, 
carpenter, and caulking shops in addition to the above-mentioned store houses. The 
same document also gives an idea about the recruitment procedures. Following the 
applications by workers, who sought employment in the Yalıköşkü Factory and the 
factories and store houses of the Imperial Naval Arsenal, those who were successful in 
the first phase were to subjected to a three-day trial process with no payment. After this 
stage, the decisions regarding their employment and future wages were made according 
to their performance during the trial, and the successful applicants were sent to the 
Sıhhıye Dairesi (the Medical Office) for medical examination. After they were 
pronounced fit by the Medical Office, they were approved by the naval board and their 
registration and admission protocols were sent to the Ministry of Marine.455 
Their working hours are clearly stated in the code of practice of the Factories 
and Shipbuilding Department456 which is now preserved in the Naval Museum 
Commandership Archive in Istanbul. Accordingly, military and non-military personnel 
of the Imperial Naval Arsenal should be at work at a certain hour apart from holidays: 
 Between March and October, they would work a total of nine hours between 
7.30 am to 4.30 pm during the day. 
 From April to the end of September, they would work a total of ten hours 
between 7 am and 5 pm during the day. 
 From November to the end of February, they would work a total of eight hours 
between 8 am and 4 pm during the day. 
                                               
455 DMA, MKT, 156-35 (12 September 1872). 
456 DMA, TRS, 392-6A (28 April 1869); DMA, TRS, 392-13B (28 April 1869). 
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When it was necessary to work overtime, excluding the specified working hours 
for emergency work, those who worked overtime for four-and-a-half hours between 
April and September, or for five hours during the other months, would be eligible to 
receive a full day’s wage. The overtime work was mostly carried out in the night-time 
which led to an exception in the pay, as it was calculated these extra working hours 
were worth only the equivalent of two hours’ day work. However, it also caused 
performance issues both during the night of the overtime and the following day due to 
fatigue deriving from the lack of rest between shifts. Thus it was reasoned, in the same 
document, that giving a full day’s wage for the equivalent of only two hours’ work was 
not cost-effective for the already financially burdened naval treasury. Therefore the 
workers should not be employed except during regular working hours, unless there was 
an extremely important job.  
Another document, which was prepared for the Finance Office, shows that the 
workforce of the Imperial Naval Arsenal was divided into two categories, permanent 
and temporary, on December 1869, influenced by the new arrangements on working 
hours.457 The same document also gives information about the names of all the 
manufacturing and construction stations, the number of workers, and their monthly 
salaries. Accordingly, the workforce of the Imperial Naval Arsenal consisted of a total 
of 5376 workers which included 4830 permanent and 546 temporary employees.458 The 
first group, which represented the labourers, was commissioned for the routine 
operations covering all manufacturing and shipbuilding activities and increasing their 
number and daily wages were strictly prohibited by order of the Ministry. However, 
workers who demonstrated their competence in their assigned positions could gain an 
                                               
457 DMA, ŞUB, 53B-42A (December 1869). The date was not stated at the end of the document. 
However, we accepted it as December 1869 as the previous document in the same defter was written on 
15 December 1869 while the next to our document was dated on 9 January 1870 (DMA, ŞUB, 1901, 
53B-41B; DMA, ŞUB, 1901, 53B-49A). 
458 DMA, ŞUB, 1901, 53B-47B (December 1869). 
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increase in their wages depending upon their contributions. The second group was 
employed for the urgent operations and completion of construction activities; their 
numbers and duration of employment were mainly dependent on the workload of the 
Imperial Naval Arsenal. It was also stated in the same document that there was another 
group of workers, called meydan amelesi, were not assigned to a permanent station, but 
mainly employed for the needs of all the factories and storehouses. In case of death or 
any other reasons, the responsibility to employ new workers was held by the directors of 
all the stations on the grounds that there would be no increase in the number of 
personnel and determined salaries. They would also be in charge of informing the 
Finance Office on the name, the daily wage of each employee, and their performance.459 
The number of permanent and temporary workers, their total monthly salaries, and their 
assigned positions can be seen from the Table 22460, 23461 and 24462 respectively.  
Table 22. Temporary Workers, Their Numbers and Monthly Salaries in 1869 















































































                                               
459 DMA, ŞUB, 1901, 53B-48A (December 1969). 
460 DMA, ŞUB, 1901, 53B-46A; 53B-47B (December 1969). 
461 DMA, ŞUB, 1901, 53B-42A; 53B-43A (December 1969). 




Name of the Station 





















Iron Foundry  
Factory 
--- --- 159 61572 159 61572 
Ironworks  
Factory 
--- --- 200 68208 200 68208 
Armoury 
Factory 
--- --- 14 41160 14 41160 
Yalıköşkü Factory Master  Foreman Master  Foreman 75 22792 92 60122 
1 16 4000 33330 
Repair  
Factory 
Master  Foreman Master  Foreman 52 16604 81 80614 
2 27 10000 54010 
Boiler  
Factory 
Master  Foreman Master  Foreman 178 72884 186 89604 
-- 8 -- 16720 
Smelt  
Factory 
--- --- Master Foreman Master Foreman 20 6794 
1 19 550 6244 
Pattern  
Factory 
2 4180 10 ---463 12 4180 
General  
Total 
53 122240 708 290014 764 412254 
 




                                               


























3528 Number  Salaries Number  Salaries Number Salaries 


















8960 Nu. Sal. Nu. Sal. Nu. Sal. Nu. Sal. Nu. Sal. 

















27020 Nu. Sal. Nu. Sal. Nu. Sal. Nu. Sal. 
81 21224 3 840 9 2184 11 2772 
Sail Cloth Store 
 












Number Salaries 8 15 3220 
7 3220 
Barrel Store  
 
 
                                                              --- 
29 29 --- 
Carpenter, Capstan, 
Oar, Pannier Store 
 
                                                              --- 
40 40 --- 






















Salaries (in kuruş) 
Number 
 
Hammer, Sheet and 
Angle Iron Factory 




--- 169 75864 
1 9 3000 21890 
British Ironworks 
Factory for ironclads 




--- 168 117074 
31 27 55110 22008 
Screwmaking Store --- 109 32214 24 133 32214 
Caulking Store --- 95 28042 43 138 28042 
Dry-docks  --- 240 43735 95 335 43735 
Ironworks Factory 
for Dry-docks 
--- 69 22960 9 78 22960 
Screwmaking Store 
for Dry-docks 
--- 59 16870 14 73 16870 
Caulking Store for 
Dry docks 
--- 36 11200 17 53 11200 
Sawmill and Reel 
Store  
--- 1 420 36 37 420 
Cabinetmaking Store --- 9 4592 75 84 4592 
Engraving Store --- 8 5040 14 22 5040 
General Total of 
Construction Stations 
Master Foreman Master Foreman 1161 340619 639 1868 442627 
1 67 3000 99008 
Table 24. Construction Stations, Number of Workers and Their Monthly Salaries  
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As seen from the above tables, the total number of the manufacturing and 
construction stations reached 22 by the end of the 1860s and Yalıköşkü, Repair, 
Hammer, Sheet, and Angle Iron Factories were dominated by the British workers; an 
ironworks factory was specially arranged for the employment of this group. The number 
of permanent workers excluding marines, who were commissioned in the Naval 
Industry Corps and served a number of days per year, in both manufacturing and 
construction stations appears as 1993 while the temporary workforce consisted of a total 
of 546 workers in 1869. This also indicates that while the British employees represent 
6.07% of the total number of permanent hands, 93.9% is the total for the employment of 
local workers. In contrast to this, when the total monthly salaries of the local and 
foreign personnel are compared, it can be seen that in total 121 British workers were 
paid a total of 224248 kuruş (2038 pounds sterling) per month and local workers were 
qualified with a total monthly salaries of 630633 kuruş (5733 pounds sterling). This 
wide gap between the salaries of foreign and local personnel also appears in the monthly 
salaries of master foremen, as the monthly salary of a local master in the Smelt Factory 
was determined as 550 kuruş, while the average monthly wage of their British 
counterparts was around 4000 kuruş. The information illustrated by these tables also 
reveals that 1074256 kuruş (9765 pound sterling) was paid for all permanent and 
temporary workers on December 1869 and 12891072 kuruş (117191 pound sterling) 
was allocated from the annual budget of the naval treasury only for the wages of the 
workers employed in the Imperial Naval Arsenal. 
As confirmed by the above-mentioned documents, towards the end of the 1860s, 
when implementation of new technologies such as plating the hulls of the vessels by 
armour were accelerated, there was an increase in the number of foreign workers 
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employed in the manufacturing and shipbuilding units of the Imperial Naval Arsenal. 
The procedure for the employment of foreign workers was slightly different from the 
domestic workers, and based on a well-prepared contract system. Demonstrating this, 
the contract of Daniel Rogers, who was a British foreman specializing in armour plating 
and employed in the construction of armoured ship units, included detailed information 
regarding foreign workers’ employment conditions.464 Accordingly, the term of his 
contract was two years and the monthly salary was assigned as 56 pounds sterling. In 
addition to this, it was highlighted that the worker would never engage in tasks different 
from his job such as trading, never leave the work place as long as he was not sick, and 
obey the regulation of the unit to which he was appointed to. If there was a matter of 
disobedience, drunkenness, or other negative attitude or action contrary to the 
provisions of the contract, the Ministry had a right to fire the worker. If the Ministry 
found it unnecessary to extend the contract after the end of the specified period, or the 
worker did not request an extension for personal reasons, he would be informed with an 
official protocol one month before the termination day. If the extension was required by 
the Ministry, the worker would continue to serve in the Imperial Naval Arsenal, and be 
informed of the termination day in the same fashion as mentioned above. In the event of 
death or dismissal from work because of the above-mentioned breaches of contract 
during the period of employment, the daily wages would be paid until the date of death 
or dismissal, and the salary would be cut from the date of exit. In case the worker could 
not come to the work-place because of sickness, an official document confirming his 
illness would be requested from the health officers of the Ministry of Marine and the 
British embassy. Afterwards, he would be given a total of 30 pounds sterling as travel 
                                               




allowance for his return journey from Britain to the Ottoman Empire and this would be 
paid back to the Naval Treasury by cutting three pounds sterling from his salary every 
month.465 
As is seen, the articles of the contract were prepared to prevent the loss of 
working days and to keep the workers’ performances at the highest level. The authority 
of dismissal was given to the units that the workers belonged to, and there was zero 
tolerance shown by the Ministry to extend the contracts of the workers who had no valid 
excuse for absence on working days.  
Although the relations between local and foreign personnel seemed amicable 
until the end of the 1860s, the problems started to appear caused by the financial crisis; 
the debts of the Ottoman Empire reached up to 213,000,000 pounds sterling towards the 
end of the Sultan Abdülaziz’s reign. As evidence of this, we found two archival 
documents that were sent from the Imperial Naval Arsenal to the Ministry of Marine on 
25 January 1872466 and 4 June 1876.467 As is understood from the first document, local 
workers went on strike on grounds that their salaries were not paid at the appointed 
time. The other document also confirms the continuance of this problem, stating that 
while the salaries of foreign workers were paid on a regular basis, local workers were 
experiencing delays in their payments. For this reason, a slowdown strike was started by 
the local workers and this situation also led to a disturbing hostility between these two 
groups. To end this, it was stated in the same documents that the accrued salaries of the 
workers should be paid at short notice and the Finance Office of the Arsenal should be 
warned, as it was held responsible for the cause of the strike. This situation shows that a 
new working system, which was established in the naval factories using regulations 
                                               
465 DMA, TRS, 729-10-11 (23 August 1869). 
466 DMA, MKT, 148-3 (25 January 1872). 
467 DMA, ISL, 2-46A (4 June 1876). 
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imported from Britain, fell short in terms of its deliverance. The influence of Britain 
over the naval industry can be seen also from Woods Pasha’s observations with the 
following statements:  
In 1867, and for a number of years afterwards, all the Chief Engineers and 
subordinates on board the Turkish ironclads were Britishers, as also those on 
board the two Imperial yachts. The Engineers of the ferry-boats running on the 
Bosphorus and to the Islands of the Marmora were Britishers as well, and English 
was the language of the engine room... A few years after my arrival, Turkish 
engineers who had been sent to England for a little training and others brought up 
under the engineers in the Dockyard, were coming to the front, and gradually all 
but the chiefs of the ironclads were superseded by them. The more ambitious 
amongst the Turks became very jealous of the positions held by the Englishmen 
on board the Imperial Yacts, on account of the special advantages connected 
with such service.468  
 
He also mentions an incident, which describes the dependency of the Ottoman 
officers on the British engineers, in his memoirs. This account concerned a marine 
engineer called Joseph Arms, who was the chief engineer of the Sultan’s yacht. 
Following his release from his job, he left the ship with the starting gear of the engine 
with his belongings and waited to be recalled. After a short time, an order arrived from 
the Palace, requiring the quick preparation of the yacht for the Sultan. Following the 
unsuccessful efforts made by the Turkish engineers to run the engine or to find the 
reason for its problem, it resulted in the reinstatement of Arms to the same position with 
a remark that his discharge was by mistake, and he was under the protection of the 
Sultan who issued an enactment confirming that he was never to be dismissed until he 
himself requested his removal from the service of the Ottoman Navy.469  
This anecdote also emphasises the insufficiency of training carried out in the 
Naval Academy, which focused on theoretical training for the Departments of 
Machinery and the Shipbuilding, failing to give the cadets of these departments a 
                                               
468 Woods, 1924b: 225-226. 
469 Woods, 1924b: 225-227. 
228 
 
chance to experience practical training during their four years of education. In addition 
to the insufficient number of graduates, the rivalry between British and Turkish 
engineers resulted in the discontinuation of training after their graduation. As indicated 
by Wood’s experience, in order not to lose their job, the British engineers and 
workers—who were employed with salaries that were considerably higher than their 
Turkish colleagues—declined to share their knowledge and experience, which caused a 
rift between these two main workforces. Therefore, the dependency of the Ottoman 
Navy on Britain continued until the end of the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz. By sending 
assistance to strengthen the Ottoman Navy, Britain intended the Ottoman Empire to be 
able to protect its waters without needing any alliance against Russia. However, this 
approach failed in operation and the fact regarding the definite failure of the Ottoman 
Empire in the absence of foreign military aid was confirmed with the Ottoman-Russian 
War of 1877-1878.  
 
The Ottoman Navy in the Age of Ironclads 
Shell Guns and the Emergence of Armoured Fleets (1853-1861) 
 
The application of explosive shells to naval operations had the most remarkable impact 
in the emergence of ironclad warships, accompanied by a rapid acceleration in the 
construction of large war vessels, which paved the way for a dramatic change in the use 
of naval ammunition. Conforming to the prevailing tactics in naval warfare practiced for 
centuries, traditional solid shot was designed mainly for local damage, wrecking rigging 
and killing enemy crews, as the thick oak sides of wooden vessels could handle 
numerous hits, which enabled the crew to plug regular rounded holes left by the shot 
when it penetrated, meaning many accurate strikes would be required for the entire 
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destruction of a wooden vessel or forcing them to surrender.470 For this reason, absence 
of destructive explosive guns prompted navies to develop a strategy based on the 
protection of crew until the arrival of the Paixhans guns in the 1820s. Developed to fire 
explosive shells in a flat trajectory by French colonel Henri Joseph Paixhans between 
1822 and 1823, this new type of ammunition enabled navies to destroy enemy ships 
rather than partially damaging them and also offered smaller powder charges which 
reduced the weight of the ordnance.471 Following the trials carried out between 1823 
and 1824, the results clearly indicated that an armed frigate equipped with a few heavy 
Paixhans guns could sink an ordinary wooden ship, which was enough to convince 
France to adapt these guns into her navy in 1824, in the hope of ceasing the British 
predominance in European naval warfare.472 In contrast to the French experience, 
Britain’s approach to Paixhans guns for naval operations took longer on account of an 
extended trial process which ended with the adaption of an 8-inch shell gun in 1838.473 
After the decision made to suspend building iron ships in the Royal dockyards,474 the 
Board of Admiralty concentrated more on trials to examine the behaviour of iron under 
                                               
470 Kinard, 2007: 235; Tucker, 2000: 78. 
471 Tucker, 2000: 79; Sondhaus, 2001: 22-23. 
472 Tennent, 1864: 227; Kinard, 2007: 236; Tucker, 2000: 79, Lambert, 2001: 51; Sondhaus, 2001: 23. 
473 Tucker, 2000: 80; Sondhaus, 2001: 23. 
474 The application of iron to naval industry initiated with the attempts made by a Scottish shipbuilder, 
John Laird and the first step taken in accordance with this purpose was the launch of Nemesis, the first 
iron vessel carrying guns built in Birkenhead Shipyard for the East India Company in 1839 (Halsted, 
1861: 12; Tucker, 2015: 95: Sandler, 2004: 19-20; Osborne, 2004: 18). The success of Laird’s ships 
attracted Admiralty’s attention to iron vessels, which concluded with the decision pertaining to use of 
light iron for river operations. The increasing demand towards iron after the extension of railways was 
also effective as it reduced the cost of iron while led an increase in the number of skilled men in metal 
construction (Lambert, 2001: 47-48). After the Admiralty’s order to build a regular iron ship, the 
construction of an iron hulled sloop by Ditchburn&Mare Company, was approved on August 1843. She 
was launched as Trident on December 1845 and Birkenhead built by Laird joined among the first iron 
hulled vessels of the Royal Navy in the same month (Jane, 1915: 219; Winfield, 2014: 314, 324; Walker, 
2010: 79). Further orders were made for four large iron screw frigates from Napier and Ditchburn&Mare 
in the same year. However, building iron frigates without gaining sufficient experience was responded 
with an increasing criticism against the Board and overburdening the capacity of the Royal dockyards by 
these kinds of large vessels resulted in the abandonment of iron warships, which required further trials 
headed towards the safety of iron (Smith, 1938: 116; Jane, 1915: 219-220; Eardley-Wilmot, 1892: 43; 




the effects of shot and to compare it with wood, together with the newly developed 
explosive shell guns and the experiments were directed by Captain Henry Ducie Chads. 
However, iron’s durability against shells did not produce convincing results, revealing 
instead the impracticability of iron hulls when subjected to heavy gunfire. The trials 
revealed a tendency of the ironclads to fracture and the iron splinters produced by shot 
had a shrapnel-like effect, posing a serious threat for the crew.475 Further trials were 
made at Portsmouth from 1849 to 1851 under the direction of Captain Chads. While the 
first experiment made on 6 November 1849 to try the resistance of iron plates against 
musketry, canister and grape shot; 5⁄8 inch thick large iron plates, representing a section 
of the iron steam frigate Simoom, were used for subsequent trials started on June 1850, 
implying that two or three shots striking near the waterline of an iron vessel were 
sufficient to endanger the ship.476 Carrying out six more experiments between 11 July 
1850 and 12 August 1851, the Board was convinced that iron vessels—however 
convenient and advantageous in other respects—were utterly unfit for purposes of war. 
The results were summarized by General Sir Howard Douglas, a strong opponent of 
iron vessels, with the following statements:477 
Thus, it appears that the destructive effects of the impacts of shot on iron cannot 
be prevented. If the iron sides are of the thickness required to give adequate 
strength to the ship (5⁄8, or at least 4⁄8 of an inch), the shot will be broken by the 
impact; if the iron plates be thin enough to let the shot pass into the ship without 
breaking, the vessel will be deficient in strength. 
                                               
475 Arnold, 2000: 49; Tucker, 2000: 64; Osborne, 2004: 18. In the official report of Captain Chads dated 
1842 in Woolwich, these effects were explained with the following words: “The shot going through the 
exposed or near side generally makes a clean smooth hole of its own size, which might be readily 
stopped; but on the opposite side all the mischief occurs; the shot meets with so little resistance that it 
must inevitably go through the vessel, and should it strike on a rib on the opposite side the effect is 
terrific, tearing off the iron sheets to a very considerable extent.” (Jane, 1915: 220). 
476 Douglas, 1855: 135-136; Tennent, 1864: 228. Between 1849 and 1850, Captain Chads informed the 
Admiralty with two additional reports, concluding that, “iron could not be beneficially employed as a 
material for the construction of vessels of war as shot of every description in passing through iron plates 
made such large holes, which were improper for the bottom of ships” (Jane, 1915: 223). 
477 Douglas, 1855: 143-144. 
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In consequence, the Board decided the entire rejection of iron and seventeen iron 
ships under construction were condemned while the existing ones were employed as 
troopships.478 This idea was consolidated by the loss of Birkenhead on 26 February 
1852 on South African coasts479 and led to the continuation of the doubtful approach of 
the Royal Navy towards iron until the middle of the 1850s480, when the supremacy of 
the new naval armament technology was proved in the Crimean War.481  
Since the beginning of the war, the Russian fleet commanded by vice admiral 
Pavel Stepanovich Nakhimov was actively cruising along the eastern part of the Black 
Sea between Sinop and Sohum with a force of three line-of-battle ships, two brigs and 
one steamer. On 5 November 1853, an Ottoman squadron, consisting of seven frigates, 
three corvettes and two transport steamers, proceeded to Black Sea under the command 
of vice admiral Osman Pasha so as to ensure the security of shipping between Istanbul 
and Batumi.482 Being aware of the need for an immediate victory to compensate the 
failure of her army in the Battle of Oltenitsa on 4 November 1853 in the Danube 
front483, Russia decided to target Turkish squadron, which was forced to anchor in the 
port of Sinop on 13 November 1853 due to a severe storm. Another force of three 120-
                                               
478 Douglas, 1855: 145-147; Eardley-Wilmot, 1892: 44-45; Jane, 1915: 223; Tucker, 2000: 64-65; 
Lambert, 2001: 51; Osborne, 2004: 18. 
479 Following her conversion as a troopship in 1848, Birkenhead was commissioned for South Africa with 
a crew of 487 officers and men together with 25 women and 31 children. After Cape Town, she 
proceeded to Algoa Bay and hit an uncharted rock on the morning of 26 February 1852 near False Bay, 
leading her to be broken in two and sink in a short time (Paine, 2000: 20). 
480 Eardley-Wilmot, 1892: 43-44; Tucker, 2015: 95. 
481 The war started between the Ottoman Empire and Russia in July 1853 when Wallachia and Moldovia 
were occupied by the Russian army after the refusal made by the Sublime Port against Russian demands, 
which involved the recognition of Russian protection over the Empire’s entire Orthodox population 
consisting of around 12 million people at that time. Being failed to procure acceptance for the withdrawal 
of Russian troops from the Danube, Sultan Abdülmecid declared war against Russia on 4 October 1853 
(Anderson, 1952: 578; Lambert, 2011: 54-58; Badem, 2010: 99). 
482 The name of the ships composing the fleet were as follows: (Frigates) Avnillah-50 guns (flagship), 
Nizamiye-64 guns, Nesim-i Zafer-48 guns, Fazlullah-48 guns, Navek-i Bahri-42 guns, Dimyat-42 guns, 
Kaid-i Zafer-22 guns; (Corvettes) Necm-i Efşan-22 guns, Fevz-i Mabud-22 guns, Gül-i Sefid-22 guns; 
(Transport Steamers) Ereğli-10 guns, Taif-12 guns (Anderson, 1952: 579-580; Badem, 2010: 116-117; 
Lambert, 2011: 94). 
483 Badem, 2010: 108-109. 
232 
 
gun three-deckers and two frigates were secured from Sevastopol and included in the 
Nakhimov’s fleet on 28 November 1853. Unlike the others, these ships were equipped 
with thirty eight Paixhans guns. The attack started on the morning of 30 November 
1853 at 11:30 and within a few hours, six Russian battleships with over 600 guns 
destroyed the entire Ottoman fleet, apart from the steamer Taif, which managed to 
escape. Nesim-i Zafer, Avnillah and Fevz-i Mabud ran aground and were later burnt by 
the Russians and the rest were blown up during the action. The total number of Ottoman 
losses was around 2000 apart from 156 men imprisoned by the Russians, who lost only 
36 men including one officer. In the Battle of Sinop, the destructive effect of shell-fire 
upon wooden vessels was proved for the first time, which revived the world interest in 
iron ships for protection against shell guns.484 Sinop also produced a long-term alliance 
of the Ottoman Empire with Britain and France as an Anglo-French ultimatum sent for 
the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Danube and following its refusal, both 
countries were involved in the war as allied countries of the Empire on 28 March 
1854.485 
 The necessity of armour protection for line-of-battle ships commenced the 
construction of five armour-plated floating batteries ordered by the French Emperor 
Louis Napoleon III for service in the Black Sea on 4 October 1854. They were wooden 
vessels of 1400 tons displacement and their sides above the water line were plated with 
a well supported 4½ inch of iron together with a backing of 17 inch of timber, a 
thickness specified to resist 32-pounder shot at 300 yards, after the experiments 
                                               
484 Anderson, 1952: 580; Badem, 2010: 120-123; Lambert, 2011: 94; Tennent, 1864: 223; Watts, 1911: 
892; Jane, 1915: 223-224; Potter et al., 1981: 116; Tucker, 2000: 85-86, 101; Sondhaus, 2001: 58; 
Osborne, 2004: 20; Sandler, 2004: 21. 
485 Stone, 2006: 18; Badem, 2010: 100-101; Anderson, 1966: 131. 
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conducted on board Excellent at Portsmouth on September 1854.486 For the same 
service, the construction of four similar ships was begun by the British Government. 
Although these vessels, later named the Glatton, Meteor, Thunder and Trusty, could not 
be completed in time to engage in an action during the war, three of the French batteries 
named the Dévastation, Lave and Tonnant were sent to the Crimea, where they took 
part in a large fleet, consisting of unarmed wooden ships and most of them were sailing 
line-of-battle vessels.487 On 17 October 1855, these batteries took part in an action on 
Russians’ Kinburn forts and fired 3,177 shot and shell, causing the entire destruction of 
the forts in a very short time. While two men were killed and twenty five wounded, all 
on board the floating batteries, the Russians lost forty five killed and 130 wounded. 
Iron’s durability against shot and shell was proved as the wrought iron plates of the 
batteries were merely dented against Russian shot and shell, mainly 32-pounder and 18-
pounder, marking the end of the wooden line-of-battle ships and the beginning of a new 
ironclad race between Europe’s leading naval powers.488 
Under the influence of the Battle of Kinburn, the British Government ordered 
the construction of four more armoured batteries, named the Etna, Erebus, Terror and 
Thunderbolt. On the French side, no order was made for further construction of screw 
battleships after 1855 and the design of existing vessels were modified in compliance 
with the new technology. In January 1857, Stanislas Dupuy de Lôme was appointed as 
the chief constructor and six additional ironclads were ordered in March 1858. De Lôme 
commenced the transformation of the Napoleon, a two decker wooden line-of-battle 
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488 Tennent, 1864: 229; Eardley-Wilmot, 1892: 47-48; Wilson, 1896: xxxv-xxxvi; Watts, 1911: 892; Jane, 




ship, into an ironclad. According to the plans completed in November 1857, ship was 
cut down to a single deck and fitted with a complete belt of 4½ inch armour on a 
backing of 26 inch of wood. Having a displacement of 5630 tons, the world’s first sea-
going ironclad was renamed Gloire and launched in November 1859.489 Two other ships 
of the same design, Normandie and Invincible were launched in March 1860 and April 
1861 and the first fleet of French ironclads were formed with the launch of the Magenta, 
Solferino and Couronne in 1861.490  
In contrast to the French experience, steps were taken more deliberately to 
prepare the construction of an experimental sea-going ironclad on the British side and 
trials continued to be carried out at Woolwich until May 1858, when the news of the 
Gloire reached Britain. Alarming the Admiralty, the necessity to embody the same 
number of French ironclads in the Royal Navy created pressure from the Queen and the 
Surveyor of the Royal Navy, Sir Baldwin Wake Walker491 submitted his proposal in the 
same year, which was the programme of the construction of six ironclads, even though 
he was not in agreement with the idea of the replacement of wooden vessels with 
armoured ships.492 On 27 January 1859, the design for an armoured frigate with 36 guns 
was issued to outmatch the Gloire and Thames Ironworks and Robert Napier were 
selected by the Chief Constructor, Isaac Watts among the tenders from fourteen private 
companies.493 Fourteen months after her French opponent, the first British-built iron-
hulled warship, Warrior was laid down on 25 May 1859 and launched on 29 December 
1860. Compared to Gloire, she was a larger ship with 9137 tons of displacement and her 
                                               
489 Eardley-Wilmot, 1892: 49; Watts, 1911: 892; Potter et al., 1981: 118; Lambert, 2001: 53; Sondhaus, 
2002a: 50-51; Tucker, 2000: 66-67; Osborne, 2004: 20; Sandler, 2004: 22; Wooley and Clarke, 2006: 14. 
490 Watts, 1911: 892; Sondhaus, 2002a: 51-52. 
491 As mentioned in Chapter 1, he was in the service of the Ottoman Navy between 1838 and 1844 and 
known as Yaver Pasha. 
492 Tucker, 2000: 68; Lambert, 2001: 54; Sondhaus, 2002a: 52. 
493 Jane, 1915: 250; Lambert, 2001: 55-56. 
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hull measured 380 feet by 58 feet, 6 inches. She was covered with 4½ inch iron plates 
from the upper deck to 5 feet below the load waterline, secured by a wooden backing of 
18 inches and mounted with a trunk engine, developed by John Penn. When she was 
completed in October 1861, nine more armoured frigates were under construction and at 
the end of 1861, the number of armoured ships in the Royal Navy matched France’s 
total of 16 ironclads, which were similar to Britain’s smallest ships in displacement, 
clearly indicating the continuation of British superiority in European naval warfare. The 
creation of the modern warship also meant the starting of an ironclad race between the 
world’s naval powers after the 1860s.494 In 1861, two armoured frigates of 5700-tons 
were ordered for the Royal Italian Navy, followed by two entirely iron corvettes built at 
La Seyne dockyard in France. Austria joined the ironclad race in October 1861 by 
ordering three 3600-ton armoured frigates and two large vessels were converted to 
armoured frigates by the Russian Navy, which later ordered three iron hulled coast 
defence ships.495 
 
The Modernization of the Naval Fleet and the Armoured Vessels that Constituted 
the Ottoman Navy 
 
Rapid developments observed in the European naval warfare in the first half of the 
nineteenth century had remarkable effect on the strategic power of the Ottoman Navy 
and the new era started by the enthronement of Sultan Abdülaziz pioneered the 
emergence of the Ottoman armoured fleet. From the early period of his reign, the 
biggest obstacle to the realisation of Abdülaziz’s intentions was the financial crisis and 
for this reason, some of the dignitaries from the Sublime Port warned the Sultan not to 
                                               
494 Watts, 1911: 892; Sondhaus, 2002a: 53; Lambert; 2001: 57-58. 
495 Sondhaus, 2002a: 54-55; Lambert, 2001: 58. 
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place a new burden on the treasury. However, Sultan Abdülaziz, determined to achieve 
his targets in the field of maritime expansion and had been persuaded of the necessity of 
a strong naval power by Vesim Pasha,496 the commander of the Saik-i Sadi vessel, 
wholly disregarded these recommendations.497  
His determination to increase the capacity of the naval fleet also appears in the 
letters of Henry Bulwer, the British Ambassador in Istanbul between 1858 and 1865. In 
his first letter sent to Lord Russell—Foreign Secretary in the Palmerston government 
between 1859 and 1865—on 3 July 1861, the new Sultan of the Empire was described 
as having “the earnest desire to get his country out of its fallen condition and also a 
great readiness to take himself an active part in the reforms he wished to bring 
about.”498 Another letter dated 21 August 1861 shows this determination more clearly, 
stating that the Sultan shared his opinions with Bulwer regarding the strengthening of 
the naval fleet to start a new era, which would unite his country with Europe, and act 
together with Britain as allies in the case of war at sea. In fact, this can be regarded as 
the starting point of negotiations between the Empire and Britain, eventually resulting in 
receiving aid for the early steps of the naval modernization. It can be seen from the 
same correspondence that the British approach on this matter was quite deliberate at 
first, as the first suggestion made by the British Ambassador to the Sultan was to find 
new resources to support the treasury instead of enlarging the naval fleet. He was also 
advised to set the finances straight in order to be able to execute the intended reforms.499 
                                               
496 Langensiepen and Güleryüz, 1995: 2. 
497 Conversely, the Grand Vizier Keçecizade Fuad Pasha showed a negative approach to the expenditures 
on the renewal of the navy due to the financial crisis and the following Grand Vizier Kıbrıslı Mehmed 
Emin Pasha, who tried to warn the Sultan by objecting to the expenses on high priced ships purchased 
from foreign countries, and thus was dismissed from his duty (Ayın and Göksu, 2002: 822). 
498 TNA, PRO, 30-22-89, 171 (3 July 1861). 
499 TNA, PRO, 30-22-89, 197-198 (21 August 1861). 
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Another letter was sent to Lord Russell by Bulwer regarding the visit of the 
Kapudan Pasha (Damat Mehmet Ali Pasha) with the Sultan to discuss the Sultan’s 
desire to purchase a yacht, a frigate, and five corvettes which would be paid for out of 
the Sultan’s own privy purse and by the Valide Sultan’s own allocation, to be donated 
to the government. On 28 November 1861, the British Government was informed by the 
Ambassador again about the Ottoman Government’s request to send a commission for 
making the necessary arrangements for building the vessels the Sultan desired to have 
constructed in Britain.500 This request was responded to by the Admiralty’s inspection 
report, explaining that the yacht resembling the Victoria and Albert that the Sultan 
requested was too expensive to be useful for other purposes. Instead, the report 
suggested, the state should turn its attention to frigates and sloops which were fast and 
had a high gun-carrying capacity. Afterwards the Ottoman Navy could obtain more 
effective and economical vessels and the attention could be paid to “the financial 
details which would tend more to strengthen the Sultan’s power than any ships of 
war.”501 
As understood from a document dated 3 May 1862, the success of ironclads 
during the American Civil War was also influential on the early attempts of Sultan to 
build iron-hulled warships. Including mostly Admiral Mehmet Pasha’s observations 
made regarding the progress of naval technology in London, it was highlighted in the 
same document that the weakness of wooden vessels has been proved by the success of 
the Confederate States Navy against the North in a naval war and an acceleration was 
observed in the replacements of wooden three-decker and double-decker ship-of-the-
                                               
500 TNA, PRO, 30-22-89, 333 (28 November1861). 




lines with iron hulls in Britain.502 For this reason, the construction of an ironclad in 
London was approved with an imperial decree providing that the expenditures would be 
met from the Sultan’s private purse.503 This war mentioned in the document was the 
Battle of Hampton Roads, which took place between the Union and Confederate States’ 
Navies on March 1862 and clearly revealed the obsoleteness of wooden vessels by the 
full potential of ironclads. 504 From this date forward, military reforms were headed 
towards the purpose of enlarging the naval fleet and half of the Hazine-i Hassa 
allocation amounting to 254,238 pounds sterling was donated to the allocation of the 
naval treasury by the Sultan in the fiscal year of 1863.505 The number of existing ships, 
inherited from the period of Sultan Abdülmecid was 48, including seven ship-of-the 
lines, six frigates, four corvettes, four gunboats, and 27 transport vessels.506 These ships 
were modernized in Sultan Abdülaziz’s era and some were sent to Britain to be fitted 
with steam engines.507 The most important ships of this period were ironclads, whose 
usage was allowed in the navy from 9 April 1862.508 In parallel with this, the public was 
                                               
502 A letter, which was sent to the Duke of Somerset from the Admiralty on 7 June 1861, confirms the 
statements written in the abovementioned document, stating that preparing the frame of ships in iron was 
deemed more convenient to carry heavy guns in the Mediterranean Squadron by the Admiralty and works 
to prepare wooden vessels for plating was underway since 1861. Somerset was also acquainted that some 
three-deckers ships would be cut down for plating in case of an immediate action (TNA, PRO, 30-22-24, 
7 June 1861). 
503 BOA, A.MHM.NZD, 416-20 (3 May 1862). 
504 The battle began on 8 March 1862, when CSS Virginia—the first steam-powered ironclad built by the 
Confederate Navy—steamed into the Hampton Roads, targeting the wooden Union fleet. Within a few 
hours, USS Congress and Cumberland were destroyed and USS Minnesota had run aground while the 
Confederate loss was only 27 men killed or wounded throughout the entire fleet. On 9 March, Virginia 
moved again to attack Minnesota, still aground. However, she was met by the USS Monitor, which was 
the only ironclad in the Union Navy and commissioned to defend Minnesota (Davis, 2006: 3). The clash 
between Virginia and Monitor was the first meeting in combat of ironclads and marked a turning point in 
the history of modern naval warfare as the success of ironclad warships was greatly recognized by globe 
and the construction of wooden ships was ceased by the prominent naval powers, Britain and France.  
505 Karal, 2003: 190. 
506 Panzac, 2009: 333. 
507 The most important warships of the Ottoman Navy in 1860 were as follows: Ship-of-the Lines-
Kosova, Fethiye, Şadiye, Peyk-i Zafer, Mahmudiye, Teşrifiye, Mukaddeme-i Hayr; Frigates-Şerafettin; 
Corvettes-Mesir-i Ferah, Burc-ı Şeref, Sinop, İzmir, Alayiş-i Derya, Necat-ı Fer; Brigs-Fecr-i Sefid, Kavi 
Zafer, Şerefnüma, Feth-i Hüner, Ahter, Tab-ı Dar, Tir-i Zafer, Ferahnüma (Zorlu, 2009: 154). 
508 DMA, ŞUB, 36A-100A (9 April 1862). 
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informed regularly through the military articles, which were published in the section of 
navy of the Ceride-i Askeriye, regarding the importance of ironclads and the naval 
modernization to be implemented by the Sultan. In the first issue of the military paper, 
dated 17 January 1864, it was reported that the existing officers, who had been assigned 
to the ships with the title of Hoca, were to be divided into four classes: the clerkships of 
Ship-of-the lines, Frigates, Corvettes, and Brigs, and these officers were given the 
military ranks of major colonel, lieutenant and sub-lieutenant respectively.509 In the 
third issue of the Ceride-i Askeriye, published on 31 January 1864, it was stated that the 
ships of the Ottoman Navy were divided into three classes according to their functions: 
Sefain-i Safiyye (war ships), Sefain-i Muhafaza (coast guard ships), and Sefain-i Nakliye 
(transport vessels). Underlining the modernization of the warships, the Sultan expressed 
his view in the same article that the battleships available in the navy were not equivalent 
with the developed condition of European navies, and therefore it was obligatory to 
abandon the building of wooden ships and to adopt the construction of ironclads. He 
pointed out that the Imperial Naval Arsenal was deprived of technical infrastructure 
needed for the building of armoured ships, and the numbers of slipways in the other 
existing shipyards of the Empire were insufficient. Because of this reason, he stated that 
the construction of new ships would be continued in the shipyards and the ironclads 
would be bought from Europe when needed.510 To demonstrate this, the following table 
shows the ironclads constructed for the Ottoman Navy between 1864 and 1876, with 
their several features:511 
                                               
509 Ceride-i Askeriye, ‘Mevadd-ı Bahriye’, 1, 17 January 1864. 
510 Ceride-i Askeriye, ‘Mevadd-ı Bahriye', 3, 31 January 1864. 
511 Turkey, Greece and Roumania, War Vessels and Torpedo Boats, Admiralty,  Intelligence Department, 
1891: 12-40; King, 1878: 265; King, 1881: 340; L’Année Maritime, Revue Des Evénements Et Répertoire 
Statistique Annuel, Troisième Année 1878, 1879: 348; Langensiepen and Güleryüz, 1995: 133-139; Lyon, 










































Thames Iron Works – 
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Captured by Russian forces at 
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Captured by Russian forces at 


































Forges et Chantiers de 
la Méditerranée 
 
Repaired and Reboilered: 1886-1890 
Decommissioned, broken up: 1929 


























Forges et Chantiers de la 
Méditerranée 
Repaired and Reboilered: 1886-1890 
Decommissioned: 1903 















Forges et Chantiers de la 
Méditerranée 
Repaired and Reboilered: 1890-1892 
Went aground and became total loss 














Thames Iron Works – 
Maudslay, Sons&Field 
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SA des Chantiers et 
Ateliers de la Gironde 
 
Sunk by a Russian field guns near 














Thames Iron Works – 
Maudslay, Sons&Field 
Refitted: 1903-1906 
Sunk by a gunfire by an Italian 

































Thames Iron Works – 
Humphrys,Tennant&Co 
Refitted: 1903-1907 
Sunk by a torpedo by a Greek 

















Tecnico Triestino – 
Ravenhill&Co 
Refitted: 1891 
Commissioned at Heybeliada for the 
Naval Academy: 1914 
Decommissioned and sold: 1928 
 

































Imperial Naval Arsenal -
Maudslay, Sons&Field 
Renamed as Hamidiye in 1881 and 
re-launched in 1885 
Commissioned as the stationary 
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Imperial Naval Arsenal  
 
Sunk by a Russian torpedo cutter 















Thames Iron Works – 
Maudslay, Sons&Field 
Refitted: 1898-1903 
Disbanded from active fleet: 1914 















Thames Iron Works – 
Maudslay, Sons&Field  
Renamed as Hamidiye in 1876 
Purchased by Britain on 20 February 
1878 and entered the service of the 

















Purchased by Britain on 13 February 
1878 and renamed as Belleisle to be 















Samuda&Son –  
Maudslay, Sons&Field 
Purchased by Britain on 13 February 
1878 and became Orion to enter the 
service of the Royal Navy in 1882 
 
Table 25. Armoured Vessels of the Ottoman Navy Constructed in the Reign of Sultan Abdülaziz (1861-1876) 
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As is seen, 27 armoured ships were added to the Ottoman Navy, including seven 
central battery ironclads, five broadside ironclads, two barbette battery ironclads, two 
casemate ironclads, two coast defence turret ships, two armoured rams and seven river 
monitors. In 1867, this numbered decreased to 26 after Fatih was purchased by Prussia 
on 6 February 1867.512 While 12 of the armoured vessels were purchased from Britain, 
10 were built in French dockyards and one was ordered from an Austrian shipbuilding 
company. The Necm-i Şevket, Asar-ı Şevket, Asar-ı Tevfik, Hıfzurrahman and Lütf-i 
Celil were purchased from France by the governorship of Egypt and transferred to the 
Ottoman Navy on 29 August 1868.513 Apart from purchased ships, two central battery 
ironclads named Nusretiye and Mukaddeme-i Hayr and two river monitors, Hizber and 
Seyfi were constructed in the Imperial Naval Arsenal after 1870. As a result of these 
efforts, the total tonnage displacement of armoured vessels reached 88,622 tons towards 
the end of this period, which rendered the Ottoman Navy to be the third-largest navy in 
Europe in terms of the number and quality of the vessels in 1876.514  
According to an archival document, dated 24 May 1875, the total number of 
ships in the navy reached 111, composed of 26 armoured ships and 85 wooden and 
armour-plated vessels towards the end of the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz,515 which 
corresponds to the number of armoured vessels in the Ottoman Navy we presented in 
the above table. In addition to this, it was also stated in the same document that they 
were divided into five categories: consisting of 49 warships, the first, second and third 
categories were commissioned for the security of seashores and included the most 
                                               
512 TNA, PRO, ADM, 12-796 (25 February 1867); Langensiepen and Güleryüz, 1995: 133. Another 
document reveals the fact that Fatih designed by Sir Edward Reed, was first offered by the Thames 
Ironworks Shipbuilding Company for sale to the Admiralty as the Turkish Government failed to make 
payments in due course (TNA, PRO, ADM, 12-781, 13 October 1866).  
513 Langensiepen and Güleryüz, 1995: 137; TNA, PRO, ADM, 12-831 (23 January 1869). 
514 King, 1881: 339. 
515 DMA, ŞUB, 88E-1A (24 May 1875). 
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important vessels. In the fourth category, 11 high speed ships were reserved for the 
urgent actions while 51 ships, including steamers and sailing vessels, would be used in 
the fifth category for the activities related to transportation.516  
In parallel with the increasing number of vessels in the navy particularly after 
1864, meeting the coal needs for the operation of the ships appeared as an important 
problem. Being the richest region of the Empire in terms of coal reserves, the 
administration of the Ereğli Coal Mines had been assumed by Britain until the end of 
the Crimean War for the purpose of fulfilling the demands of the allied fleets. In the 
reign of Sultan Abdülaziz, mining rights were given to the Imperial Naval Arsenal in 
order to operate coal mines on behalf of the Hazine-i Hassa on 20 February 1865.517 It 
was seen that the mines were modernized and a number of new mines were opened after 
this transfer. Additionally, there was an obligation of selling the whole coal extracted to 
the Imperial Naval Arsenal for the price designated by the Ministry of Marine for the 
miners from 1866 to 1882.518 Despite these measures taken to avoid the necessity for 
importation of coal, the Ereğli Coal Mines were insufficient to meet the needs of the 
new navy and consequently coal had to be bought from Britain at high prices. 
The sister ships Mahmudiye and Mesudiye and the sister ships Peyk-i Şeref and 
Burc-ı Zafer were the last vessels built for the Ottoman Navy during the reign of Sultan 
Abdülaziz. However, only Mesudiye was delivered to the Ottoman Empire in 1876 
whilst the other three still under construction in Britain519 due to the Ottoman-Russian 
War started on 24 April 1877.520 The primary measure taken by the British Admiralty 
against Russians negotiations with German and American companies to reinforce their 
                                               
516 DMA, ŞUB, 88E-1A (24 May 1875). 
517 Öğreten, 2007: 140. 
518 Öğreten, 2007: 143. 
519 King, 1878: 263. 
520 Campbell, 1879: 417, 426. 
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naval fleet in terms of armament on the eve of war, was the enhancement the forces 
available to the Royal Navy by purchasing foreign ships under construction in British 
shipyards. During this period also known as Anglo-Russian war scare of 1878, above-
mentioned Ottoman vessels were detained by the British Government under existing 
international law, and purchased by the Admiralty on February 1878.521 Designed by Sir 
Edward Reed, Mahmudiye522 entered the service of the Royal Navy in 1880 and was 
placed upon the list of British armoured ships under the name of Superb. In parallel 
with this, Peyk-i Şeref and Burc-ı Zafer, which had been designed formerly for the 
Ottoman Navy by the chief architect Ahmed Pasha, were commissioned as Belleisle in 
1878 and Orion in 1882 respectively.523 
Apart from these vessels, the river monitors named İşkodra and Podgoriçe were 
captured by the Russian forces in 1877 while another river monitor, Seyfi and the coast 
defence turret ship named Lütf-i Celil were sunk in the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-
1878.524 For this reason, the number of Ottoman armoured fleet decreased to 19 with a 
total displacement of 66,148 tons in 1878. The following table compares the effective 





                                               
521 Roberts, 1979: 18; Sondhaus, 2008: 63. 
522 She was launched as Mahmudiye in 1875 but later renamed as Hamidiye in 1876 (Langensiepen-
Güleryüz, 1995: 136). 
523 King, 1878: 124, 127, 263-264; Roberts, 1979: 18. 




Table 26. Number of Ships, Total Tonnage Displacement and Number of Personnel in the 
Armoured Fleets of Europe in 1878525 
 
Country 










Britain 25 12 15 341,442 60,536 
France 21 10 14 210,226 42,670 
Ottoman 
Empire526 
7 7 5 66,148 18,159 
Russia 3 4 22 92,550 28,311 
Germany 9 --- 3 63,127 7365 
Italy 4 9 1 59,800 10,712 
Austria 6 2 2 42,010 6319 
Spain 4 5 2 46,768 11,310 
Holland 2 --- 21 38,660 1029 (officers) 
Denmark 3 3 --- 16,697 1259 
Sweden --- --- 14 10,390 7794 
Portugal 1 --- --- 2479 4533 
Norway --- --- 4 6540 2338 
Greece --- 2 --- 3834 269  (officers) 
                                               
525 King, 1878: 124-127, 178-179 (Britain); King, 1878: 201-202 (France); King, 1878: 251-252, 257-259 
(Russia); King, 1878: 226; King, 1881: 316-317 (Germany); King, 1878: 248; King, 1881: 298 (Italy); 
King, 1878: 272-273 (Austria); King, 1878: 282; King, 1881: 366 (Spain); King, 1878: 278-279 
(Holland); King, 1878: 283; King, 1881: 369 (Denmark); King, 1878: 284: King, 1881: 435 (Sweden); 
King, 1881: 372-373 (Portugal); King, 1878: 285; King, 1881: 374 (Norway); King, 1881: 375-376 
(Greece); L’Année Maritime, Revue Des Événements Et Répertoire Statistique Annuel, Troisième Année 
1878, 1879: 306-307, 315-317, 332, 335-336, 342, 344-345, 348, 352, 356-357, 363-365. The ships, 
which were under construction in 1878, were not included in the table. In addition, the armoured fleets 
were divided into three categories according to their tonnages and assigned positions: first-class ironclads 
(sea-going fighting ships), second-class ironclads (lesser tonnage vessels for ordinary service) and coastal 
defence ironclads. For the names of the armoured vessels see appx. 
526 Turkey, Greece and Roumania, War Vessels and Torpedo Boats, Admiralty,  Intelligence Department, 
1891: 12-40; King, 1878: 265; King, 1881: 340; L’Année Maritime, Revue Des Événements Et Répertoire 
Statistique Annuel, Troisième Année 1878, 1879: 348; Langensiepen and Güleryüz, 1995: 133-139; Lyon, 
1979: 389-393.The name of the vessels in the Ottoman Navy in each category can be listed as follows: 
Mesudiye, Nusretiye, Aziziye, Osmaniye, Orhaniye, Mahmudiye, Asar-ı Tevfik (first-class ironclads); 
Feth-i Bülend, Mukaddeme-i Hayr, Avnillah, Muin-i Zafer, Asar-ı Şevket, Necm-i Şevket, İclaliye 
(second-class ironclads); Hıfzurrahman, Hizber, Feth-i İslam, Semendire and Böğürtlen (coastal defence 
ironclads). As mentioned in Chapter 4, the number of personnel assigned to warships, the Imperial Naval 
Arsenal and the naval industry corps was 15188 in 1870 (BOA, İ.DH, 626-43544). According to same 
document, the number of personnel in the same locations would reach 17390 in 1871. As we could not 
find an equally accurate document regarding the number of personnel at the end of the reign of Sultan 
Abdülaziz, we refer 18159, which was indicated as the total number of naval personnel including officers 
in the Ottoman Navy in 1875 by Panzac, 2009: 342. 
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As confirmed by the data, British maintained her preponderance as the most 
advanced naval power in the world527 as no other navy had a force of armoured vessels 
in commission near the size of Royal Navy’s. The Ottoman Navy contunied to be the 
third naval power of Europe in terms of tonnage and Russian Navy ranked fourth in 
importance, even though the numbers and total tonnage displacements of the armoured 
ships were higher the Ottoman Empire. The primary reason for this can be explained 
with the quality of the vessels as the Peter the Great and the Knaz Minin were regarded 
as the only sea-going armoured ships complied with the standard fighting efficiency of 
1870s in the Russian Navy, making the fleet numerous rather than powerful except for 
coast defence.528 When the Ottoman armoured navy were passivated based upon the 
negative influence of the Great Eastern Crisis, the position of the fleet in the ranking of 
European naval powers dropped to sixth place under Britain, France, Italy, Germany 
and Russia respectively in 1881.529 
 
The Cost of Naval Modernization 
 
Although the comprehensive naval modernization carried out during the reign of Sultan 
Abdülaziz provided a technically improved naval fleet, it placed a huge burden on the 
naval treasury. The Empire’s finances were not in a good condition, especially after the 
Crimean War, as the extraordinary expenditures of the war had brought an additional 
burden of 11,200,000 pounds sterling to the treasury. As it appeared in the state budget 
of 1851-1852, there was a deficit between income and expenses of 519,781 pounds 
                                               
527 In 1881, while the US Navy comprised 20 armoured ships with a total displacement of 53,500 tons, 12 
armoured vessels amounting to 17,946 tons were included in the Brazilian Navy, followed by Chili (3 
ships, total 8220 tons), Peru (2 ships, total 4200 tons) and Argentine (2 ships, total 1200 tons). In the Far 
East, Japanese Navy came into prominence with a force of 5 armoured ships amounting to 11,721 tons 
(King, 1881: 435). 
528 King, 1878: 251. 
529 King, 1881: 435. 
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sterling.530 To reduce this, financial constraints were placed on non-military 
expenditures and the first application was the launch of a temporary issue which was 
printed in March 1854 and called ordu kaimesi.531 This temporary issue was valid only 
within the location of the army and would be demonetised at the end of the war. 
However, usage of this money was forbidden by the Meclis-i Tanzimat, apart from in 
the provinces of Silistre, Vidin, Erzurum, Van, and Trabzon and the sanjaks of Sofia, 
Niš, Samakov, Köstendil, Sinop, and Lazistan. Their utilization in non-military areas 
led to claims by mültezims532 who purchased some treasury income in the provinces by 
tender, and then complained about their loss which was due to the divergence in value 
between the lira and the ordu kaimesi. During the war, kaimes were printed four times 
equally reaching 778,409 pounds sterling in total but increasing complaints from the 
provinces caused this practice to be abolished by the Meclis-i Vala on 2 April 1857.533 
 The other common method for the closure of the treasury’s deficit was internal 
borrowing. For this purpose, government bonds, called as esham-ı mümtaze, offering 
10% interest annually, were released in June 1854. Further to this, the Empire 
contracted debt from the brokers of Galata who received credit from financial circles of 
Europe with long-term and low interest opportunities, and lent this money as a short-
term, high interest credit in the country. At that time, while the interest rates were 
generally 3-4%, the brokers charged interest of 12% for loans to the state. The tax 
revenues of Egypt and Western Anatolia were pledged as security in response to the 
                                               
530 Özcan, 1997: 20-21. With the acceptation of the new regulation on Ottoman silver and gold coinage in 
1844, the state abandoned debasements to increase fiscal income until 1922 (Pamuk, 2006: 16). Thus the 
exchange rate of the silver kuruş remained stable until the First World War and 1 pound sterling 
exchanged for 110 kuruş and was equivalent to 1,10 Ottoman golden Lira (Pamuk, 2002: 25). 
531 Issawi, 1980: 361. 
532 Şevket Pamuk, one of the best known Ottoman economic historians, supports these claims. According 
to his research, as a result of printing large amounts of kaime during the war, the nominal value of gold 
liras went down to less than half and one gold lira began to be equivalent to 200-220 piasters in kaime 
(Pamuk, 2006: 18).   
533 Akyıldız, 2007: 12-13. 
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debt but it was not enough to cover the expenses and, therefore, the Ottoman Empire 
was forced to apply for external borrowing for the first time in its entire history.534 
With the support of Britain and France, the first external loan was acquired 
through Palmer and Goldschmid Financial Institutions on 4 August 1854 by putting up 
the tax revenues of Egypt as collateral. This 5,000,000 pounds sterling loan was given 
with a 6% annual interest rate and a maturity date of 33 years. After deductions for 
insurance, commission, and transfer fees, the money credited to the Ottoman Treasury 
was 2,286,285 pounds sterling, less than half of the amount borrowed.535 This first 
external loan was followed by the 1855 loan which was obtained with the financial 
intermediation of the Rothschild Company and the guarantee of Britain and France on 
27 April 1855. The tax income of Izmir and Syria were provided as collateral.536 In 
1858, 5,000,000 pounds sterling was transferred to the treasury after the loan obtained 
from the Dent Palmer and Company in London. Towards the beginning of the 1860s, 
the Empire’s debts reached 15,000,000 pounds sterling and according to the financial 
report prepared by the Lord Hobart and Mr. Foster, the annual amortisation payment 
was 1,578,000 pounds sterling in total.537 
 
The Allocation of the Naval Treasury and Its Distribution 
 
As mentioned in previous chapters, the structuring of the naval administration was 
formed with the purpose of developing the best policy of financial management whilst 
modernizing the naval fleet and personnel. As indicated by archival data, the officers 
commissioned in the various units of the navy were warned many times to avoid 
                                               
534 Akyıldız, 2007: 14-15. 
535 Sağlam, 2007: 8-10. 
536 Anderson, 1964: 54-55; Akyıldız, 2007: 17; Özcan, 1997: 29. 
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unnecessary expenses, and to spend the allocated income in an economical manner. To 
meet these requirements, new units were constituted especially for the management of 
expenditures within the body of the Ministry of Marine and the Imperial Naval Arsenal, 
with the goal of increasing the level of manufacturing, thus bringing to an end the 
dependence on foreign countries. However, administrative, educational, and 
technological modernization led new expenses to be incurred and this situation placed a 
huge burden on the naval treasury. 
In the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz, a great portion spent for the allocation of the 
Ottoman Navy was reserved for technical modernization. Along with this, the salaries 
and provisions of the naval officers and marines, foreign and local workers 
commissioned in the Imperial Naval Arsenal, and the staff and the students of the Naval 
Academy had the biggest portion of the allocation from the available budget. The table 
below shows the allocation of the Naval Treasury between the fiscal years of 1859 and 
1877: 
Table 27. Budget Allocated for the Ottoman Navy between the Fiscal Years of 1859 and 
1877 
Fiscal Year Total Amount of Budget 
 (in kuruş) 
Total Amount of Budget 
(in £) Rumi Gregorian 
1275 1859-1860 98,850,205538 898,638 
1276 1860-1861 57,954,214539 526,856 
1277 1861-1862 71,254,252540 647,765 
1278 1862-1863 122,946,276541 1,117,693 
1279 1863-1864 105,178,679542 956,169 
1280 1864-1865 102,102,817543 928,207 
1281 1865-1866 --- --- 
                                               
538 Foster and Hobart, 1862: 17; Güran, 2003: 51. 
539 Güran, 1989: 72; Güran, 2003: 53. 
540 Güran, 1989: 72; Güran, 2003: 55; Güran, 2014: 339. 
541 Güran, 2003: 57. The amounts for the fiscal years of 1278, 1279, and 1280 were written as 
121,716,540 ; 104,126,770 and 101,082,190 kuruş respectively in House of Commons Parliamentary 
Papers, Statistical Tables relating to Foreign Countries. Complied Chiefly from the Official Returns of 
the Respective Countries, part XI., 1867-1868, 346. 
542 Güran, 2003: 59. 
543 Güran, 2003: 61. 
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Fiscal Year Total Amount of Budget 
 (in kuruş) 
Total Amount of Budget 
(in £) Rumi Gregorian 
1282 1866-1867 75,000,000544 681,818 
1283 1867-1868 75,000,000545 681,818 
1284 1868-1869 83,700,500546 760,913 
1285 1869-1870 107,632,500547 978,477 
1286 1870-1871 88,315,500548 802,868 
1287 1871-1872 82,646,500549 751,331 
1288 1872-1873 80,000,000550 727,272 
1289 1873-1874 125,000,000551 1,136,363 
1290 1874-1875 100,000,000552 909,090 
1291 1875-1876 80,000,000553 727,272 
1292 1876-1877 80,000,000554 727,272 
1293 1877-1878 90,000,000555 818,181 
 
As understood from the table, the allocation of the navy from 1859 to 1877 
reached 14,778,003 pounds sterling and the average amount for expenses per year 
appears as 777,789 pounds sterling. The gradual increase observed in the allocation 
rates from 1861 can be explained with the financial measures taken by the Sultan 
between 1861 and 1863, and the remaining was mainly provided by the loans from 
foreign countries. To understand the distribution of expenses from the allocation 
reserved for the navy, we may refer to a document dated 19 April 1873 that lists all the 




                                               
544 Güran, 2003: 64. 
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Total Amount of 
Allocation for 





Salaries of the All Officers and Scribes 
in the Ministry of Marine 
2,891,808  
 
3,280,165 Allocation for Their Provisions  182,061 
Allocation for the Expenditures of the 








Allocation for Their Provisions 24,470,107 




Salaries of the Officers Commissioned in 
the Factories and other Manufacturing 






Salaries of the Workers Commissioned 
in the Factories and other Manufacturing 





The Prices of Coal for the Machineries in 
the Factories and Steamers and Iron-
Steel to be used for the Construction and 





5 The Prices of Gun, Gunpowder, etc. for 




Salaries of the Staff Commissioned in 
the Naval Academy 
742,212  
1,720,275 
Allocation for Their Provisions 704,145 
Allocation for Their Uniforms 273,918 




Salaries of the Officers Commissioned in 
the Office of Harbourmaster and 






 The Salary of the Harbourmaster Rear 
Admiral Salih Pasha 
26,905 








593,492 Salaries of the Captain and the Crew of 
the Lightship (positioned in Bosphorus) 
38,513 
Miscellaneous Charges and the 




Salaries of the Officers Commissioned in 









Allocation for the Provisions and  
Uniforms of the Crew 
29,931  
94,031 
















Salaries of the Officers Commissioned in 
the Cellars and Storehouses in the 












Salaries of the Officers, Scribes, etc. 
Commissioned in the Imperial 
Dockyards outside of Istanbul 
Salaries and Travel Allowances of the 
Officers, who were sent to foreign 
countries  
Miscellaneous Charges 
13 Allocation Reserved for the Possible 
Repair Works of Ironclads 
4,965,213 4,965,213 
GENERAL TOTAL FOR THE FISCAL YEAR OF 1873 125,000,000 
 
 
 As is seen from the table, 1,136,363 pounds sterling was reserved from the 
state’s budget in the fiscal year of 1873 for the expenses of naval affairs, and the biggest 
portion was allocated for the salaries and provisions for the officers and marines— 
amounting to 496,927 pounds sterling. When this amount was added into the total 
amount of the salaries of other departments, it reaches 818,757 pounds sterling, 
meaning 72% of the total allocation of the naval treasury was spent on the wages and 
provisions of the naval personnel, and approximately 300,000 pounds sterling was 
reserved for the other needs of the navy, such as providing the technical equipment and 
repair and maintenance of ships that constituted the naval fleet. The disproportional 




Figure 7. The Distribution of the Allocation Reserved for the Naval Treasury in the Fiscal 
Year of 1873 
The distribution indicated in Figure 5 above explains the negative impact of the 
remuneration of naval personnel, which resulted in the Ministry having little income left 
to carry out the manufacturing and construction activities in the arsenals, or to pay the 
instalments for purchased vessels and required equipment. In fact, it can be seen from 
the continuation of the same document that the Ministry had to apply for an exceptional 
allocation from the Ministry of Finance, as there was no money available for the needs 
of other departments.557 The fiscal deficit of the naval treasury was calculated as 
416,750 pound sterling for the same year and the rest would be paid from the allocated 
budget of the navy for the following fiscal year. The total amount would be spent for the 
following expenditures: the order placed for the guns and rigging of Mukaddeme-i Hayr 
(£20,000); the cost of five armoured gunboats to be ordered from London (£275,000); 
the cost of five armoured gunboats to be built in the Imperial Naval Arsenal (£225,000); 
the expenditures of the construction of a new frigate (£300,000); expenses made for the 
                                               













Expenses on Coal, Iron and Steel 
Workforce of the Imperial Naval Arsenal
Other Expenses
Expenses on Ammuniton
Allocation Reserved for the Repair of 
Ironclads
Ministry of Marine 
Naval Academy
Naval Hospital
Office of Harbourmaster and Commercial 
Court
Danotions and Gratuities for Naval 
Soldiers
Expenses of Staff Commissioned in 
Bophorus




new drydock (£22,000); the expenditures made for the ironclads named Asar-ı Tevfik, 
Asar-ı Şevket and Necm-i Şevket (£22,000), and finally the cost of the frigate which was 
being built by the Thames Ironworks Company (£481,000). To meet these exceptional 
and expensive requirements, the state applied for borrowing many times during this 
period, and the Ottoman Empire reached up to 213,000,000 pounds sterling in 
outstanding debt, with its interest payable in a single year at around 12,900,000 pounds 
sterling. The main external and internal debts of the Ottoman Empire can be seen from 
the table below:558 
Table 29. The Amount of Loans between 1862 and 1875 
Date Loan 
Type 
Amount of Debt Creditor Interest 
Rate 
Collateral 




6% Several revenues 




6% Silk duties of Bursa 
and Edirne, olive 
duties of İzmir, 
Balıkesir, Lesbos 
1865 External 6,055,045 pounds 
sterling 
Credit Mobilier de 
Paris and Societe 
General 
6% The copper revenues 
of Ergani and the 
revenues of ağnam 
(sheep) tax 
1869 External 22,426,093 
pounds sterling 
French banks and 
brokers 
6% The taxes of ağnam 
and tithe collected 
from  several 
provinces  
1870 Internal 1,834,862 pounds 
sterling 
Broker Kamentof --- --- 
1871 Internal 275,229 pounds 
sterling 
Broker Wilson --- --- 




6% Tithe tax revenues of 
Egypt 










9% Tax revenues of 
Edirne, Thessaloniki 
and Danube 









6% Tithe tax of Ankara 
and Danube, ağnam 
                                               
558 Pur, 2006: 218-224; Sağlam, 2007: 28; Zorlu 2009: 157.  
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tax of Anatolia. 
1874 Internal 9174 pounds 
sterling 
Broker Ohanis --- --- 
 
When the interest rates and the other expenditures such as insurance, 
commission, and transfer fees were removed from the total, external debt amounted to 
73,494,328 pounds sterling, borrowed between 1862 and 1874, and the money credited 
to the Ottoman Treasury was 44,987,252 pounds sterling—amounting to only about 
6/10ths of the sum borrowed. The percentages of the funds allocated for the military 
expenditures from the Ottoman budget during the second half of the nineteenth century 
were as follows:559 
Table 30. The Percentages of the Funds Allocated For the Military Expenditures 
Unit The Reign of 
Abdülmecid (1841-
1861) 
The Reign of 
Abdülaziz (1862-1876) 
The Reign of 
Abdülhamid II (1877-
1900) 
Nizamiye (Army) 81.11 % 69.49 % 62.4 % 
Tersane-i Amire 12.29 % 17.27 % 7.71 % 
Tophane (Armoury) 2.54 % 10.46 % 8.38 % 
 
As can be seen from Table 30, the funds reserved for the army were reduced and 
the share of the Ottoman Navy was significantly increased during the period of Sultan 
Abdülaziz. However, the reforms performed to modernize the Ottoman Navy started to 
diminish gradually after 1875 as the requisite financial infrastructure, which would 
create new fiscal resources to meet the increasing expenditures, could not be provided. 
As it was no longer possible to borrow from foreign countries, the government was 
forced to contract debt from the moneylenders of Galata undertaken at high interest 
rates. On 6 October 1875, Grand Vizier Mahmud Nedim Pasha announced that half of 
12,900,000 pounds sterling paid up by the government in 1875 upon the suggestion of 
Ignatiyef, the Russian ambassador, would discontinue for five years, and in return stock 
                                               
559 Gürsakal, 2010: 125. 
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shares (esham) would be provided on the basis of 5% interest per annum.560 After this 
decision that diminished the financial reputation of the Ottoman Empire throughout 
Europe, the insolvency of the treasury was announced by the Ottoman government with 
another declaration dated 10 October 1875. In addition, the tax revenues of Egypt, the 
revenues of ağnam (sheep) tax and customs, tobacco, and salt duties were put up as 
collateral for the instalments, whose payments were stopped by the Ottoman 
government for five years.561  
The treasury insolvency not only discredited the reputation of the Ottoman 
Empire, but also damaged the financial situation of European credit institutions and the 
brokers of Galata. Upon these developments, Sultan Abdülaziz was dethroned on 30 
May 1876 as a consequence of efforts undertaken by Midhad Pasha, Hüseyin Avni 
Pasha, Interpreter Rüşdü Efendi, and Hasan Hayrullah Efendi. He was found with his 
wrists cut in Feriye Palace on 4 June 1876. As the exact cause of death was unknown, 
the Court of Yıldız was convened during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II and the case 
was recognized as murder.562 In the same period, the Ottoman Navy, which cost Sultan 
Abdülaziz his reign and his life for the sake of upgrading to meet the contemporary 
European standards, was withdrawn to the Golden Horn and left to decay. 
 
The Rise of Torpedo and the Naval Policy of the Ottoman Empire in the Reign of 
Sultan Abdülhamid II 
The withdrawal of the Ottoman Armoured Navy to the Golden Horn for a period of 
nearly twelve years was a natural result of the Sultan Abdülhamid II’s cautious 
                                               
560 Sağlam, 2007: 35-36. 
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approach towards naval affairs. The great financial depression started with the 
announcement of the treasury insolvency, the dethronement of Sultan Abdülaziz and the 
failure of the Ottoman Empire against Russia during the Great Eastern Crisis 
necessitated immediate measures to be taken and as shown by the Table 30, a restrictive 
policy was followed on the allocations reserved from the treasury for both the army and 
the navy, which were decreased approximately 7% and 10% respectively. However, as 
indicated above, the budget of the navy was insufficient even in the reign of Sultan 
Abdülaziz and the Ministry of Marine had to apply for exceptional allocations for 
several expense items. Accordingly, a further reduction on an already limited budget led 
the naval treasury to be incapable of maintaining the large armoured fleet, which can be 
regarded as the primary reason for the inactivity of the Ottoman Navy in the period 
Sultan Abdülhamid II. In fact, the Naval Council presented a programme of 
maintenance in 1885 including the equipping the guns of the Feth-i Bülend, 
Mukaddeme-i Hayr, Avnillah and Muin-i Zafer; changing the boilers of the Osmaniye, 
Mahmudiye, Orhaniye and Aziziye due to the obsoleteness of the existing ones, which 
reduced the speed from 12 to 8 knots; purchasing two steamers and a certain amount of 
Nordenfeldt guns, all costing approximately 386,940 pounds sterling. The response was 
received through an imperial decree after four years, stating that only 45,454 pounds 
sterling—one eighth of the specified allocation—could be reserved for this programme 
from the state’s budget in 1889. Towards the middle of the 1880s, it was observed that 
rotting was developed to a large extent on some of the ironclads, which even precluded 
them from being repaired. On 9 May 1889, an official memorandum was sent to the 
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Sublime Port and the outdatedness of the armoured fleet of the Ottoman Navy was 
remarked with the following statements:563 
Reforms made to modernize the Ottoman Navy 15 to 20 years ago have lost 
their significance when the recent progress made upon the guns and ammunition 
taken into consideration. The ships constituted the armoured fleet were 
constructed in accordance with the conception and requirements of the previous 
period and the current situation of this fleet is regarded as weak compared to the 
navies of rival states due to the fineness of their armours and insufficiency 
observed on their speeds. For this reason, required measures should be taken 
urgently as in comparison to the innovations made on today’s naval warfare, our 
armoured fleet has been downgraded the level of our transport vessels. 
 
On the other hand, the era of Sultan Abdülhamid II witnessed also the 
emergence of the Ottoman torpedo fleet and the launch of the first Ottoman submarines. 
In parallel with this, 24 torpedo boats were ordered between 1883 and 1886. While five 
of them were constructed in the Imperial Naval Arsenal, the rest was purchased from 
Germany, France and Britain.564 In 1886, the newly developed Nordenfeldt I submarine 
equipped with Whitehead torpedoes was purchased by Greece and upon the information 
regarding a possible attack of the Greek fleet encouraged by Britain, Sultan Abdülhamid 
II declared with an imperial decree that two submarines, which cost 22,000 pounds 
sterling, would be purchased for the Ottoman Navy. Later named Abdülhamid and 
Abdülmecid, the first submarines of the Ottoman Empire were completed in 1887 in 
Istanbul.565 This situation confirms that the naval policy of the Empire in Sultan 
Abdülhamid’s reign was formed within the scope of the constitution of a powerful 
coastal defence fleet, which required a lower budget. However, the requirements of the 
                                               
563 From DMA, MKT, 596-115-116 (9 May 1889) transferred by Batmaz, 2002: 207-208. This official 
memorandum was quoted by Batmaz, 2002: 207-208 and its translation from Turkish to English has been 
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564 Batmaz, 2002: 220. 
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alteration made in the naval policy of the Empire in the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz 
cannot be explained only with the mandatory budget rearrangements.  
Following the invention of self-propelled torpedoes by the British engineer 
Robert Whitehead in 1866, the efficiency of large armoured fleets against fast-moving 
steamers reinforced with torpedoes came under question, particularly after the Ottoman-
Russian War of 1877-1878.566 As the neutralization of the Black Sea had been 
confirmed by the Treaty of Paris in 1856567, the Black Sea was demilitarized under 
international law until 30 October 1870, when the Russian Government unilaterally 
denounced the neutralization clauses of the Treaty on the pretext of the Franco-Prussian 
War of 1870.568 This resulted in the annulment of the articles numbered XI, XIII and 
XIV by the arrival of the London Convention on 13 March 1871. According to this, 
Russia would be permitted to build navies and fortify ports in the Black Sea and the 
Straits could be opened in the time of peace to war ships of friendly and allied powers if 
such a case was considered necessary by the Ottoman Government to carry out the 
terms of the Treaty of Paris, meaning that Russia’s right to maintain a fleet in the Black 
Sea was conceded by the Powers while the Ottoman Empire’s sovereignty rights to 
control over the Straits was extended by leaving the decision of which war ships should 
                                               
566 Sondhaus, 2002b: 177; Briggs, 2002: 447-448; Epstein, 2014: 3. 
567 (Article XI) The Black Sea is neutralized; its Waters and its Ports, thrown open to the Mercantile 
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Emperor of All the Russias, and His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, engage not to establish or to maintain 
upon that Coast any Military-Maritime Arsenal. (Article IV) Their Majesties the Emperor of All the 
Russias and the Sultan having concluded a Convention for the purpose of settling the Force and the 
Number of Light Vessels, necessary for the service of their coasts, which they reserve to themselves to 
maintain in the Black Sea, that Convention is annexed to the present Treaty, and shall have the same 
force and validity as if it formed an integral part thereof. It cannot be either annulled or modified without 
assent of the Powers signing the present Treaty (Oakes and Mowat, 1918: 178).  
568 The Annual Register: A Review of Public Events At Home and Abroad For the Year 1871, 1872: 9-10; 
Mosse, 1961: 166-167; Ünlü, 2002: 30. 
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pass through the Straits entirely to the Sultan.569 Marking the end of the Crimean 
system, the London Convention also referred the changing international circumstances 
for Russia as the same opportunities regarding the Straits were given by the convention 
for all the contracting parties.  
Using the advantage given by the Convention, Russia composed her Black Sea 
fleet of fast merchant steamers reinforced with self-propelled torpedoes, which 
performed a successful campaign against the far superior Ottoman Navy during the 
Great Eastern Crisis. On the night of 25-26 January 1878, the wooden screw gunboat 
İntibah became the first vessel to be sunk by self-propelled torpedoes in a Russian 
attack against the Ottoman port Batum and this was followed by the sinking of two 
more wooden screw gunboats, a small monitor and an armoured corvette. Despite being 
doubtlessly inferior to her Turkish opponent, the Russian fleet managed to paralyze the 
Ottoman warships, which were compelled to go on the defensive by the fear of torpedo 
attacks.570 
 The failure of the Ottoman Navy not only discredited the reputation of 
armoured vessels but also proved the inefficiency of the armoured ships in the sight of 
Sultan Abdülhamid II, who considered torpedo boats and later submarines as the 
primary interest of the Ottoman naval policy after 1882. As a result of the experimented 
effectiveness of torpedo after the Russo-Turkish War, a new naval strategy called Jeune 
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École was developed by the Admiral Théophile Aube from the French Navy, 
advocating the deterrent effect of the torpedo boats over expensive armoured battle 
ships. Centring the torpedo as the main element its defensive theory, the arguments 
developed by the young school was widely adopted by the European naval powers. 
Following ten years, a considerable deceleration observed in the construction of 
battleships and the domination of Jeune École reached its peak in 1887, when no 
warship was laid down by any power.571 However, the ecole lost his significance 
depending upon the anti-torpedo boat developments by the end of 1880’s. The use of 
torpedo nets and electric searchlights reduced the destructive effects of torpedo attacks, 
particularly at night and an effective defence was provided with the introduction of 
torpedo boat destroyer in 1893. The nitro-cellulose based smokeless powder enabled 
navies to remove disadvantages arising from the large quantity of smoke produced by 
the gun-powder based charges and the introduction of nickel-steel armour plates 
provided the sufficient protection for battleships against newly invented armour 
piercing chrome steel shells. As a result, torpedo boats were not accepted as a serious 
threat after the developments of naval armament and armour production which turned 
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The adoption of iron was the most influential development that directly changed the 
conditions of naval warfare in the nineteenth century. Being the final element in the 
creation of modern warship, the introduction of armour for the protection of ships 
remarkably affected the political and strategic power of naval forces. 
When Sultan Abdülaziz ascended the throne under the influence of these rapid 
developments, the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire had been assured by the 
European powers under the leadership of Britain by terminating the Russian pressure on 
the Ottoman territories in Balkans after the Treaty of Paris. Even though, this created a 
buffer zone between the Empire and Russia, the Crimean War clearly indicated that the 
entire elimination of the Russian threat became inevitable for the Empire’s future 
existence. Having a keen awareness of this necessity, the first attempts of the Sultan 
show that the strategy he followed in his sixteen year of reign in accordance with this 
purpose was developed within the scope of two primary requirements: the continuation 
of the reform programme carried out in the reigns of Sultan Mahmud II and Sultan 
Abdülmecid, maintaining of the alliance with Britain and France and having a strong 
military power, much stronger than the Empire’s major opponent, so as to be able to 
respond to any kind of attack without need of assistance from a different country. As the 
weakness of the Ottoman Navy against Russia was confirmed two times in the Battle of 
Navarino and the Battle of Sinop, it was believed that a powerful naval fleet reinforced 
with armoured battleships was the main solution to stop the worsening strategic 
condition of the state. As is seen in the last chapter, the success of the Russian Navy 
against the Ottoman squadron anchored at Sinop was reversed by the world’s leading 
naval powers, Britain and France at the Battle of Kinburn. The entire destruction of 
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Russian forts by the armoured batteries of France proved the vulnerability of the 
wooden vessels against iron ships equipped with heavy shell guns, which gave an idea 
to Sultan Abdülaziz that the Russian threat for the Empire could be removed by the 
creation of the Ottoman Armoured Navy, which would reach the same level of the 
navies of Britain and France; the only powers, which managed to lock Russia in the 
north of the Black Sea. For this reason, Battle of Kinburn should be regarded as the 
driving force for the emergence of Ottoman armoured fleet, which included 26 vessels 
at the end of Abdülaziz’s reign.  
In parallel with the Sultan Abdülaziz’s intentions, Russia could not dare to 
confront the Ottoman Navy for a period of over 20 years between the Crimean War and 
the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878. This provided breathing space for the Empire to 
sustain her own existence without experiencing a war threat, thus Sultan Abdülaziz had 
an opportunity to carry out the naval modernization during the 16 years of his reign. For 
this reason, constituting the third largest navy of Europe in a short time can be regarded 
as an achievement of the Ottoman Empire as the Ottoman ironclads was effective 
enough to contain the enemy in the north of Black Sea. 
In reality, however, the failure of the Ottoman armoured fleet first against the 
weakest naval power of Europe, Greece during the Cretan Insurrection and later against 
the outnumbered Russian Black Sea fleet in the Ottoman Russian War of 1877-1878 
clearly indicated that the prospective results could not be achieved in operation on 
account of the problems that arose from deficiencies in naval training. These operational 
failures confirmed that even though the Ottoman Navy seemed more powerful than her 
biggest rivals, a pre-designed and well-organized naval programme could not be 
established during this period. To find the most significant evidence in support of the 
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above verdict, one needs to seek an answer to the question of why the activities 
designated and implemented for the modernization of the Ottoman Navy did not give 
the intended positive results?  
On taking a general look at the naval modernization carried out in this period, 
one can easily see that a systematic and sequential operating cycle as necessitated by a 
logical system could not be established. It was observed that Abdülaziz himself was, in 
a tumult after becoming the Sultan, desperate to prove his authority and power to his 
people, which as he believed, would only be possible with a solid naval system. During 
his travels to Europe in 1867, he had the opportunity of an onsite examination of the 
naval forces of Britain and France. With the intended modernization of the Empire’s 
naval force, the Sultan aimed at restoring the long-absent military power of the Ottoman 
Empire on the land and on the water, and upgrading the political prestige of the Empire 
in the international arena. However, while the main focus was given to increase the 
number of large armoured vessels, the requirement to ensure their efficiency on coastal 
defence was disregarded. Towards the beginning of the 1870s, the Black Sea clauses of 
the Treaty of Paris came under question and the Sublime Porte was acquainted by the 
British Ambassador in 1870, when negations were commenced by Russia to end the 
Crimean system, with the resolve that in the case of a Russian attack against Turkey 
Britain would adopt a neutral attitude.573 This resulted in the London Convention of 
1871, which gave Russia the right to maintain a fleet in the Black Sea. By considering 
the changing political status quo of Russia, a different strategy should have been 
developed to increase the efficiency of naval defence against the Russian Black Sea 
squadron, composed of steamers reinforced with the power of torpedo. Instead of 
                                               




following this plan, building a navy consisting of great tonnage vessels, regardless of 
the capacity of the Imperial Naval Arsenal, the navy did not clear the ground for 
building new vessels; conversely, it actually curbed the Arsenal’s capacity for 
maintenance and repair of already existing vessels. The infrastructure of the Arsenal, far 
from being strengthened, was not compatible with the then-current technological 
advancements. Thereby the government became foreign-dependent for the supply of 
such crucial items of the period, and neither the personnel nor the method of 
maintenance were sufficient for the newly purchased vessels and materials. The 
geopolitical requirements of Britain and France, coupled with the need for applying a 
rather different policy on the water were ignored. Consequently the attempt at creating 
an equally good naval force in comparison to the European naval powers ended in 
failure due to inadequate raw materials and training, as well as production drawbacks. 
The application of a new system copied from Europe to a traditional 
administrative structure, which was not ready to cover all the implementations with its 
administrative staff due to the constant changes implemented in the administration, 
proved a major obstacle to naval modernization. The short tenure in office of the 
presidency of the Ministry and the appointment of officers who had no previous 
experience in naval affairs led existing units to be replaced with new ones, which also 
caused the preparation of new regulations within a short few years, without giving an 
opportunity for the older regulations to be carried out. This situation not only paralyzed 
the functionality of the administrative units, but also failed to provide consistency in the 
financial management of the navy. For this reason, sustainability could not be achieved 
in the field of naval administration during this period, which was arguably one of the 
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most important reasons for the financial crisis that the state faced at the end of the reign 
of Sultan Abdülaziz.  
Depending upon the increasing number of ships and personnel, steep increases 
were observed in the budget allocated for naval affairs in the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz. 
However, as presented in the last chapter, more than 70% of the allocation was spent on 
the salaries and provisions of the naval personnel, which compelled the Ministry of 
Marine to apply for exceptional allocations to carry out manufacturing and construction 
activities in the Imperial arsenals, and also to meet the need of other departments. The 
acceleration of such expenditures led the Empire to apply for internal and external 
borrowing many times between 1862 and 1874, which resulted in the treasury’s 
insolvency and dethronement of Sultan Abdülaziz in 1876. Instead of putting new 
burdens on already strained financial conditions, measures should have been taken to fix 
the finances by narrowing the existing fiscal deficit inherited from the previous periods. 
As revealed by the Ottoman squadron’s failure against Greek blockade-runners during 
the Cretan Insurrection, the focus of the naval modernization should have been 
conducted to improve the quality of naval training as a great portion of the budget 
allocated for the navy was spent on the expenditures of foreign advisors and workers. 
Reserving only 1.37% of the naval budget for the naval education prevented the 
Ministry from achieving the targeted number of officers to be assigned to the warships 
and the Imperial Naval Arsenal, with the result that dependency on the West continued 
until the end of this period. As confirmed by Chapter One, the foreign policy of Britain 
towards the Eastern Question had an inconsistent tendency from the beginning of the 
nineteenth century and it was predictable that the Ottomans’ alliance with Britain and 
France after the Crimean War would not last forever after the London Convention of 
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1871. For this reason, a defensive naval policy should have been developed by 
increasing the number and the quality of light tonnage-fast moving coastal defence 
vessels, which would cost far less than heavy tonnage armoured ships and allow the 
Ministry to reserve a higher budget for the training of naval personnel. 
With the acceleration observed in the activities to enlarge the naval fleet, the 
need for a qualified personnel emerged as an important issue to be addressed from the 
early years of Sultan Abdülaziz’s reign. Particularly after the establishment of the Naval 
Reforms Commission, the efforts to adapt the training methods implemented by the 
Royal Navy led to constant changes being made, especially to the length of training and 
the Naval Academy’s curriculum. Instead of carrying out the same theoretical course 
programmes in the preparatory and higher naval education, naval cadets should have 
been sent to a seagoing training ship after the successful completion of the Naval High 
School. This would have avoided the problems arising from the excessively advanced 
and ever-repeating nature of the naval education, which often caused prolongation of 
study, increases in the drop-out rate, decreases in the number of students successfully 
completing the programme, and other related performance issues such as disinterest. As 
is confirmed by Nutku’s observations, the plan envisaged in the new regulations of the 
practical training carried out on board Hüdavendigar and Muhbir-i Sürur was far from 
being practicable when the period of cruising and the expenditures are taken into 
consideration. Indeed, it was thought preferable to focus on a new course programme, 
which would provide students more experience on seamanship rather than determining a 
new routing that included expensive trips. The new system had more important 
problems, such as the failure to produce the desired number of graduate students and the 
continuing reliance on Britain to meet the need for qualified instructors. Therefore it can 
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be said that the best method for ensuring practical and theoretical education remained 
uncertain and undecided during this period.   
As is seen, the inconsistency in naval development characterized by the 
advancements in warship design, armour production and naval armament led the 
Ottoman Sultans to develop different naval strategies for short periods in the second 
half of the nineteenth century. With the launch of Gloire, a considerable increase was 
observed in the number of armoured vessels in Europe’s leading navies and it did not 
take long for the Ottoman Empire to join this ironclad race under the influence of the 
impetus given by the destructive effect of heavily built sea-going vessels reinforced 
with the explosive shells. However, the failure of the Ottoman ironclads against Russian 
torpedo boats during the naval operations of the Great Eastern Crisis led naval powers 
to focus on the deterrent force of torpedo, which caused a decrease in the number of 
newly built armoured vessels. In parallel with these developments, Abdülaziz’s 
successor Sultan Abdülhamid II followed a different naval policy by using the allocated 
budget to constitute a smaller fleet, composed of torpedo boats and later submarines, 
rather than spending it on the maintenance of Sultan Abdülaziz’s large armoured fleet, 
whose inefficiency was proved two times against Greece and Russia. As a result of this 










APPENDIX I. The Form of Inspection Regarding the General Service of the 
Ottoman Warships (Implemented first by the Royal Navy and translated from 
English to Ottoman Turkish by the Naval Reforms Commission for the Ottoman 















































The Form of Inspection in transliteration  
 
 
FORM OF INSPECTION  
REGARDING THE GENERAL SERVICE OF THE OTTOMAN WARSHIPS 
 
Name of the Ship: 
By whom now inspected:                                                        
Where the Inspection Takes Place: 
When The Ship Was Equipped: 
 




1 Name of the Captain and date of his appointment? 
2 Station where the ship is commissioned. 
3 Five Times Prayer- If regularly performed, and by whom? 
4 Smoking- If regulations have been attended to? 
5 If the subordinate officers have been instructed at the gun, cutlass drill and 
musket? 
6 Ship’s log and other books to be examined and their state. 
 
7 
Petty officers, Seamen and Boys- Strict inquiry is to be made whether they 
have been properly rated with reference to their age, ability and fitness for 
their duties, and especially if the Boys have been exercised aloft, and been 
properly instructed in their various duties as Seamen.  
8 What system is followed to instruct the Ordinary Seamen to prepare them for 
better Ratings?  





Defaulter’s Books for Seamen and Riflemen to be examined and reported on, 
relative to the description and duration of summary punishments; and 
whether all those inflicted have been recorded. Report also as to Record of 
Conduct Book; and whether the characters of the Crew have been noted in 
their certificates according to the instructions on that head.  
11 Imam- Whether he performs his duties, and how many persons he has under 
instruction. 
12 Leave on Shore- If it has been permitted to the Ship’s Crew; and the 
regulations have been attended to? 
13 Provisions- Whether there has been, or is, any complaint against them, and 
whether any condemnations have taken place? If so, from what cause? 
14 Wages- If they have been paid at proper periods, and the amount of payment 
deserved when delays have been experienced. 
 
15 
Cases- If there are any under trial on board; what opinion has the Captain 
formed of their merits; and have the reports been regularly transmitted to the 
Ministry of Marine? 
16 Bow and Mastheads- Whether properly fitted; and if the officers of the 
watches are acquainted with the regulations? 




18 Are the Instructions respecting the Clothing of Men complied with? 
19 What are the Captain’s regulations with regard to Inspections of Clothing 
and Bedding? 
20 Of what number of men was the Clothing examined, and was it compared 
with the Officer’s Division List? 
21 Of what number of men did the Inspecting Officer examined the Bedding? 
 
22 
Is the Inspecting Officer satisfied with the personal cleanliness of the Crew, 
and with the condition of their Clothing and Bedding? 
 
23 What time is set apart, periodically, when the service will admit of it, for the 
Ship to make and mend their clothes? 
 
24 
Ship, Armament- Has the Captain any observations to offer in regard to the 
qualities of the Ship, or any recommendations to submit, which it is 
considered would render the Ship in any respect more serviceable and 
efficient? 
25 Places of Confinement- Whether of suitable dimensions and properly 
ventilated, or otherwise? 
26 Filling Live Shells in Action- Has a place been set apart for the purpose. 
27 Watch, Station, Quarter and Fire Bill- Whether the regulations therein 
contained have been attended to? 
28 Paddle-Box Boats- Whether ready and efficient for Service? 
 
29 
Advancement of Seamen-With reference to Questions Nos. 7 and 8. Have 
Quarterly Lists been submitted by the Officers of Divisions to the Captain, 
of Ordinary Seamen of either Class desirous of examination for a better 
Rating. 
30 Good Conduct Badges-Whether correctly awarded? 
31 At General Quarters-Whether the Ship was cleared for action with order and 
rapidity. 
32 How many of her guns (specifying on which deck) are masked by cabins? 
33 If the Stern and Bow Ports are clear and ready for the Guns on each deck? 
34 Date of last; Inspection at Quarters, Shot practice at a target and double 
Shooting, Shell practice. 
35 Do the Officers understand the Gunnery Instructions, and are they properly 
qualified to exercise their men. 
36 Have the men been properly trained to the guns and to fire with precision? 
37 The same as to rapid horizontal fire? 
 
38 
Are all the arrangements proper and judicious: For the Magazines, and for 
action; Boarding and repelling boarders; For the helm, in the event of 
accident to the wheel, tiller or tiller robes; For stoppering , repairing or 
replacing rigging or spars, also for clearing wreck of mast; With pumps, 
hoses, buckets, in case of fire? 
39 Were the Stern and Bow Guns exercised on each deck? 
40 Are the boats properly and efficiently fitted for all services? 
41 Are the established number of Field Pieces on board; and have the men been 
trained to the exercise? 
42 Description of Engines. 
43 By whom made? 
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44 Of what power? 
45 When fitted to the ship? 
46 If they have at any time been defective, or have broken down; if so, when, 
and cause? 
47 Whether now in good order and work satisfactorily, or in any manner 
defective, and if so, from what cause? 
48 When last overhauled and repaired? 
49 If a screw, diameter and pitch? 
50 If paddles, diameter and breadth? 
51 Description of boilers. 
52 When put on board? 
53 Where made? 
54 Their present state? 
55 At what pressure they are worked? 
56 How long they will continue fit for service? 
57 Number of Engineers on board. 
58 Number of Stokers on board. 
59 If the Engineers are attentive to their duty, and efficient? 
    60 What number of troops can the Ship convey for five days and thirty days? 
61 What quantity of Coal can she stow? 




                      Rate per hour              Full Speed                                
                                                         Expansively 
Average                       
                      Distance run with        Full Speed 
                      one ton of Coal           Expansively         
64 Whether the Captain or Chief Engineer has any submission to make with 
reference to the Machinery, or Boilers, to render them more efficient. 
 
General Remarks, with Inspecting Officer’s opinion of the Ship and the state of 
















APPENDIX II. Sanjaks and Kazas Allocated for the Naval Recruitment for the 

















































APPENDIX III. Report Regarding the Alterations on Naval Training in 1875 




















































































































APPENDIX VI. Admiral Hobart and Woods Pashas (The Illustrated London News, 

















APPENDIX VII. The Ministry of Marine and the Imperial Naval Arsenal in the 























APPENDIX VIII. A View of the Imperial Naval Arsenal in the Late Nineteenth 





































































Names of Armoured Vessels Total 







Inflexible, Dreadnought, Thunderer, 
Devastation, Agamemnon, Ajax, Monarch, 
Neptune, Alexandra, Téméraire, Sultan, 
Hercules, Bellerophon, Swiftsure, Triumph, 
Audacious, Invincible, Iron Duke, Penelope, 






Black Prince, Warrior, Hector, 
Valiant, Resistance, Defence, 
Lord Warden, Repulse 
 
 
Glatton, Hotspur, Rupert, Prince Albert, Cyclops, 
Gorgon, Hecate, Hydra, Scorpion, Wivern, Viper, 









Redoutable, Richelieu, Colbert, Trident, 
Friedland, Marengo, Océan, Suffren, Solferino, 
Flandre, Gauloise, Guyenne, Magnanime, 
Provence, Revanche, Savoie, Surveillante, 
Valeureuse, Héroïne, Gloire, Couronne 
 
La Galissonnière, Victorieuse, 
Alma, Armide, Atalante, 
Belliqueuse, Jeanne d’Arc, 




Tonnerre, Bélier, Bouledogue, Cerbère, Tigre, 
Taureau, Onondaga, Arrogante, Implacable, 








Mesudiye, Nusretiye, Aziziye, Osmaniye, 
Orhaniye, Mahmudiye, Asar-ı Tevfik 
 
Feth-i Bülend, Mukaddeme-i 
Hayr, Avnillah, Muin-i Zafer, 













Peter the Great, Knaz Minin, Duke of Edinburg 
 
 
General Admiral, Sevastopol, 
Petrapavlovski, Knaz Pojarski 
Admiral Lazareff, Admiral Greig, Admiral 
Tchitchagoff, Admiral Spiridoff, Pervenetz, Ne-
tron-mena, Kreml, Ouragan, Tiphon, Latnik, 
Lava, Vetchoun, Koldoun, Streletz, Edinorog, 
Bronenosetz, Perm, Smertch, Tcharogeika, 











Names of Armoured Vessels Total 





Kaiser, Deutschland, Sachsen, Preussen, 
Friedrich der Grosse, König Wilhelm, Prinz 













Principe Amadeo, Palestro, Roma, Venezia 
 
Castelfidardo, Messina, San 
Martino, Maria Pia, Ancona, 










Custozza, Lissa, Erzherzog Albrecht, Kaiser, 










Numancia, Vittoria, Saragossa, Arapiles 
 
Mendez Nunez, Sagunto, 
Aragon, Castilla, Navarra 
 
 










Guinea, Buffel, Schorpioen, Stier, Cerberus, 
Bloedhond, Heiligerlee, Krokodil, Tijger, Adder, 
Haai, Hyena, Panter, Wesp, Draak, Matador, 
Luipaard, Rhenus, Isala, Vahalis, No.1 
 
23 
Denmark Danmark, Peder Skram, Odin Gorm, Lindormen, Rolf Krake --- 6 
Sweden --- --- Loke, John Ericsson, Thordoen, Tyrfing and 10 
gunboats 
14 
Portugal Vasco da Gama --- --- 1 
Norway --- --- Thor, Thrudnang, Mjalner, Skarpianen 4 
Greece --- King Georgios, Queen Olga --- 2 
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